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ABSTRACT

This work explores the connections between M iddle English literature and
transitions occurring within the English legal system. It focuses on the way Chaucer
and the Gawain-poet negotiate the tension between the legal potency of the written word
and the spoken word.

As the common law contains an ongoing negotiation between

written and unw ritten forms o f law, the dissertation discusses the function and
significance of the tension between the lex scripta and the lex non scripta. It argues
that the increasing displacement of oral and written language in the legal realm is a
source o f considerable cultural anxiety, and this anxiety is expressed in the works of
literature chosen for discussion.
Entering into the current re-evaluation o f the M iddle Ages, the dissertation
addresses historical, cultural, and literary issues o f contem porary relevance. The first
chapter argues that the Wife o f Bath manipulates hidden texts in a rhetorical strategy
which parodies that of the medieval courtroom, not the pulpit.

Chapter two

demonstrates that the General Prologue’s portrait o f the Sergeant o f the Law points to
the legal profession’s subversive use o f its influence over the formation o f the lex non
scripta in the area o f land law, an influence which facilitated profound social changes,
and subverted the written laws created by parliament. The third chapter presents the
thesis that C haucer’s Pardoner is a textual exhibitionist and his Proloeue and Tale
depict the abuse o f texts, and the fetishization o f texts and writing.

Chapter four

demonstrates that the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale expresses the fear o f an
emptiness in texts, and also questions whether written language has, or can have, any
i i i
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authentic source.

The final chapter argues that S ir Gawain and the Green Knight

challenges the thesis o f the certainty o f the oral oath by deprivileging the determinacy
of oral communication.

iv
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation explores the connections between Middle English literature and
transitions occurring within the English legal system during the late medieval period.
Its central focus is how the legal system ’s relationship to writing is conceived o f and
depicted in Middle English poetry. It explores the way Chaucer and the Gawain-poet
conceive of and describe the tension between the legal potency o f the written word and
that of the spoken word. As the common law contains an ongoing negotiation between
written and unwritten forms of law (which will be referred to in their technical names
as the lex scripta and lex non scripta). the dissertation discusses the manifestations and
significance of this tension in the medieval literary imagination.
Legal questions have particular importance in the latter half o f the fourteenth
century insofar as they are connected with a cultural transition away from the ancient
legal and social system based on oral contracts and customs and towards a culture
which is increasingly dependent upon writing. The opposition between two modes o f
discourse, the oral and the written, is reflected in the interlocking network o f pow er
struggles between classes, sexes, and newly forming professions. Jesse Gellrich has
described the situation created by the intersection o f these two modes o f discourse, the
oral and the written, as one of "displacement." He writes that in this period: "writing
is commonly masked as oral, and just as often spoken language is veiled as inscriptionone channel of language is the guise or disguise o f the other" (x). In my interpretation
o f this situation I see the concept o f mutual "disguise" as deeply problematic in the

1
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legal realm. The document, rather than being seen as a written creation which stands
on its own, open for interpretation, is frequently seen in this period as a signifier of
something else, something which went before it.

I will argue that the increasing

displacement o f oral and written in the legal realm is a source o f cultural anxiety, and
this anxiety is expressed in the works o f literature chosen for discussion.
M .T. Clanchy notes that in the thirteenth century "documents did not
immediately inspire trust" (294); however, texts were simultaneously held in extrem e
veneration and turned into quasi-magical objects.

However, texts used as legal

documents seldom inspired the same trust as those texts created and used for other
purposes. As feudal societies are based on the legal principle o f "the word as bond,"
(to use Douglas Canfield’s term) considerable anxiety is likely to arise in a transitional
period during which members of the society are uncertain o f what exactly constitutes
"the word" that binds them together. The question troubling the medieval com m on law
is whether the written word is as binding, or binding in the same wav as the spoken
word. There is evidence that legal documents inspired a great deal o f anxiety amongst
various strata of society.
Evidence of this anxiety about the increasing and often confusing dependence
upon written legal documents is evident in the Peasants’ Revolt o f 1381 and in the later
deposition of Richard II. These events represent the culminating moments w hen pre
existing tensions led to revolutionary action. Furthermore, from a legal standpoint they
are very significant and complex "trials" o f the bonds of late medieval society.

The

revolt and deposition test the pecking order of English society and force revelations
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about who holds real power, and how it is held by them. These two events are fram ed
in highly legalistic terms by the participants in them , who in both cases prim arily w ish
to establish the nature of their legal rights.

The participants in the Revolt strive to

establish what their customary rights are in relationship to the lords and landowners,
while in the process o f the deposition proceedings both the King and Parliament strive
to determine the balance of power between themselves. The nature o f the lex scripta
(the written statutes) and the lex non scripta (the laws established by the custom o f the
courts), and the balance of power between these two forms o f law are questioned over
the course o f these events.
At his coronation ceremony Richard "swore on the cross to confirm the laws and
customs of the people" (Jones 14). However, what exactly constituted "the laws and
customs" was not easy to determine. For instance, Richard H. Jones notes that in the
coronation ceremony, "especially noteworthy w ere the pains taken to remove any doubt
that the laws which the king swore to confirm were those which had been established
in the reign of Edward the Confessor, not those which had been ordained by the
legislation o f Edward I," and further, an alteration was made to the coronation oath
established in 1308 for Edward II "whereby the king swore to uphold whatever laws
the people might elect for the glory o f God. F o r these phrases there was substituted
in the coronation oath of 1377 an ambiguous reference to the laws o f the church" (Jones
14-15).

From the opening of his reign those supporting and surrounding Richard

intended for him to escape being bound by the laws and customs o f the people;
however, the underlying problem is the uncertainty o f what constituted these laws and
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customs. Were they established by Parliament’s spoken w ord, or by the written laws
it created?

Or, was law established by the decisions o f the judges whom Richard

consulted on his rights and obligations, or by the immemorial usage o f custom filtered
down from the past, or by the word of the King himself? A t the heart o f this confusion
is the common law’s negotiation o f the supposed certainty o f the written law (the lex
scripta). and the flexibility and apparent uncertainty o f the unwritten law based on
custom (the lex non scripta).
An examination of the rebels’ actions during the Revolt o f 1381 exemplifies a
crippling legal confusion. W hile I am in agreement w ith Steven Justice’s thesis that the
general populace did have a degree o f literacy and legal knowledge, Justice ignores the
fact that the rebels’ legal demands and ideology reveal evidence of naivete and
confusion.
exist.

During the Revolt, the rebels often dem anded documents which did not

As in their belief in the legal value of the Domesday Book, the populace

subscribed to a mythic belief in ancient texts and documents which could set them free
from villeinage. Yet, it appears that such documents never existed. The rebels were
attempting to reform society by returning to a previous, lost order o f things; and, I
would argue, rather than being legally astute, the uprising was motivated by nostalgia
for an Edenic past where words held true and justice prevailed. The rebels longed for
a mythic past, "an ‘honest’ England" which predated the legal dependence upon texts
and writing. But, paradoxically, this past could be reconstructed and validated only by
reference to ancient texts and documents o f mythical legal status. In their seizure of,
and demand for, documents the rebels were looking, I propose, for the equivalent of
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what we could call "written oaths." They desired documents which would constitute
evidence of the oral ties which once bound them to their land. They believed that the
original documentary evidence surviving from the oral past offered them legal redress,
when in reality this is extremely unlikely. They saw in their vision o f the past a time
when the oral word was the bond, and the written document only a recording o f what
was spoken, not the bond itself, as it was gradually becoming. That spoken promises
and legal contracts appeared to be two separate and distinct things seems to be at the
heart o f the rebels’ legal anxieties and confusion.
In this dissertation I explore how Chaucer and the Gawain-poet express their
understanding of, and interest in, the legal complexities created by the anxietyprovoking relationship between the unwritten and the written in the medieval common
law. There exists within the Canterbury Tales, I argue, an ongoing negotiation of, and
confrontation with, legal issues, and especially with the relationship between the oral
and the written. Sir Gawain and the Green Knight depicts an interlocking set o f "trials"
in which the bonds of a society are held up to the test. Its plot is predicated on oathmaking and contractual obligations. That the contracts entered into are both oral and
ambiguously indeterminate provokes my interest in this poem, as the w ork in many
ways presents a counterbalance to the questioning of the proper uses o f w riting and
texts which pervades Chaucer’s work. The contrasting attitudes o f these authors toward
oral and written "bonds" reveals a tension which, I believe, was prevelant and
unresolved in their time and culture.
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This dissertation enters into the current re-evaluation of medieval history w hich,
following Foucault’s distinction between ‘total history’ and ‘general history,’ attempts
not to draw "all phenomena around a single centre," but to "deploy the space o f a
dispersion" (10). In other words, it follows a new trend o f examining the com plexities
of medieval society rather than attempting to impose a single, unifying focus upon the
age or its literature.

In the process o f this analysis the dissertation addresses medieval

cultural and literary issues of current academic interest and relevance. The first chapter
argues that in her Prologue the Wife o f Bath manipulates hidden texts in a rhetorical
strategy which parodies the medieval courtroom, not the pulpit.

Chapter two

demonstrates that the General Prologue’s portrait o f the Sergeant o f the Law points to
the legal profession’s subversive use o f its influence over the formation o f the lex non
scripta regarding land law, an influence which facilitated profound social changes, and
subverted the written laws created by parliament. The third chapter presents the thesis
that the Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale depicts the abuse of written language.

The

Pardoner’s performance is seen as a response to the increasing textualization o f
contracts and agreements in the late M iddle Ages.

Chapter four argues that the

Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale expresses the fear o f an emptiness in texts, as
the Yeoman’s performance questions w hether written language has, or can have, an
authentic source.

This attitude aligns with the suspicions about, and resistance to,

codification in the common law, which in theory is based on custom and experience,
not texts or writing. The final chapter argues that Sir Gawain and the Green K night
challenges the thesis of the certainty o f oral oaths by de-privileging the supposed
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determinacy o f oral communication. The interlocking trials o f the spoken word in Sir
Gawain ultimately reveal that there is no ideal, oral, legal past to which society can
strive to return.
The main argument o f this dissertation is that Chaucer and the Gawain-poet are
intensely concerned with the negotiation o f the oral and the written in their poetry, and
this concern reflects and parallels an underlying cultural anxiety about the relationship
between the oral and the written in the English legal system. This w ork focuses on the
similarity between the authors’ poetic concerns and practices and legal anxieties about
the use o f written language in the construction of social bonds.
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CHAPTER ONE
The "Buried" Legal Case of the Wife of Bath’s Prologue

In the Prologue to her Tale the Wife o f Bath argues that according to Saint Paul,
wives have been given authority over their husbands. She summarizes her argum ent
in the following way:
I have the power durynge al my lyf
U pon his propre body, and noght he.
Right thus the Apostel tolde it unto me,
And bad oure housbondes for to love us weel.
Al this sentence me liketh every deel (III.158-162)1
There is some ambiguity in the W ife’s reference to Paul’s words as a "sentence," a
term which in M iddle English has a number o f meanings, including:

"a personal

opinion," "doctrine, authoritative teaching," "a judgement rendered by God, one in
authority, a court," "a punishment imposed by a court," "a statute, law," "a prophecy,"
"the contents o f the Bible," and, "a practice, custom" (M .E .D . P T .S .4.438-441). We
see that the word has both legal and religious denotations. Immediately following the
above-quoted lines, the Pardoner responds to the W ife’s remarks by exclaiming: "Now
dame . . . by God and by Seint John!/ Ye been a noble prechour in this cas" (III. 16465). Like "sentence," the word "cas" has a variety o f meanings, such as: a "state o f
affairs," "an event, incident," "an action, a deed," "an instance o f som ething,
example," "any civil or criminal question contested before a court o f law," "the side
of one party in a trial," or, "an accusation, a charge" (M .E .D . V ol.2.74-76). W hile
a number of the definitions of "cas" are specifically legal, none are religious.
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Interpretations o f the W ife’s Prologue have assumed from the context that only the
religious meanings of "sentence" are relevant and that the Wife is giving a mock
sermon, but it is possible that she is deliberately playing on the disjunction between the
religious and legal meanings o f the term.

The Pardoner refers to the Wife as a

"prechour"; and yet, he conjoins this label with the statement that the W ife is arguing
a "cas."

The "sentence" of the Wife can also be a legal suit or cause, "a question

contested before a court of law," as preachers do not argue "cases," but lawyers do.
The Pardoner’s choice o f words suggests that the Wife may be presenting a legal case
for the listeners’ judgement, and not a sermon for their edification. Thus, I contend,
the Wife of Bath presents in her Prologue not a mock sermon, but a mock legal case
which parodies the rhetoric of the courtroom not the pulpit.
While I agree with Lee Patterson and Charles E. Shain that the Wife is in
control o f her rhetoric rather than powerless before it, and does not suffer from what
one critic called "a certain mental blindness" (Wood, Country o f the Stars 174), I differ
about what type of rhetoric she is in control of- Patterson argues that the Wife offers
a sermon ioveux in the Prologue, but he bolsters his argument with some points that
undermine his assessment of her rhetorical strategy. He claims that the W ife "preempts
the very language of accusation" in her "mastery of masculine modes o f argument"
("For the Wyves" 678).

However, does a sermon ioveux embody "the language of

accusation"; or, do Patterson’s words create another disjunction between legal and
religious terminology? And, what could more embody a masculine mode o f argument
than the rhetoric of the courtroom, stemming as it does from the agonistic tradition of
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the Greeks and Romans? The W ife’s strategy o f turning other people’s words against
them is surely more appropriate to the courtroom than the pulpit.
Like Patterson, Shain is convinced that the W ife’s Prologue results from the fact
that Chaucer, like all o f his contemporaries, "was steeped in the lore o f pulpit rhetoric"
(235). Shain goes so far as to posit that "Chaucer had inevitably to make use o f that
powerful and pervasive instrument o f medieval culture, the sermon" [italics added]
(236). However, the trial, in both the ecclesiastical and secular courts was becoming
another "powerful and pervasive instrument o f medieval culture," and it is inevitable
that Chaucer, having performed the functions o f magistrate and civil servant, would
also have been steeped in this powerful cultural form.
Although the W ife’s Prologue has been assumed to m irror pulpit rhetoric, it can
more logically be seen as mirroring the rhetoric of the courtroom. Furtherm ore, this
interpretation can explain the W ife’s use o f terminology from the legal lexicon which
critics in the "serm onist” camp must ignore.

In their analyses o f her form of

argumentation, Shain and Patterson overlook the disjunctions between the W ife’s use
of legal and theological terminology. The form of the Wife o f Bath’s rhetoric follows
common law practices of presenting a case, and some o f the terminology o f the
Prologue can only be fully understood and appreciated from an examination of
fourteenth-century legal procedure.
Derek Persall has noted that during his lifetime Chaucer saw "the increasing use
of litigation and the increasing sophistication o f legal procedure" (The Life 248). He
concludes, "the law, which had once functioned and been thought o f as a last resort

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

11

when all means of reconciling disputes had failed, was now becoming a first resort"
(The Life 248).

It is possible that the W ife is mocking in her Prologue the newly-

evolving forms of legal procedure and argum entation, and their practitioners.

The

agonism of her discourse may be a comment upon the growing need for disputes to be
settled in the courtroom, as the twelfth-century legal reforms o f Henry II led to the
increasing litigiousness of late medieval England.
Some legal background and definitions are first necessary to facilitate this
discussion. Sir Matthew Hale’s History o f the Common Law serves well to define the
com m on law:
The Laws of England may aptly enough be divided into two kinds,
viz. Lex Scripta. the w ritten Law ; and Lex non Scripta. the unw ritten
Law: For although . . . all the Laws of this Kingdom have some
Monuments or M emorials thereof in Writing, yet all o f them have not
their Original in W riting; for some o f those Laws have obtained their
Force by immemorial Usage o r Custom, and such Laws are properly
call’d Leges non Scriptae. or unw ritten Laws or Customs. (3)
The common law of England is unique in its use o f unwritten law; unlike legal systems
which are derived from the Roman tradition, it is not completely codified. As Henry
Sum ner Maine explains, "the theoretical descent o f Roman jurisprudence from a code,
the theoretical ascription of English law to immemorial unwritten tradition, were the
chief reasons why the development o f their system differed from the development o f
ours" (7). The Leges non Scriptae create an indeterminate quality in the English Law,
as well as an instability, which in its positive aspect is an ability to adapt to changing
social and political circumstances. There is, however, a certain tension created by the
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ambiguous differentiation between the w ritten and unwritten aspects o f the law. M aine
has stated that:
there is no such thing as unw ritten law in the world. English caselaw is
sometimes spoken o f as unwritten, and there are some English theorists who
assure us that if [a] code o f English jurisprudence were prepared, we should be
turning unwritten law into written . . . . As soon as the Courts at W estm inster
Hall began to base their judgements on cases recorded, whether in the year
books or elsewhere, the law which they administered became written law (1213).
Nevertheless, in the Middle Ages the distinction between lex scripta and lex non scripta
remained valid. M .T. Clanchy holds that "one persistent medieval tradition rejected
written law" ("Law and Love" 51). He cites as evidence the statement o f Bracton, the
thirteenth century legal writer, who declares: "law comes from nothing written" (1.19).
The lex non scripta is determined, and decisions made, by examining prior cases
and thereby establishing the "custom o f the courts." A modem legal w riter explains:
The idea o f looking back to prior cases for guidance is as old as our
professional courts..................During the Middle Ages . . . prior cases
were also inspected, but rarely revered. Law was not found in a single
case; rather, a group o f cases illustrated the true law. Law, in this
sense, was the total custom o f the courts. (Kempin 103)
However, it has been established by legal historians that the citation o f cases in
medieval courts took a necessarily vague form. Arthur R. Hogue explains:
In the Middle Ages the courts were unquestionably guided by
traditions and customs built up in the handling of case after case. But
there was not the citation o f cases in the modem fashion. Rather,
citation took the form o f professional memory and ultimately "the only
authority cognizable by the court was the record o f the case" [Allen
189]. But this record, it must be remembered, might be buried under
several hundred pounds o f parchment rolls and consequently be very
difficult to find; to "search the record" was a serious task w hich the
court would not lightly assign to anyone. (190)
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While Percy Winfield disagrees with H ogue’s position and has put forth the argument
that the medieval court records do not present "sufficient evidence o f the practice of
citing cases" (153), C.K . Allen has demonstrated that the courts in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries did make their judgements based upon the citation of, and
precedents set by, case law (183-197). He summarizes:
the foundations o f our case-law do most plaintly exist in these medieval
reports [the Year Books]. Their very raison d ’etre was the instructive
value o f the decided case, or the arguments and pleadings leading to it.
The judges were well aware, even from early times, that their decisions
were shaping the law. (197)
In the early years o f the fourteenth century, for example, a counselor reminds the court
that "the judgem ent to be by you now given will be hereafter an authority in every
quare non admisit in England" (Y ear Book 32 Edward I, Rolls Series, 32). In 1327
Judge Scrope reminds counsel that, "the King has commanded us that we do law and
reason according to that which has been done in like case; wherefore consider whether
there is any case like to this matter" (Y ear Book I Edward III 24, M ich. pi. 21). There
is evidence to be found, as well, to substantiate Hogue’s point that counselors relied on
memory. In the following exchange Judge Stanton challenges counsel to substantiate
his case reference:
Stanton: Where have you seen a guardian vouch on a writ of dower?
Miggeley: Sir, in Trinity term last past, and o f that I vouch the record.
Stanton: If you find it, I will give you my hat.
(Year Book 4 Edward II, Selden Society vi, 168)
Finding the case record, as the judge must well have known, would have been a nearly
impossible task. Thus, the law is being formed in the late Middle Ages by reference
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to past decisions, but the record of these cases remains "buried" in a number of
potentially problematic ways.
Legal records existed in three written forms:

as w rits, plea rolls, and Year

Books. The writs, by which proceedings were instituted, w ere filed in a way which
suggests that "they were always intended to be capable o f being consulted without
difficulty" (Hector, "Reports" 269).

The plea rolls, which Hogue is specifically

referring to above, give a record of all court proceedings case by case; however, they
by no means give a complete record o f each proceeding, as a m odem court record
would. The rolls "entirely ignore everything in the proceedings they record that can
be regarded as abortive or irrelevant" (Hector, "Reports" 268). The Year Books, on
the other hand, are a select compilation o f case proceedings, which can provide
differing information about the cases from the plea rolls. W hile the Year Books were
not "buried" in the literal sense that the plea rolls most probably w ere,2 they were still
a fairly limited source of information about "the record o f the case." Hogue explains
that "the Year Books often present only fragments o f the case as it was argued in court"
(190).
Furtherm ore, the Year Books bring up other aspects o f the "buried" nature of
the case record. First of all, as T .F .T . Plucknett explains, "the Y ear Books were never
published annually like m odem law reports, nor were they ev er published in the year
which they report" (Studies 330). Secondly, the selection o f cases recorded in the Year
Books appears to be profoundly biased. Plucknett notes that there is a:
curious predominance in those books of a very few names—presumably
o f those who were soon to be described as serjeants, and . . . these
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prominent lawyers seemed to conduct practically all the vast litigation o f
the realm . . . . In short, the Year Books seem to be openly partial to
the serjeants. (Studies 336)
Thirdly, the Year Books had a very limited circulation. After the reign o f Edw ard II
manuscripts are quite few in number, and Plucknett surmises that "it is obvious that
they all emanate from one source" (Studies 337). In his study o f the history o f the
legal profession, Plucknett concludes that:
The number o f the later Year Book manuscripts surviving seem s to
suggest that they were only destined for use by a very restricted public
. . . . at present it seems clear that they did not circulate am ong the
profession at large, but were rather a close and intimate m anifestation o f
the work o f the order o f serjeants, being most probably designed for
their especial, perhaps for their exclusive use. (Studies 337)
As the O rder o f Serjeants was always very small in number,3 it must be assum ed that
the Year Books cannot have been an accessible source o f court records for the legal
profession in general.

Thus, despite the publication o f the Year Books, the case

records still remained for all practical purposes "buried" in their piles o f parchm ent
rolls. Despite the amount of documentation available, H ogue’s point seems valid, that
memorization of case records was required o f the professional lawyer.
The "buried" nature o f the case record, the incomprehensibility o f the m edieval
legal vocabulary, and the extrem e formalism of procedure increasingly served to
exclude lay people from direct access to the justice system. G .O . Sayles notes:
It was always open to anyone at any time to plead his own case in court:
he might even disavow his counsel and continue the action himself.
Obviously, as law became more complicated, the services o f an expert
became advisable, if not essential, for many a case was lost through lack
of proper advice, (xxxii)
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Pollock and Maitland describe medieval law as composed of an "intricate mass o f
procedural rules" (229). In W infield’s interpretation o f the case records: "procedure
is so predominant that we wonder at times where the point of substantive law is to be
found in the web o f writ, declaration, counterplea, double plea, and judgement" (155).
Thus, pleading one’s own case in court, while potentially possible, is clearly becoming
an ill-advised course of action.
Winfield claims that a lawyer who was not well versed in procedure and
pleading "would have lost his client’s case a dozen times over before discussion o f the
point o f substantive law in issue were reached" (156). He summarizes that "formalism
in procedure is not a disease o f early law, but is the life-blood o f it" (156).

The

monetary aspects of this situation must have been significant as pleading played a large
part in a medieval lawyer’s business (Allen 185). There are sound business reasons for
the increasing intricacy of the rules o f pleading, as the increasing legal formalism
created and maintained the law yer’s professional monopoly.

Because judges were

recruited exclusively from the bar, there was little reason for the bench to counteract
the tendency towards procedural intricacy and thus go against the interests o f the
profession it inevitably shared with the counselors. This is one o f the ways in which
the practice of recruiting judges from the bar, which is unique to the common law, had
a considerable influence on shaping the English legal system.
Possibly due to its increasing monopoly over the courts, the legal profession
incited suspicion and hostility.

May M cKisack notes, for instance, that during the

Peasants’ Revolt on June 13, 1381, "prisons were opened and in Cheapside a num ber

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

o f lawyers, Flemings and other unpopular persons . . . were summarily beheaded"
(410). The movement toward literacy, which created the written case record and the
mass o f required writs, expanded the role o f the counselors.

Nevertheless, the

unpopularity of the profession may be related to the form o f oral argumentation it uses
and thus to the profession’s alignment with rhetoric, not, as is the most obvious
assumption to be drawn, to its alignment with writing and literacy.
The considerable amount o f legal documentation available from the fourteenth
century gives us an understanding o f the procedural rules followed in the courts. Legal
records from the reigns of Edward II, Edward in , and Richard II are accessible to
m odem scholars in the printed volumes o f the Selden Society and the Ames Foundation.
The information the reports give about fourteenth-century legal practice has, however,
particular strengths and weaknesses. The early reports show patterns of pleading and
argument, say little about rules o f process or substantive law, and give very little idea
o f how trials were actually conducted. Nevertheless, the arguments and pleadings used
are shown "in nearly pure dramatic form" so that it is possible to decipher the system
o f pleading and the patterns of reasoning used (Sutherland 182). The vocabulary used
in the pleadings is difficult for a m odem reader to follow; however, Donald Sutherland
has surmised from his examination o f them that "the logic o f argument in the fourteenth
century was not essentially different from ours" (182).
Legal reasoning, both m odem and medieval, depends upon a balancing of
findings on both the law which applies in a case, and the facts which apply (or can be
proven).

As a result, legal reasoning has always been problematic for logicians.
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Duncan Kennedy describes one o f the logical problems inherent in the conventions of
legal argumentation:
From the great m ass o f facts, the lawyer selects those that he or she
thinks can be cast as "relevant" to one of the preexisting rule formulae
that together compose the corpus juris. Then the lawyer works to recast
both facts and form ula so that the desired outcome will appear compelled
by mere rule application. (184)
A further convention is that "argum ent and counterargument are presented as simply
’correct’ as applied to the general question, without this presentation binding the arguer
in any way on the nested sub-question" (Kennedy 190). Kennedy concludes his
dissection of legal reasoning by asserting:
Legal argument has a certain mechanical quality, once one begins to
identify its characteristic operations. Language seems to be "speaking
the subject," rather than the reverse. It is hard to imagine that an
argument so firmly channelled into bites could reflect the full complexity
either o f the fact situation or the decision-maker’s ethical stance toward
it. It is hard to imagine doing this kind of argument in utter good faith,
that is, to imagine doing it without some cynical strategy in fitting foot
to shoe. (192)
The problem with legal reasoning stems from the fact that it depends upon characteristic
manouvers which often result in the adoption o f logical fallacies. Law yers’ cases tend
to be formulated in an illogical and deceptive manner, as the Wife o f Bath’s case is.
The Wife uses argumentative strategies similar to those used in legal proceedings
in order to make a case about the status o f the wife in the marriage partnership. The
same vagueness of citation necessitated by the "buried" nature o f the case record in the
judicial system is notable in reference to the W ife’s use o f citation in the first part o f
the Prologue.

The case she argues is founded upon doctrine which is proven by

reference to the writings of St. Paul, but typically the Wife cites only one half o f a
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"sentence" and ignores the other. She deliberately leaves the other half "buried" in the
text which contains it. For instance, in lines 158-162, quoted at the opening o f this
chapter, the W ife uses two statements o f Paul as her authority. The first reads, "The
wife has not the power o f her own body, but the husband; and likewise also he hath not
power of his own body, but the wife" (I Cor 7.4). She uses this passage to affirm her
"sentence:"

"I have the power duryinge al my lyf/ Upon his propre body, and noght

he" (III. 158-9), while ignoring the corollary statement.

Similarly, she makes use o f

Paul’s commandment, "Husbands, love your wives" (Eph 5.25), while suppressing the
fact that this "sentence" is embedded in a text which also commands, "Wives, submit
yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord" (Eph 5.22). The W ife exploits
the "buried" nature of the Scriptural case record she cites in an effort to establish her
own laws of marriage—laws which are based upon "custom," not the written "laws" o f
the New Testament.

By doing this she pleads for the an interpretation o f marriage

based on the lex non scripta. rather than the lex scripta o f Paul.

From the point o f

view o f English jurisprudence, this is proper procedure.
The Wife mediates between the written laws of marriage found in the New
Testament and the "customs" o f marriage established by experience.

Just as the

"custom of the courts" is determined by examining the record o f past cases, the W ife
of Bath finds the "custom of marriage" by examining a group o f "cases"--her own five
marriages. We can make an alignment between her use of "experience" and the legal
use of "custom." In common law, "custom" is determined by the study o f past usage;
in other words, custom is derived from the experience of the courts in the application
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of the law.

In the Prologue the W ife creates a common law case for follow ing the

dictates o f custom (her experience) rather than o f written law (the w ritings o f Paul,
Jerome, and other anti-female w riters).
The Wife presents h er argum ent without addressing the counterargum ent,
thereby following another standard practice of legal argumentation. "I quitte hem word
for word" (1.422) she says, proclaim ing that she is presenting one side o f a battle of
words, not dialectically balancing the sides o f a logical argument.

Like a counselor

pleading a case, she engages in a verbal contest which has distinctly w ell-draw n lines
of demarcation. Verbal am m unition, and not fairness, is the prim ary consideration in
the formulation of her argum ent.

As a sermon, the W ife’s speech would be absurd;

however, as an example o f legal reasoning it is quite typical.
The W ife’s use o f Paul involves channelling him into "bites" that autom atically
become rules, which are then presented as simply "correct" as applied to the general
question of a w ife’s authority over her husband. The other halves o f the quotations do
not have to be addressed, as her assertions do not have to be binding on "the nested
sub-questions." The Wife applies her bites of law to her facts, which are taken from
the history o f her marriages, and she thereby proves that her definition o f the custom
of marriage is correct. H ow ever, she recounts the stories o f her marriages so that her
authority over her husbands is proven, as her rule has been cast in such a w ay that her
stories will prove it. Furtherm ore, the facts presented in the narratives are limited to
those that prove her rule. This again is standard practice in legal argum entation.
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W hether or not the Wife is found to be "misquoting" or "misusing" Scripture
depends upon whether one considers her to be using a dialectical strategy o r a rhetorical
one. The agonistic form of trial law , by this period fully established, does not compel
counselors to give a fair and balanced description o f the other side’s position; in fact,
procedure compels them to do the opposite. The lawyer is compelled to discredit the
other side’s case in order to build his own. Lawyers, like all rhetoricians, must play
to an audience, and cannot follow the motive o f fair play. As J. A. Alford states: "To
achieve ’the maistre’, to manipulate other people into believing or behaving according
to one’s own wishes is ’what orators most desire’" ("The Wife" 124).
The W ife is masterful at turning her husbands’ (the opposition’s) w ords against
them.

One instance is found in h er description o f how she argued w ith her "olde

housbondes" that "Oon of us two moste bowen, douteleess,/ And sith a m an is moore
resonable/ Than womman is, ye moste been suffrable (III.440-442). The W ife turns
a rule which comes from m an’s domination of written language (i.e. that m an is more
reasonable than woman) against her husbands through a twist o f oral argumentation.
W ritten language loses its privilege in the W ife’s use o f it.

She demonstrates the

privilege and authority of the oral over the written throughout her Prologue by showing
how treacherous textual "bites" can be in the mouth of a skilled orator.
"The language o f accusation" most directly appears in the Prologue in the long
section containing the "Thou seist" passsages.

At the conclusion of this section the

Wife explains, as if in summary, "Under that colour hadde I many a myrthe" (III.399).
While "colour" contains the general meaning of "a specious reason or argum ent," "a
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pretext" (M .E .D . V .2.395-398), it also refers to a procedure invented in the fourteenth
century.4 This practice is embodied in another M iddle English denotation o f the term:
"a reason or argument advanced by way o f justifying, explaining, or excusing an
action; grounds for an action" (M .E .D . V .2 .395-398). D .W . Sutherland explains the
practice o f "pleading colour":
It is odd that the defendant should have to describe not only his own
claim but also the plaintiffs . . . . But this description of the p lain tiffs
claim by the defendant was the specific elem ent o f "color," and the law
insisted that the defendant include it if he wanted any discussion o f the
parties’ rights in court before the case went to a jury. And if this seems
strange, it is surely much stranger that what the defendant said about the
plaintiffs claim was not true and not expected to be true, but pure sham,
pure fiction. (184)
Sutherland claims that colour was "a product o f the early fourteenth century" that
became the rule by the end of the century (186). Due to the formalistic nature o f the
rules of pleading, it became necessary to ascribe false claims to one’s legal opponents
in order to facilitate judgement and mediation of a case.

These allegations were

inserted into the suits to create a stronger claim, and thus get the case into the
courtroom.
The "Thou seist" passages in the Prologue are clearly instances o f pleading
colour, for not only does the W ife specifically refer to her argumentative strategy as
"colour," she concludes this section o f the poem by saying:
Lordynges, right thus, as ye have understonde,
Baar I stifly myne olde housbondes on honde
That thus they seyden in hir dronkenesse;
And al was fals, but that I took witnesse
On Janekyn, and on my nece also. (III.379-383)
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In this passage the Wife openly admits that she ascribed false arguments to her
husbands, and invented fictional claims to use against them. It seems that in the W ife’s
use of "colour" there is a reference to a developing legal practice, one whose ironies
and, perhaps we could say, moral subversiveness, Chaucer, the m agistrate, could not
have failed to notice.
The inconsistency o f "pleading colour" stems from the agonistic nature of
bureaucratic procedures.

The battles of words and the W ife’s actual physical battle

with her fifth husband described in the Prologue point to the nature o f legal procedure:
fairness is supposedly imposed by a strict set of rules, and yet fairness never extends
to fairness to one’s opponent.

In trial by battle, which is what an oral trial still

essentially remains, the necessity is winning.

The two sides do not co-operate to

discover the truth, nor to agree upon an outcome that is just; they are m erely concerned
with convincing the judge and jurors o f their own particular interpretation o f the law,
the facts, and the way the one should be applied to the other. The law yer’s rhetoric
is inevitably to some degree false, as he or she cannot admit to the possibility o f a
client’s guilt, nor to the truth o f the other side’s argument.
John Manly has pointed out how highly rhetorical the Wife o f B ath’s Prologue
and Tale are.5 In A lford’s view, the rhetorical Wife is the philosophical C lerk’s direct
counterpart; he claims that the conflict between the Wife and the C lerk "is rooted in
the recurrent tension between two modes o f discourse, rhetorical and philosophical"
("The Wife" 109). We see in this opposition a tension between the oral tradition o f
rhetoric and the written tradition o f philosophy. Although Alford does not discuss the
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oral/w ritten dichotomy, the Wife obviously aligns herself throughout the Prologue with
the oral tradition o f rhetoric, in order to use it against the written one o f philosphy.
In Platonic thought the opposition betw een rhetoric and logic/dialectic is
essentially a moral one. As Alford explains:
In contrast to dialectic, whose object is truth, rhetoric is morally
indifferent. Its only guide is self-interest. Its practitioners may side with
the true but they may ju st as easily side with the false—to deceive, to
have the guilty judged innocent, to make the worse cause seem the better
. . . . Their object, in a word, is not truth but power. ("The Wife" 110)
We can see from the example Alford uses to m ake his point the obvious connection
between rhetoric and the legal profession, and by an extension which Alford does not
make, between the Wife o f Bath and the lawyer. The objections to, and anxiety caused
by, the legal profession seem to be related to its professional practice o f undermining
what Douglas Canfield has termed "the chivalric code o f the word as bond."
It is the rhetorical performance o f the law yer which poses a threat to the "word
as bond." Jody Enders explains:
According to rhetorical theory and practice, law had always been a
kind of microcosmic drama that was "staged" at the time o f delivery.
Ever since Plato, the lawmaker was thought to be engaged in a theatrical
enterprise . . . . Eventually, how ever, forensic delivery became so
theatrical that law was more than similar to drama . . . it was a
protodrama characterized by conflict, spectacle, impersonation, staging,
costume, and audience participation. (19-20)
We can only conjecture the dramatic flair with w hich the Wife would have delivered
the rhetorical tour de force o f her Prologue. Perhaps in her oral perform ance we can
see Helene C ixous’ image o f the speaking female:

"She doesn’t ’speak,’ she throws

her trembling body forward; she lets go of herself, she flies; all o f her passes into her
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voice, and it’s with her body that she vitally supports the "logic" o f her speech" (881).
The dramatic rhetoric o f the Wife makes her a dangerous opponent. While Canfield
claim s that it is with "her tongue" that the Wife of Bath "subverts not only Scripture,
. . . but the entire Code" (122), the truly feminine rhetorician, in C ixous’ conception,
"physically materializes what she’s thinking; she signifies it with her body" (881). Like
the theatricality of forsensic delivery, the W ife’s "performance" collapses the border
betw een "masculine" and "feminine" modes o f discourse.
Essentially, for the medievals as for the ancient Greeks, the lawyer is aligned
w ith rhetorical and dramatic speech, not with written language.

It is what lawyers

orally do to texts which causes suspicion and anxiety, just as what the Wife of Bath
does to texts in her narrative arouses suspicions about, and objections to, her.

The

W ife wields rhetorical power over the written word which lies "buried" in her argument
ju st as the case records do in their heaps o f parchment scrolls. It is not easy to "search
the record" in the W ife’s case either; one must have considerable memory o f Scripture
to be able to recall extemporaneously the "buried" halves o f her Scriptural quotations.
In her somewhat illogical and deceptive formulation of a case the Wife of Bath
may embody a covert representation o f cultural anxiety about legal procedures. The
rhetorical practices of the legal profession may have led to its extrem e unpopularity,
as what lawyers orally did to a frequently "buried" case record allowed them to abuse
their powers. It may not have been their function as writers o f documents that caused
lawyers to be targeted by the peasants, but their role as speakers about "hidden"
documents.

It is "hidden writing" and those who have control and mastery over it

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

which poses the greatest threat to the "word as bond," and to the fair trial o f a case in
the courtroom.
By her appropriation o f the lawyer’s rhetoric the Wife poses a serious threat to
the "code." Michael Clanchy has noted that the increased dependance upon litigation
and the increasing sophistication o f legal procedures toward the end o f the medieval
period had the effect of "weakening and straining the bonds o f affection in feudal
lordship" ("Law and Love" 62). The courtroom undermined the code o f the oral oath
as much as any other force at w ork to bring about the demise o f feudal society. As a
"mock lawyer" the Wife is more dangerous to the code than she is as a "resistant
woman" (to use Thomas H ahn’s label for her). In the face o f a grow ing bureaucracy,
the personal, feudal ties o f the oral oath were fast disappearing. The agonistic approach
of trial procedure was antithetical to the idea of personal allegiance contained in feudal
bonds.
The bureaucratic system in place by the fourteenth century was devoid of the
personal attention of the king as arbitrator, and bargaining was increasingly replaced
by hostile litigation. Clanchy explains:
Henry II devised an automated system o f justice emphasizing speed and
decisiveness. The plaintiff obtained a writ in standardized form . . .
instructing a jury to be summoned, the jury gave a verdict o f ’Yes’ or
’N o ,’ and judgem ent and execution then followed. The system stopped
people rambling on about their grievances by compelling them to confine
their statements within prescribed forms . . . . Like Frederick II’s
system, the common law penalized people for making agreements. To
compromise with the defendant was to insult the king, whose aid had
been given to the plaintiff to prosecute a wrongdoer . . . . Henry II’s
automated system o f law made it easier—and more necessary-for
neighbors to sue each other in the king’s court. ("Law and Love" 62)
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In Clanchy’s assessment the standardized nature o f bureaucratic procedure led to
increasing agonism.

The bureaucratic system disintegrated feudal ties and replaced

them with increasingly necessary disputes ("Law and Love" passim).
Carolyn Dinshaw has said, "the W ife is everything the M an o f Law can’t say"
(115). She argues that the Wife is exposing the techniques of the "clerkly glossatores."
"exposing techniques that they would rather keep invisible" (120). Yet, it seems that
the W ife’s rhetorical techniques go far beyond mere glossing. She is herself a product
o f uncertainty; her contradictions and agonism are an embodied depiction o f the new
bureaucratic system itself. As Dame Counselor, the W ife represents the disputational
spirit and contorted logic of the new bureaucratic order o f society.
From an historical perspective there are a number o f significant factors
underlying the W ife’s appropriation o f legal rhetoric and her attitude towards texts and
documents.

She uses texts in a manipulative fashion and also attacks them, tearing

"thre leves" (III.790) out o f one text and causing another to be tossed in the fire
(III.816).

The dependence of the bureaucracy upon documents obviously caused

widespread concern about their proper use and faction, and about the nature o f what
constitutes a "valid" legal document.

Clanchy notes o f the thirteenth century that

"documents did not immediately inspire trust" (From Memory 294). Furthermore, the
forgery of legal documents was rampant in the early Middle Ages, so that many titles
and privileges rested upon the tenuous foundations o f forged charters. Even one o f the
later Year Books is considered to be a forgery (Plucknett, Studies 337).
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Clanchy has demonstrated that "lay literacy grew out o f bureaucracy" (From
Memory 19) and in this sense literacy and bureaucracy worked together to block the
peasants and commons from obtaining the mediating function o f their king as feudal
lord. If the commons were opposed to literacy it was in this context that it appeared
most hostile to their customary rights: law now equalled bureaucracy. Feudal law was
personal and based upon oral oaths w hich required no intermediaries; but, the new
"automated system o f justice" was embodied by a complex bureaucratic system . Justice
was turning into the modem definition o f "law":

"everything to do w ith the

administration of justice in a society, such as the law o r laws, the lawyers, the judges,
and every system, office, and functionary concerned with the enactment, application,
determination, and enforcement of the laws" (Gale 6).
Bruce Lyon explains:
the last two centuries o f medieval England witnessed the elaboration of
the machinery of process and o f the rules o f pleadings and a refinem ent
of legal principles previously established. No longer was the law
dominated and molded by legislation but by a skilled, learned, proud,
and jealous legal profession. (613)
While in the late 1300s, king and parliament are battling for control o f the law , the war
is about to be won by the legal profession.

This profession was instrumental in

bringing about the ascendancy of a bureaucratic system over a feudal one.

The

lawyers’ powers lay in the indeterminacy o f the unwritten rules and custom s which
controlled the application and interpretation o f the written laws.

In the fourteenth

century, the lawyers’ power lay also in the occulted nature of the buried case record.
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The W ife’s argument in the Prologue is ostensibly about the authority o f the
wife over the husband in marriage; however, her "buried" case is about the legal
authority of the lex non scripta over the lex scripta.

This aspect o f the Prologue

reflects the social tensions in the background o f the literary performance. There is, in
fact, a battle going on outside the poem for control o f the law, a battle which will be
won by "a skilled, learned, proud, and jealous legal profession" (Lyon 613) with which
the W ife is subtly aligned through her appropriation o f legal rhetoric. There is also a
"buried" accusation against the misuse o f documents by those in power, including both
king and parliament.

The Wife covertly exposes the contorted logic by which the

courts are making their rulings, bringing up the question o f who is ruling whom, or
what is being ruled by what. Is law ruling or is rhetoric? And what form of law has
precedence, if law indeed is ru lin g -th e written or the unwritten?
The authority of the lex non scripta over the lex scripta forms not only a
backdrop to the W ife’s Prologue, it is her Prologue. The W ife’s fifth husband reads
her a case history of wicked wives, and she quites him by tearing "thre leves" (III.790)
out o f the book and making him "brenne his book" (III.816), an action which echoes
the defiant peasant Margery Starre crying, "Away with the learning o f clerks, away
with it!" (McKisack 417) However, unlike the rebel peasant, the Wife o f Bath asks not
for a new lex scripta. but formulates a lex non scripta.

Her "law" o f marriage is

embodied in an oral argument which quites the written word. She proves through wily
argumentation that wives were given authority over their husbands, and that she had
authority over her own, setting thereby a customary precedent.

Doubtless, her
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argumentation throughout makes the foot fit the shoe; however, the practicioners o f this
type o f rhetoric are now a powerful force in fourteenth century society. Furtherm ore,
the W ife’s Prologue leads to a tale about a legal case, its sentencing, and the
commuting of that sentence, giving further justification for the legal undertones o f the
Prologue.
Chaucer aligns the Wife o f Bath with the practitioners o f a form o f oral
argumentation that uses a particular form o f logic and rule application. In the tension
between lex scripta and lex non scripta. the Wife is on the side of the unw ritten law.
The Wife assumes the power of oral interpretation over the written texts o f Paul, and
sets forth a "cas" which is written dow n in Chaucer’s record as a precedent for future
readers to follow. There is buried in her Prologue an alignment between the hatred
toward lawyers (and their power of interpretation) demonstrated by the peasants’ attack
upon them, and the hatred toward w om en (whose rhetoric is necessarily oral) in w ritten
texts of the period.

The Wife is aligned in her Prologue with interpretation, the

unwritten law, legal rhetoric, and m ost significantly, with the mediation between the
written and the unwritten.
The Wife of Bath reinforces rule by law (a written/oral negotiation) rather than
by oath and sovereignty. She is aligned with the new order of things which will not
be bound by the sovereignty o f the king, but takes the power o f interpretation and
negotiation unto itself. Neither w ritten law nor sovereign oath rule; what now rules is
the professional, bureaucratic negotiation between lex scripta and lex non scripta. The
"buried" legal case of the W ife’s Prologue is that those who are professionally
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assuming the power of legal interpretation are an emerging political force destined to
become "the supreme master, above both king and parliament" (Lyon 625).

ENDNOTES

‘Quotations from The Canterbury Tales are taken from Larry D. Benson, ed.,
The Riverside Chaucer, and will be cited as line references within the text.
2Evidence of the inaccessibility o f the plea rolls can be surmised from the fact
that only a very eminent judge such as Bracton seems to have had access to any
substantial number of them for use in compiling a legal textbook. Hogue explains that:
"Bracton’s use of the plea roils was extraordinary. Other justices may not have been
able to secure custody of royal plea rolls for the purpose of compiling anything
comparable to Bracton’s Note Book, which consisted o f about two thousand cases
selected to illustrate the law at its best. The author of Fleta. writing about forty years
after Bracton, refers to one case; Britton, who wrote an epitome o f Bracton soon after
1290, refers to none; Littleton in his authoritative work on Tenures (ca. 1481?) refers
to eleven cases" (189).
3G. O. Sayles estimates that there were only three or four practicing at any one
time (Select Cases xxx).
4Although "colour" only comes into the common law in the fourteenth century,
it is clearly similar to the use of fictio in Roman jurisprudence. As M aine explains:
"Fictio, in old Roman Law, is properly a term of pleading, and signifies a false
averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse;
such, for example, as an averment that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen when in truth
he was a foreigner. The object o f these "fictiones" was, o f course, to give jurisdiction"
(24-5).
sJohn Manly in "Chaucer and the Rhetoricians" claims that about fifty percent
of the content of the Wife of Bath’s Prologue and Tale consists o f rhetorical devices,
with only the M onk’s Tale and the M anciple’s Tale showing a higher incidence.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Legal Implications of the
General Prologue’s Portrait of the Sergeant of the Lawe

Derek Pearsall writes: "In The Canterbury Tales generally, vows and promises
are made to be broken, once the exchange rate has changed" (The Life 248). These
words take on an interesting resonance with regard to the portrait o f the Sergeant o f the
Law in the General Prologue. In lines that have drawn much critical discussion, the
narrator says o f the Sergeant: "So greet a purchasour was nowhere noon:/ A1 was fee
symple to him in effect;/ His purchasyng myghte nat been infect" (1.318-20).

R .F .

Green has noted the reference made in these lines to a legal procedure for removing
entailments (usually the claims o f heirs) from property ownership. For this strategy
Green uses the label "collusive recovery." G reen’s insight into this issue offers a new
perspective on the Sergeant which I will use to clarify some unresolved questions about
the meaning and implications of the legal terminology Chaucer uses in this portrait.
Edwin A. Greenlaw notes o f the contrast between "purchas" and "rent" in the
portrait of the Friar that, "rent" "always had the sense o f legal income, as contrasted
with ’purchas,’ which generally connotes practices o f doubtful propriety" (144). Pauli
F. Baum agrees that in the F riar’s portrait, "purchas stands for illegal gains and rente
for legal income"; however, he holds that in the Sergeant’s portrait, which occurs a few
lines after the F riar’s:
purchasour. purchasyng have the other and more modem meaning, not
however without the sinister implication. The Man of Law was very
successful in negotiating puchases, and always to his own advantage; his

32
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purchases could not be infect, i.e ., they could not be proved to be other
than legal. (242-3)
There must be something sinister about the method the Sergeant uses in negotiating
purchases, for, I will argue, in the fourteenth century all land was not held in "fee
symple." In order for "Al" to be "fee symple to him in effect" (1.319) the Sergeant
must be practicing a means of disentailing properties. The conveyancing practice called
"collusive recovery" may have led to the sinister meaning o f "purchas"; for, to
purchase land in the fourteenth century was frequently "to contrive, plot," (M .E .D .
P .8.1467) and in the end, to "appropriate (land) to one’s use without legal title"
(M .E.D . P.8.1466).
The word "purchas" also expresses medieval Christian resistance to the
economic freedom o f the individual. P .S . Atiyah explains that in the medieval societies
of W estern Europe:
economic ideas and ethical ideas were closely related . . . . the elem ent
o f freedom was severely constrained by ethical ideas. M en w ere not,
nor were they thought to be, free to do what they chose. Even their
own property-as it came to be thought o f in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries-did not ’belong’ to them. Land, the most im portant
source of property, was not owned, but ’held’ . . . . And if a m an did
not own his property to do what he chose with it, neither did he ow n his
person absolutely. Medieval man was involved, whether he liked it or
not, in an intricate network o f relationships with his fellow men.
(Freedom of Contract 61-2)
In regard to contractual relationships, the medievals held that, "Justice was more
important than freedom o f choice" (Atiyah, Freedom of Contract 62). By introducing
freedom of choice into land law, and altering the "network of relationships" involved
in traditional land tenure, the movement to free land up for inclusion in a com modity
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market led to profound changes in the social structure. By making freedom o f choice
more important that justice, land law broke down the customary ties between m en and
the land, and among men. This social and legal shift, with roots in land conveyancing
practice, must have been greeted with apprehension and unease by those w ith an
understanding of what was going on. It appears from the portrait of the Sergeant that
Chaucer had an insider’s knowledge o f the workings o f the legal system, and the
professional appointments he held would attest to this.
The concept of the free alienability of land was a fairly recent phenomenon in
the fourteeenth century. In the thirteenth century even a tenant in fee simple (the most
unrestricted form of ownership) could not freely alienate his land. Medieval restrictions
upon the alienation of property were the result o f both the imposition of feudalism (after
the reign of Henry II) and ancient English customs which predated feudal ideas. The
customs which originally restricted alienation were based on the belief that a tenant had
no right to sell the inheritance o f his family. Anglo-Saxon custom held that the sale o f
land cheated future heirs, as well as ancestors, out o f what rightfully belonged to them.
Land did not "belong to" the fleeting current owner, but was "held by" him. A fter the
reign o f Henry II, restrictions upon alienation were based primarily on the belief that
the tenant had no right to transfer the obligations he owed to his immediate lord to
another tenant, as the relationship between lord and tenant was based on a personal
covenant. Feudal ideology maintained that alienation broke the bond o f fealty w ith the
lord.

Thus, in both customary and feudal systems of thought, there were ethical

objections to the freedom to alienate real property.

Nevertheless, land was being
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alienated in Chaucer’s time, and even much earlier, by means which undermined this
ideology about landholding as well as more recent legislation regarding alienation.
K .E. Digby explains:
a practice prevailed as early as the reign o f Henry II o f conveyancing
lands by means o f a fictitious o r collusive suit, commenced by
arrangement by the intended alienee against the alienor, and then
compromised with permission o f the court by the defendant making his
peace with the claimant and abandoning his defence. (Real Property
105-6)
Digby places this practice under the rubric o f "the doctrine of fines," which he claims
"was formally one o f the most intricate branches o f the law o f real property" (Real
Property 106).

The "doctrine of fines" (which will be referred to hereafter as the

"collusive recovery") was abolished in 1834 by the Act for the Abolition o f Fines and
Recoveries (3 and 4 W ill. IV, c.74); however, by this time free alienation o f property
had become such an accepted doctrine that the abolition o f the practice was redundant.
The power of "collusive recovery" was that it made the doctrine o f free alienability
seem to be a sanctioned and acceptable practice, even though it was proscribed by both
custom and legislation. Collusive recovery gave the appearance of legitimacy to the
practice of selling land which had been given under the condition that it was not to be
sold. The influence o f the collusive recovery is significant enough for it to deserve
more attention in the history of the common law than it has hitherto received.
The fact that the oath of the fictitious suit "was compromised with permission
of the court" is an aspect of the doctrines o f fines which may have inspired C haucer’s
allusion to the practice.

This was a situation in which the courts o f law were

undermining the value of both oaths and written laws.

This chapter argues that
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C haucer’s portrait o f the Sergeant points to the key culprits behind this compromising
situation: the Order o f Sergeants, who had a subversive relationship to both oral and
written forms of law.

The lex scripta. I argue, is undermined in the area o f land

conveyancing through customs established in the courts (i.e. the lex non scripta): and,
in this area of the law, the courts were controlled by the Sergeants.

In "collusive

recovery" we see a specific example o f the lex non scripta "overwriting" the lex
scripta. the written Statutes created by King and Parliament.
In order to alienate or sell land a seller has to have an unencumbered ownership
o f it, one that gives the right to alienate the property from one’s heirs and/or the heirs
o f the original donor. Unencumbered ownership o f property is referred to as holding
in "fee simple." A great deal of land in the Middle Ages was held in "fee tail," and
thus could not be alienated.

The proliferation of "fee tail" estates generally resulted

from the problems created by male prim ogeniture. This system o f inheritance (in which
all real property goes to the eldest son) was not completely workable due to "the almost
inescapable duty o f fathers to make some sort o f provision for their daughters and
younger sons" (M iller 119). Commonly, a conditional gift o f land was given to these
family members; this gift did not give them the freedom to sell the land (and thus
permanently break up the family holding) for three or four generations. In the interval,
any failure of heirs (often o f a particular type stipulated by the will) meant that the
property would revert to the donor and/or his heirs (Miller 119).

Daughters and

younger sons were apparently unhappy about this restriction on their ownership, and
in the thirteenth century "the common law courts apparently showed some sympathy for
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their endeavours to turn these imperfect gifts at the earliest possible moment into
holdings over which they had free disposition" (M iller 119).
The method by which entailments were escaped from eventually became a
legally sanctioned procedure referred to as the "common recovery."

J.H . Baker

explains the origins o f it:
The basis of the family settlement was still, and w ould always remain,
the entail. Bedevilled as early as Henry V II’s time by an accretion o f
abstruse erudition, the entail in practice represented a compromise
between the interests of the living and the dead: landowners wanted
maximum freedom for themselves with which to lim it the freedom o f
their descendants. The balance between these irreconcilable freedoms
was ever shifting, but well before 1500 the dem and for freedom o f
alienation had achieved a substantial victory over vanity and ancestral
pride, through the use of the fine and the feigned or "common"
recovery. (11.204)
A.W .B. Simpson has noted that an air of mystery surrounds the practice of common
recovery. He relates, "in the first place we do not really know w hen it was evolved,
and in the second place there is no real understanding o f the theoretical justification
which allowed its entrance into the law" (Land Law 130). Sim ilarly, T .F .T . Plucknett
has noted that "if the theory o f the recovery is obscure, its history is even more so"
(Concise History 621).
The first clear indication in the records of the acceptance o f the device which
came to be known as the com m on recovery appears in Taltarum ’s Case in 1472;1
however, there is evidence that the procedure had already been in use for some time,
as Edward I ’s Second Statute o f Westminster attempted to make it more difficult for
people to alienate property held in fee tail.

Chapter one of the Statute "concerning
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lands that are many times given upon condition" is generally referred to as De Donis.R .F. G reen explains the Statute’s intent:
There is no doubt that many tenants in fee tail in the middle ages, as
later, were dissatisfied with their lot, and that a great deal o f legal
ingenuity went into helping them circumvent the wishes o f their
ancestors. De Donis . . . offered those who had been disadvantaged by
the breaking of an entail a legal remedy (known as a w rit o f formedon)
which made the buying or selling o f entailed estates a very much more
risky business. (304)
The conveyancing of property became a "risky business" after the passing o f De Donis
because when property was sold, the seller had to warrant that it was free of any
possible claim. If, after the sale, a claim was made, the buyer could sum m on the seller
(in a process called "vouching to warranty") to answer the claim (thus making the seller
replace the buyer’s role as defendant). If the original seller won, the buyer remained
in possession. But, if he lost, the land went to the new claimant and the buyer would
expect compensation. Thus, both buyer and seller were put at risk if any claims were
made after the sale was transacted.
This same procedure of "vouching to warranty" was used deceptively in the
"collusive recovery" to get around entailments (allowing people to do precisely what
the Statute meant to prevent them from doing). R .F. Green offers the m ost detailed
explanation of how the "switch" in the process o f "vouching to w arranty" was done.
He writes:
a tenant in fee tail would privately agree to a price w ith a purchaser who
would then sue him for ownership; thereupon, the tenant would vouch
to warranty a third party whose interest in the estate was purely
fictional, and who after acknowledging this obligation in court would
request an adjournment and disappear from view. The purchaser would
thus win the case against the vouchee by default and take formal
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possession o f the estate. The advantage of this process for both
purchaser and vendor was that any legitimate heirs disinherited by the
transaction were left w ithout legal grounds for complaint against either
of them. Only the vouchee, as loser o f the case, was liable, and in
theory he was obliged to provide such heirs with an estate o f equal value
to the one they had lost. Since, however, the vouchee was a straw man,
deliberately chosen because, as Plucknett puts it, he had "carefully
refrained from land ownership" the heirs were effectively left without
any legal remedy. (304)
A .W .B Simpson has commented on the questionable ethics involved in this procedure.
He notes that, "the court’s view is that it has done its best, and cannot be blamed if
Brown [the vouchee] is a man o f straw . . . . a blind eye is turned to the fact that the
whole procedure is an obvious fraud, and neither the issue nor the rem ainderm en are
allowed to do anything about it" (Land Law 130).

Why this situation was tacitly

sanctioned by the courts has not been adequately explained by legal historians.

The

procedure involves a subversive use o f the oral oath; furthermore, it turns oath-making
itself into a commodity, as the "third party" was likely compensated fo r his efforts.
The tacit approval of this fiction leads one to question what the "value" o f an oral oath
was in the fourteenth-century courtroom.
The "common recovery" became an officially sanctioned conveyancing practice
by the end of the fifteenth century. From this, R .F. Green proposes that, "collusive
recovery (that is, an under-the-counter version of the same thing) probably goes back
much further" (304).

He points to a case in the Year Book o f 1340 as evidence of

earlier use of the procedure.3 On the dating o f the use o f this procedure H.W .
Elphinstone explains:
it is often said that common recoveries were first made use o f after the
decision in Taltarum ’s case . . . . If it were allowable to make a guess
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on a matter o f such historical importance, I should surm ise that
Taltarum ’s case renders it probable that recoveries with single voucher
were already in use. (287)
Glanvill’s work demonstrates that the practice of conveying lands by m eans o f a
fictitious or collusive suit was in use as early as the reign o f Henry II (Book viii,
ch. 1,2).
Blackstone holds that "com m on recoveries were invented by the ecclesiastics to
elude the statutes of mortmain" (11.357), and Glanvill (Book vii, ch .2) provides
evidence for this conclusion.

As corporations, religious houses purchased land in

mortmain (i.e. in mortua m anu). and this required "a licence o f m ortm ain from the
crown . . . for as the king is the ultimate lord o f every fee, he ought not, unless by his
own consent, to lose his privilege o f escheats and other feodal profits, by the vesting
of lands in tenants that can never be attainted or die" (Blackstone 11.269). T he custom
o f requiring licences of m ortm ain goes back to Saxon times.

Blackstone dates the

custom "above fifty years before the Norman conquest" (11.269). The necessity o f the
licence was acknowleged by the Constitutions of Clarendon (A .D .1164); how ever, as
Blackstone claims:
such were the influence and ingenuity o f the clergy that (notwithstanding
the fundamental principle) we find that the largest and most considerable
dotations [i.e. endowments] of religious houses happened w ithin less than
two centuries after the conquest. And (when a licence could not be
obtained) their contrivance seems to have been this: that, as the
forfeiture for such alienations accrued in the first place to the immediate
lord of the fee, the tenant who meant to alienate first conveyed his lands
to the religious house, and instantly took them back again, to hold as
tenant to the monestary; which kind of instantaneous seisin was probably
held not to occasion any forfeiture: and then, by pretext o f som e other
forfeiture, surrender, or escheat, the society entered into those lands in
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right o f such their newly acquired signiory, as immediate lords o f the
fee. (11.269)
The second of Henry H i’s great charters (A .D .1217, cap 43) attempted to put an end
to this practice.

However, as Blackstone notes, "the aggregate ecclesiastical bodies

(who, Sir Edward Coke observes, in this w ere to be commended, that they ever had o f
their counsel the best learned men that they could get) found many means to creep out
o f this statute" (11.270). O f the later statutes which tried to prevent ecclesiastics from
acquiring property in mortmain without licence, Blackstone comments:
Yet still it was found difficult to set bounds to ecclesiastical ingenuity:
for when they were driven out o f all their former holds, they devised a
new method o f conveyance, by which the lands were granted, not to
themselves directly, but to nominal feoffees to the use o f the religious
houses. (II.271-2)
According to Blackstone, religious houses and their legal counsel devised strategies to
escape bars on free alienation and on corporate ownership o f property in order to allow
the religious houses to acquire freely properties by donation.

Corporate ownership

(mortmain) was also advantageous, if it could be obtained, for it eluded feudal fees,
duties, and possible seizure, as the corporation held "in a dead hand" which could not
be held accountable for the feudal obligations which involved personal perform ance.4
"Collusive recovery" became an essential element in the movement away from
both the customary Anglo-Saxon and the feudal systems o f land ownership and their
"networks of obligations." The free alienation o f property dissolved these obligations,
and the "traffic in land" ultimately dissolved the traditional land-holding structures.
Through the use o f collusive recoveries land came to be treated as "property" to be
freely exchanged. The concept of land as commodity seems to be related to the idea

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42

of the oath itself as a commodity item w hich can be bought or sold in o r outside the
courtroom . "Vouching to w arranty," that is, swearing a legally binding oath, becomes
in the "collusive recovery" a commodity exchange tool. It seems significant that the
oath (which tied feudal and pre-feudal society together) was used subversively in a
procedure whose usefulness was to m m land from a feudal and ancestral "holding" into
a m arket "commodity."
Pearsall has summarized that during Chaucer’s lifetime,

"the unw ritten

allegiances o f feudal society were being written as indentures . . . and the fixed
hierarchies of the past, based on land-tenure and service, were giving way to ’a
complex network of marketable privileges and duties’" (The Life 248).

Once land

moves into the marketplace, the meaning o f ownership changes. That this change was
expedited by a legally subversive strategy, one almost certainly perpetuated by the
Order o f Sergeants, gives a darker tone to the General Prologue’s portrait o f the
Sergeant than is generally seen.

The veiled accusation against the Sergeant in the

portrait runs deeper into the political framework o f fourteenth century England than is
suggested by viewing the portrait merely as an attack upon a particular Sergeant who
was a personal enemy of the author.5 W e also begin to see how "purchas" can mean
two things at the same time: both the legal and illegal acquisition o f property. Legal
and illegal means were essentially the same, as collusive recoveries can be seen as a
sanctioned fraud which cheated rightful heirs out o f their prospects, and in some cases
the lord out of his rightful due. How one felt about the process used in "recoveries"
depended upon whether one was profitting by it, or losing out.

T he "collusive
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recovery" explains why in Middle English "purchas" can m ean to contrive and plot as
well as to buy.
There is a strong suggestion, one could even say a blatant accusation, in the
General Prologue that the Sergeant is a master o f the collusive recovery. If "A1 was
fee symple to him in effect," (1.319) the Sergeant had to have been conveyancing land
through "collusive recovery" actions.

The O rder o f Sergeants was very actively

involved in land law and conveyancing in the fourteenth century.

It is irrelevant to

debate whether the Sergeant is purchasing land for himself o r for his clients (c.f. F.M .
Manly and Jill Mann), as land conveyancing formed a substantial part o f medieval legal
practice, and conveyancing by this time was closely connected with the Order of
Sergeants.Furthermore, wealthy lawyers were

often acquisitive purchasers of land.

Thus, the Sergeant undoubtedly would have both personal and professional interests in
the performance of real estate transactions.
Interpretations o f the Sergeant’s portrait sometimes fail to take the details o f
fourteenth-century legal history into account. F or instance, a lawyer who attempts to
clarify the issues addressed in the Sergeant’s portrait fails to consider the changes which
have occurred over the course of the last six hundred years, and assumes that Chaucer’s
legal system is the same as England’s current one. H. M unro relates:
While there is no reason to dissent from the generally held opinion that
Chaucer was attacking the Serjeant, it is not obvious that there was
anything to attack in buying land, nor is it clear what would be meant
by the suggestion that somehow or other the Sergeant could turn inferior
titles into freehold. This is an exercise as difficult today as it must have
been in Chaucer’s epoch. Further, it is hard to believe that Serjeants
with busy court practices ever did conveyancing.
Probably their
situation was similar in that respect to that o f a m odem Q .C . (1189)
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Contrary to M unro's opinion, 1) there were things "to attack in the buying o f land,"
2) "inferior titles" could be turned into freehold; and, furthermore, 3) the Sergeants not
only did land conveyancing, they had an exclusive right to appear as counsel in all real
estate actions.
In the course o f the fourteenth century a rule was established that only Sergeants
could become judges.

Furthermore, Sergeants became officers o f the Court o f

Common Pleas, and had exclusive right o f audience there (Plucknett, Studies 334).
The Court o f Common Pleas’ jurisdiction covered "the real actions and the actions o f
debt, detinue and covenant" (Potter 62). "Real actions" involved suits which were "the
most lucrative and most important since they were related to real property" (H oldsw orth
I, 198). Even though the actions o f debt, detinue and covenant became obsolete and
eventually moved to other courts whose procedures were more advantageous, real
actions remained throughout the M iddle Ages the exclusive jurisdiction o f the Court o f
Common Pleas (Potter 62). Thus, it turned out that members o f the Order o f Sergeants
were exclusively privileged to appear as counsel and sit on the bench for all land
conveyancing actions.

Therefore, the only group o f lawyers who, ostensibly, could

have been involved in "collusive recoveries" during the later fourteenth century w ere
the Sergeants.6
Although I would give the quote a more ironic cast than I suspect M cKenna
intends, I agree with her paraphrase o f the three lines in question from the Sergeant’s
portrait. She writes:
The Serjeant has knowledge and a high reputation which have brought
him many fees and robes. He is expert in handling problems of land

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45

ownership, a talent then particularly admired, since it involved
complicated and difficult procedures, especially w hen a clear title in fee
simple was so highly prized. (262)
There isnodoubt that "a clear title in fee simple" was "highly prized," as there were
few things as potentially lucrative as the sale o f land and the titles connected to it.
M .D. Lambkin notes:
During the increasing subinfeudation and the eventual disintegration of
the feudal system in the Middle Ages freely alienable land presented
opportunities for trafficking in titles, especially by the king’s officers and
all sorts of legal officials. Repeated statutes from Edward I (statute of
1275) to Henry VIH (statute o f 1540) could not prevent these officials
from stirring up litigation, maintaining others’ suits, and subverting
impartial legal processes in order to share in the proceeds o f land. (823)
It is important to note here that the Sergeants are by this period officers o f the King
(Plucknett, Studies 334), and thus are implicated by Potter in "trafficking in titles."
Edward M iller has noted o f the thirteenth century: "as land began to be looked
upon as an investment, traffic in it became keener, and the creation o f new wealth
brought new classes of men into the investor’s market" (121). One particular group
known forits eagerness to purchase property holdings was the legal profession. The
now notorious Thomas Pynchbek, along with fellow Sergeant H enry G reene, rose from
landless, presumably peasant, origins to found "families which w ould be secure among
the landed gentry for generations" (Eliason 523).
As common law judges were, and still are, recruited exclusively from the bar,
and in the fourteenth century from "a particular branch o f the bar, that is to say, from
the serjeants" (Plucknett, Studies 333), the professional interests o f the judiciary and
the lawyers were essentially the same. The Sergeants were, therefore, doing real estate
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conveyancing as counsel, conveyancing as purchasors themselves, and also sitting in
judgement on any cases involving "real actions." The all-encompassing involvement
o f the Sergeants in land transactions gives a completely new cast to the meaning o f the
word "collusive" in the appellation "collusive recovery."
The fourteenth-century legal system appears all around to have a "collusive"
quality about it, with the Order o f Sergeants at the very heart o f it all.
Plucknett comments:
instincts" (Studies 334).

As T .F .T .

"it rather seems that the serjeants had strong monopolistic
First of all, the sergeants managed to have all real actions

made their exclusive province through the O rder’s connection with the Court of
Common Pleas, thereby cornering the most lucrative and politically important facet of
the legal business.7 Having somehow established this monopoly, the Sergeants found
ways to exploit it by refining the earlier strategies devised by the religious houses to
acquire property. The judges did not, o f course, object to the subversive nature o f the
procedures involved, as they were themselves members of the Order. The judiciary in
the Court o f Common Pleas was unlikely to have opposed practices which were in the
best interests of its ow n elite group. Thus, the collusion in "collusive" recovery is as
much between the bench and the bar as it is between the parties involved in the suit.
That this under-the-counter procedure came to be sanctioned as a standard conveyancing
practice (with actual officers of the court standing in as straw men by the fifteenth
century),8 demonstrates how powerful the Sergeants were at creating a legal system
which worked for their own benefit.
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The Year Books in which legal cases were reported were apparently created for
the exclusive use o f the Order of Sergeants.

T .F .T . Plucknett suggests that there is

something vaguely suspicious about the Sergeants’ control over these legal records. He
comments that "disagreeable suspicions may be aroused when a historical source is too
intimately connected with a small and close professional group" (Studies 337-338).
J.H. Baker notes one particular and important effect o f the connection between the
Sergeants and the Year Books:
the origin of the common recovery has been regarded as a ’great
m ystery,’ mainly because the year-book cases do not draw a distinction
between recoveries and common recoveries. The success o f the device
lay, of course, in the legal impossibility o f making such a distinction: the
validity of the recoveror’s title could not be impugned by anything on
the face of the record. (11.204)
It appears that the records of these cases conceal as much as they reveal about land
conveyances.

"Collusive recoveries" were effectively buried in the Year Books

amongst legitimate recoveries. Thus, a seemingly innocuous and irrelevant fact, that
the Sergeants created the Year Books for their own exclusive use, helps to explain how
a device which greatly affected land law, and had substantial effects upon the entire
social structure, was allowed to continue without comment or opposition, despite its
fraudulent nature and its unfairness to the vast number o f people cheated out o f their
right of inheritance.
The excessive insularity o f the legal profession led to its virtual autonomy over
the creation and dispensation o f the Common Law. G.O. Sayles explains:
Before the middle of the fourteenth century the Bench and the Bar had
joined themselves together in an intimate and inseparable association. .
. No one could become a justice o f the central courts o f law, that is the
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king’s bench and the common bench, unless he had previously been a
serjeant-at-law. The fact we know: but by what m eans it became a
reality is very much a mystery. The reason seems to be that the legal
profession was allowed to look after its own affairs, make its own
decisions, exercise its own discipline, and what it did was set dow n in
its own private and domestic records, (xxvii-xxix)
The collusive nature of the legal profession allowed it to operate pretty much as it
liked, and gave it a monopoly over the creation of legal procedure.

That this power

must have incited resentment almost goes without saying. Within medieval England,
even the system o f legal education benefitted the interests o f the profession. The order
of apprentices "undertook the heavy burden of legal teaching" at the inns o f court
(Plucknett, Studies 338). This meant that the profession was not split, as it was on the
continent, between academics and practicioners (Plucknett, Studies 339). Opposition
to the "practices" of the lawyers was virtually ruled out, as there was no real venue
from which direct opposition to their development o f procedure could come.
It appears, however, that the common people did occasionally and apparently
with some vindictiveness vent their frustration with the legal system upon both lawyers
and judges. Allan Harding relates:
the aims which the chroniclers attribute to W at Tyler [during the Revolt
o f 1381] are evidence o f a general hatred o f lawyers as such. According
to W alsingham, Tyler wanted a commission from the king ’to behead all
lawyers (iuridicos). escheators and others who had been trained in the
law or dealt in the law by reason of their office’ . . . . The Anonimalle
Chronicle takes further the suggestion that the people had their own
vision o f the proper working o f the law: Tyler is said to have put at the
head of his demands at Smithfield, that there should be ’no law but the
law of W inchester and that henceforward there should be no outlawry in
any process o f law .’ (165-166)
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We note that Tyler specifically mentions the com mons’ opposition to "outlawry in any
process of law."

Here the people openly state their indignation with the procedures

created and perpetuated by the O rder o f Sergeants.
The increasing formalism and intricacy o f procedure in the medieval legal
system maintained the lawyers’ monopoly and essentially drew a veil over w hat was
going on in the courts. As legal historians have noted, substantive law (the actual point
of law in question), is virtually impossible to determine from the court records, as it
is deeply buried beneath the complex, formulaic character of the writs and pleadings.
Outlawry in the process o f law perpetuated itself because it was nearly impossible to
determine on the face of the record what precedents (i.e. leges non scriptae) were
actually being set down for the courts to follow.

The "Collusive recovery" (a

fraudulent procedure) became the "common recovery" precisely because it had been
established as a precedent for probably well over a hundred years; we recall, however,
that on the face of the record

collusive recovery did not even exist.

The lawyers

employed their monopoly over the establishment o f procedure to create a "custom"
which subverted the lex scripta. the express will o f King and Parliament in De D onis.
and in the other Statutes forbidding forms o f maintenance (i.e. collusion).

As the

powerful core of the profession, the Order o f Sergeants is the most culpable g ro u p only the assent of the judiciary in the higher courts (the Courts o f King’s Bench and
Common Pleas) could have allowed collusive actions to become engrained in the legal
system.
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Harding notes that it is not certain whether by "the law o f W inchester" Tyler
meant Edward I’s Statute of W inchester or the Domesday Book which "very
occasionally is call’d the book o f W inchester’" (166).

He holds that the form er is

meant, maintaining that the peasants were referring to the "regulations for policing" laid
down in the Statute, not to the "privileged status of villeins on ancient demesne"
attributed to Domesday (166). While I fully agree with Harding that Tyler probably
meant the Statute, the issue of the Domesday Book raises another, possibly volatile
cause o f resentment against the legal profession.

The series o f trials, occurring in

1377, which were based on attempts to establish ancient demesne from the record o f
the Domesday Book were undertaken on the advice of councillors at great expense to
the tenants, despite the flimsy legal value o f the concept o f ancient demesne (Faith 4370).

Virtually all the cases were lost, even when demesne was actually established

from Domesday (Barg 213-37). Thus, it appears that the only ones who profitted from
the G reat Rumour were the councillors and the bureaucracy, both o f whom collected
substantial fees from these court cases.

The professional ethics o f the councillors is

questionable, considering the abject failure o f this legal challenge.
On the other hand, the Domesday trials were resented by the upper classes as
much as they most certainly were, after the fact, by those below.

The House of

Commons, Mary Eliason writes, "protested that the villeins by the help o f the
Domesday Book and conniving lawyers were trying to escape the duties and customs
of villeinage" (517). Commons complained to the King that:
In many parts of England the villeins and tenants o f land in villeinage .
. . have by the advice, procurement, and maintenance and abetting of
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certain persons, for profit taken from the said villeins and tenants,
purchased in the King’s court exemplifications from the Book o f
Domesday, o f the manors and townships wherein they dwell. A nd by
colour of these, and through misunderstanding o f them, by the evil
interpretation o f said counsellors they have withdrawn and are witholding
the customs and services due to their lords, holding that they are fully
discharged of all manner o f services due both from their body and their
holdings . . . . And to maintain these errors and rebellions they have
collected among themselves a great sum o f money, to pay their costs and
expenses. (Rolls of Parliament 1377, iii, 21, reprinted and translated in
D. Hughes 229-30)
It is the councillors themselves who are the most harshly indicted in the above record.
It is claimed that they use "procurement" and "maintenance" (both with collusive legal
implications) to "aid and abet" (i.e. collude with) the peasants. The Rolls indict the
legal profession, not those who are obviously paying dearly for their services.
However, the courts were not at all lenient in their interpretation o f the freedoms
established by ancient demesne. In this case, the councillors may have gone too far in
advocating personal freedom over Justice.

It is unlikely, though, that the peasants

could have afforded the fees of members of the Order of Sergeants. Thus, the failure
of the ancient demesne actions may be due to the fact that the Sergeants (on the bench)
wished to keep the apprentices (at the bar) in their place, which was out o f the area o f
real property law.
On the other hand, over and over again historians o f land law note how
unusually lenient the courts o f medieval England were in favouring the free alienability
of land (see: Miller). This could be interpreted as a socially sympathetic stance on the
courts’ part, as it effectively reduced the power o f the lords and allowed for social
mobility.

It is likely, however, that the courts’ sympathetic leanings toward free
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alienation w ere largely self-serving.

The legal profession wanted land to be freely

alienable because this served its own interests, which w ere, potentially, for its members
to: 1) acquire substantial fees, 2) acquire for themselves large tracts o f land, 3) make
the profession as powerful as the great lords in being able to "grant" property to whom
it chose, and 4) make themselves "lords." In terms o f the last point, it has been noted
that the Sergeant is the most socially prominent m em ber o f the Canterbury group.
Bolton states:

"technically, a serjeant of the law ranked with a knight, but serjeants

were so much more select than knights that Chaucer’s Sergeant is socially the highest
figure among the pilgrims, higher than the Knight or even the Prioress" (403). The
Sergeant is probably also the wealthiest member o f the entourage (see: Manly).
Furtherm ore, voracious purchasers of large tracts of land were also purchasing the titles
connected to them.
There has been a lengthy debate on the appropriateness o f The Man o f Lawe’s
Tale to his profession.

It is my position that Chaucer occludes any significant

discussion o f legal or political issues in The M an of Law e’s Prologue and T ale, and this
may be the best explanation for why the name o f the character changes from a Sergeant
o f the Law (an exclusive label) to the Man o f Law (a rather vague one). Authors who
make a case for the legal significance of the Tale tend to base their conclusions on
broad generalizations about both the legal profession and fourteenth-century legal
procedure.9 The conclusion of Arthur Norman seems the most reasonable. He claims
that the Tale is not concerned with law and that by themselves neither "rhetoric [n]or
rant shows a lawyer at work" (322 n.9). Thomas Lounsbury has surmised that the Man
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of Lawe’s Tale "is the one instance of absolute incongruity found in this work between
the character o f the narrator and that o f the narrative" (436).
What sort of tale to place in the mouth of the Sergeant may have posed a
difficult problem for Chaucer. While the portrait appears to contain a slight directed
at Thomas Pynchbek, Chaucer might not have wanted to extend the attack any further.
An extended indictment of a member of, o r all members of, so small and powerful a
group as the Sergeants, was likely to have been problematic. Chaucer could not do to
the Sergeant (a label which Bolton and Manly claim referred to about twenty people in
Chaucer’s lifetime) what he does to the M erchant (a generic label). Therefore, he puts
aside the character drawn in the portrait and creates a substitute to stand in his place:
the Man of Law, who, as Muriel Bowden comments, "could be any insignificant
lawyer" (165).

Even then, there is evidence in the Prologue o f The Man of Lawe’s

Tale that Chaucer was uncertain about what tale to give the Man o f Law, as he sets up
the expectation that he will speak in prose, but gives him verse instead.

While the

General Prologue portrays the Sergeant as a pow erful and somewhat menacing
character, this menace is veiled in the T ale. The Tale o f Constance is a narrative as
morally upright and unimpeachable as the Sergeant and his conveyancing procedures
seem to be. Like the Sergeant’s conveyances, the story o f Constance "myghte not been
infect" (1.320).
Perhaps Chaucer felt that the General Prologue’s portrait o f the Sergeant says
enough by itself about the O rder o f Sergeants.

John Gower writes a much more

pointed indictment of the Sergeants in the M irour de l’om m e. where he proclaims:
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Et puis apres quant l’apprentis
Un certain temps ara complis,
Dont au pleder soit sufficant,
Lors quiert q ’il ait la coife assis
Dessur le chief, et pur son pris
Le noun voet porter de sergant.
Mais s ’il ad este pardevant
En une chose covoitant,
Des Mill lors serra plus espris;
C ar lors devient si fameillant,
Ne luy souffist un remenant,
Aniz tout devour le paiis. (11.24373-24384)
[And after the apprentice has fulfilled a certain time that is sufficient for
pleading, he wishes to have the coif placed upon his head, and for his
own honor wishes to bear the name o f Sergeant. But if before this time
in one thing he is greedy, now he is a thousand times inflamed; for he
becomes so ravenous that part is not enough for him, he must devour all
the land.]
Gower blatantly accuses the Sergeants o f devouring land. Like Chaucer, Gower makes
a connection between the Order o f Sergeants and the voracious acquisition o f property.
The implications in the direct accusation of Gower and the somewhat veiled one of
Chaucer seem to be tied to abuses of both legal procedure and oral oaths in land
conveyancing practices.

These procedures have far-reaching implications as they

challenge traditional medieval ideas about contract and bargaining. By privileging free
choice over the abstract idea of Justice, these land conveyancing practices promote the
freedom of the individual, and thus oppose traditional medieval social and economic
ideologies. By altering the relationship between men and land to one o f "belonging to"
rather than "holding for," these practices subvert the ethical basis o f medieval economic
thought and the Christian bias against the economic and social freedom of the individual
(represented by the exchange of money in cash transactions).
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The procedure of "collusive recovery" also subverted the ideal o f the "oath": the
personal bond o f agreement which created the crucial network of relationships in feudal
and pre-feudal society. By turning the oath into a commodity exhange tool, "collusive
recovery" stripped oath-making, and thus the personal bond, of its legal and ethical
value. The "recoveries" which led to the free alienation of property were alienating in
another sense as well. "Recoveries" led to the free alienation of oaths, as the spoken
word, vowed before the court, was alienated from the true will o f the speaker, the
fictitious third party who alienated his oath for cash.
The political and legal implications of "collusive recoveries" run far deeper than
might be supposed, for land law was at the heart of the medieval legal system . The
privileges connected with being a landholder were immensely important ones.

Thus,

it is no wonder that the Order o f the Coif managed to make land law its exclusive
domain. That the Order was allowed such a powerful freedom in this area o f the law
is an unusual, and as yet almost unexplored, facet o f English legal history. Like the
religious houses, whose legal ingenuity was the equal o f theirs, the Sergeants had
considerable political influence, and thus a certain amount of immunity.

F rom this

perspective the three seemingly innocuous lines in the portrait, "So greet a purchasour
was nowhere noon:/Al was fee symple to him in effect;/ His purchasying m yghte not
been infect" (1.318-20), take on a more ominious and pointed tone than can be surm ised
without taking the O rder’s monopolistic role in land conveyancing practices into
consideration.
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ENDNOTES

‘Year Book 12 Edw. IV M ich., f.14, pi. 16., f. 19, p i.25, 13 Edw. IV M ich.,
f .l , p l.l. Blackstone claims that the reason Taltarum ’s case was finally allowed to
enscribe openly the common recovery into the case record is that, "Edward IV
observing (in the disputes between the houses o f Y ork and Lancaster) how little effect
attainders for treason had on families, whose estates were protected by the sanctuary
of entails, gave his countenance to the proceeding" (11.117) The procedure was finally
made "law" because Edward felt that estates in fee tail encouraged treason, as they
"were not liable to forfeiture, longer than for the tenant’s life" (11.116).
2A reprint and translation o f the Statute of W estminster II, 13 Edward I, ch.i,
can be found in K.E. Digby, An Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Real
Property. 226-230.
3Year Book Rec. Pub. 14 Edw .III, pl.43.
4For a full discussion of the laws o f mortmain see Sandra Raban, Mortmain
Legislation and the English Church: 1279-1500. Cambridge U .P ., 1982.
sOn the punning reference to Thomas Pynchbeck in the portrait o f the Sergeant
see: F.M . Manly, Some New Light on Chaucer: and W .F. Bolton, "Pinchbeck and the
Chaucer Circle in the Law Reports and Records o f 11-13 Richard II."
6However, as T .F .T . Plucknett notes, "the mysterious order o f apprentices"
must have done a good portion of the work as, "alone [the Serjeants] could never have
conducted the vast amount o f business recorded on the rolls o f the Court o f Common
Pleas" (Studies 335). Plucknett summarizes that, "it would be hazardous to say that an
apprentice . . . could not address the Court o f Common Pleas" (Studies 336).
7How or why the exclusive connection o f the Serjeants with the Court of
Common Pleas came about has not been fully explained or investigated. Plucknett
notes that "it must be admitted that the stages in the history o f the seijeants can hardly
yet be traced in any detail" (Studies 334).
8See: J.H . Baker (II, 204-5).
‘’Those who take this position on the Man o f Law’s Tale include: W alter
Scheps, "Chaucer’s Man of Law and the Tale of Constance"; M arie P. Hamilton, "The
Dramatic Suitability of ’The M an o f Law’s Tale’"; W illiam E. Browne, "Notes on
Chaucer’s Astrology"; Edgar C. Knowlton, "Chaucer’s M an o f Law ”; Paul E.
Beichner, "Chaucer’s Man of Law and Disparitas Cultus": and, Chauncey Wood,
"Chaucer’s Man of Law as Interpreter."
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CHAPTER THREE
Textual Exhibitionism:
The Pardoner’s Affirmation of Text Over Context

O f the two Iawyerly figures in the Canterbury Tales, one, the W ife o f Bath,
persuades us to condone her vice, while the other, the M an of Lawe, cloaks his vice.
The Pardoner, however, throughout his Prologue and T ale, neither persuades us o f the
rightness of what he does, nor hides what he does. Ellen Schauber and Ellen Spolsky
note that despite his blatant confessions of vice, the Pardoner "refuses to justify him self
to his supposed confidants.

H is Prologue is almost entirely free o f the argum ent he

him self leads us to expect" (255). They conclude that this is because he is "a m an too
arrogant to argue when com m on conversational decency requires it" (255). He "sets
him self outside o f the communicative circle" by both boasting and confiding in his
listeners, thereby speaking at cross-purposes. Since "the first [speech act] expects
approval and the second mitigated disproval" (Schauber and Spolsky 251), the Pardoner
succeeds in alienating and confusing his audience.
Entering into the debate over the Pardoner’s rhetorical strategy, Carolyn
Dinshaw claims that the Pardoner’s "documents and bulls, placed conspicuously in his
bulging ‘m ale,’ present an iconographic substitute for his own lacking masculinity"
(164). In her interpretation, the Pardoner’s "pardouns," "bulles," and "patente" stand
in the place o f the Pardoner’s apparently absent genitals.

Dinshaw notes:

"the

Pardoner is, after all, a ‘geldyng o r a mare’; he is identified, that is, in terms o f an
absence o f something" (157). She surmises that "the Pardoner surrounds him self with
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objects—relics; sealed docum ents; even words, regarded as objects—which he substitutes
for his own lacking wholeness" (159). Dinshaw argues that the Pardoner’s "sense of
his own lack informs his social behavior, his interactions with o th ers," and this sense
of lack is related to his "view o f the nature o f language itself," which she sees as
"radically fragmentary" (158).
This chapter argues, in contrast to Dinshaw’s interpretation, that the alienating
arrogance of the Pardoner’s conversational strategies is related to what I will term his
"textual exhibitionism."

The Pardoner exhibits or exposes texts for the same

compulsive reasons that sexual exhibitionists expose themselves.

While the rolled

documents with their dangling seals function as displacements for the Pardoner’s sense
of masculine lack, the seals also specifically mark them as legally potent pieces of
w riting.1 These potent things (the "bulles," a label which can m ean both the seals and
the documents) take the place of other, possibly less potent, things (such as the
Pardoner’s genitals).

This displacement is highlighted by the juxtaposition in the

General Prologue’s description of the Pardoner. The description o f the placement o f
the documents, which are "bifom him in his lappe," is immediately followed by the
description of the Pardoner’s apparent "lack," when the narrator comments, "I trowe
he were a geldyng or a mare" (VI.686-91). The sealed "bulles" are directly juxtaposed
with statement about the Pardoner’s sexual "lack" in order to suggest that the
"pardouns" stand in the place o f the anxiety about masculine potency on the Pardoner’s
person.

I will argue that this sexual anxiety is connected to an anxiety about the

potency o f language in documents.
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The Pardoner has a conversational immunity because his professional privileges
are firmly established by the texts o f the "bulles," "pardouns," and "patentes" which
he conspicuously displays.

These legal documents establish the Pardoner’s right to

solicit alms in spite o f anything he might say about his performance o f his duties. In
the Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale the fictional "oral context" o f the Pardoner’s
performance is juxtaposed with the texts and textual references with which he surrounds
himself. In his defiantly anti-rhetorical "oral" performance the Pardoner affirms the
power o f written texts over oral contexts. His texts are a locus o f displacement for his
own sense of lack and for medieval anxiety about a potential lack in documents and
writing.
Eric Jager explains that for the medievals, "typically speech was associated with
nature, life, spirit, and presence, whereas writing was linked with artifice, death, matter
and absence" (63-4). The Pardoner’s displacment o f sexual anxiety about absence onto
texts is an attempt to deny or supercede the idea o f oral context, which encompasses
the sense o f "nature, life, spirit," and most importantly, "presence."

The focus on

displacement between text and context in The Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale can be
connected to the increasing importance o f written documents, a textualization o f legally
valid agreements, within the common law.
The history of the common law regarding covenant2 expresses the increasing
actualization o f the potency of the written word in contrast to that o f the spoken in the
medieval legal system. A.W .B. Simpson writes that the medieval common law had a
"restrictive attitude to parole agreements" (Law o f Contract 599). He explains:
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In the developed common law the writ [of covenant] could only be
used by a plaintiff who could produce a sealed instrum ent (a "specialty")
to witness the covenant; failure to produce ("make profert") the specialty
had the consequence that the action failed in lim ine. In the thirteenth
and early fourteenth centuries this rule was not clearly settled; indeed as
late as 1346 there must have been some doubt o n the point. This
suggests that originally the action lay on mere parole covenants, and that
a new and restrictive rule was introduced into the law in Edward I’s
reign, or thereabouts.
But I doubt if this would be a justifiable
interpretation, for there never seems to have been a tim e when the royal
courts regularly allowed actions to be taken on parole covenants; indeed
there is a case in the Curia Regis Rolls as early as 1234 where it seems
that an action of covenant failed because the plaintiff had no charter or
chyrograph. (Law o f Contract 10-11)
By the fourteenth century the interiorized word (that of the mutual, spoken oath) had
virtually lost its power to affect a binding agreement between parties. W hile originally
the written deed was regarded as mere evidence of an agreem ent, and the act of
producing it a ‘proof,’ a document eventually became the only legally actionable form
of agreement (Simpson, Law of Contract 15). This meant that the document came to
be seen as the agreement itself.
In earlier Anglo-Saxon and Germanic law the opposite view had been held: a
document merely witnessed an oral agreement. The example of w ills can be used to
illustrate how the idea o f contract became "textualized." A .W .B. Sim pson explains:
Today a properly executed and witnessed will is a clear example of a
dispositive instrument, and the way in which we view the matter is
clearly illustrated by the fact that when we use the w ord "will" we mean
the actual and tangible document, not the wishes it expresses. Thus to
destroy a "will" means to destroy a piece o f paper. Once upon a time
(before writing was essential) a "will" just meant the wishes or desires
of a person; hence a document was not itself a will, but merely proof of
what the testator’s will was. In those days to talk o f destroying a will
would have made no sense except as a reference to brain-washing. (Law
of Contract 15-16)
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In the Preface to W hitelock’s Anglo-Saxon W ills H .D . Hazeltine explains o f these
documents that, "the writings are only the evidence, the documentation, of these gifts;
they are not the gifts themselves" (viii). In Anglo-Saxon England a "will" is an oral
act performed before witnesses and needs no documentation to make it valid. The most
necessary requirement was not written documentation, but that the transaction o f the gift
"be actually heard and seen" (Hazeltine ix).
During the eighth century the written will was still fairly unusual in England.
The textualization of the idea o f a "will" appears to have been "ecclesiastical in origin,"
as:
it was not only developed under clerical influence for the material
benefit of Anglo-Saxon churches and convents, but it was ultimately
brought in a later age within the scope o f the jurisdiction o f ecclesiastical
courts. At least from the beginning of the eighth century onwards
ecclesiastical policy furthered the idea that spoken words were sufficient
for gifts and contracts. Lest, however, spoken words fade from the
memory, declare ecclesiastical draftsmen in the preambles to eighthcentury Anglo-Saxon charters, it is best to have evidence of these words
in writing. To the proof o f oral acts furnished by transactions-witnesses,
which was already a feature of Anglo-Saxon law, there was now the
added evidence of writings; and, so far as one can see, it is this new
species o f proof introduced by the ecclesiastics which helps us more than
perhaps anything else to understand the legal nature and purpose o f the
documents that are now known as Anglo-Saxon ’wills’. (Hazeltine xii)
Again, a strong influence by the church and religious houses on the development o f the
lex non scripta is evident. Through the influence o f the ecclesiastics custom changed
so that the evidentiary document (a text) superceded the oral agreement (a context
which the text originally witnessed). The context, the act o f speaking before witnesses,
dropped out o f the process of will-making; instead, the text became legally potent in
and o f itself, free of a context that was now insignificant.
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In the medieval common law there is an irrevocable m ovement to uphold the
potency of the written, exteriorized word (a will as a text) at the expense o f the spoken,
interiorized word (a will as a spoken desire). The text, which as Eric Jager points out
is "written on dead animal hides" (70), and is essentially skin, or fleshly covering (and
thus fit to represent "death, matter, and absence") takes the place o f the spoken
agreement, whose orality represents "life, spirit, and presence" (Jager 63-4).

Later

anxieties about the use of legal documents are surely linked with this lack o f
"presence," and the sense of an absence or lack in texts. Documents seem to provide
certainty, but, the question becomes, what do they provide certainty of? Legally, the
written word, the document as "will" or "desire," is increasingly divorced from the
voice, the oral expression of will or desire. This displacement o f written text and oral
context is what the Pardoner’s exposes in his performance to the pilgrims.
In the Prologue and Tale, the Pardoner is exhibiting, both verbally and
physically, his charters to the other pilgrims. We are told in the General Prologue that
the Pardoner has a "walet, bifom hym in his lappe,/ Bretful o f pardoun com en from
Rome al hoot" (V I.686-7). This wallet full o f "pardouns" is displayed conspicuously
on his body (in his lap)3 along with other potent symbols (the relics) which dangle
freely from his person. The texts, as symbols o f his potency, must be displayed, as the
Pardoner claims: "I asoille . . . by the auctoritee/ Which that by bulle ygraunted was
to me" (V I.387-8). Over and over in the Prologue and Tale the readers’ attention will
be draw n to texts, as textual display is the theme of the Pardoner’s perform ance Oust
as oral display is the Wife o f Bath’s, and a refusal to display is the M an o f L aw ’s).
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Early on in the Prologue the Pardoner tells the pilgrims that he begins his
normal professional routine by exposing texts to his "lewed" listeners. He relates that
when he arrives in a town:
First I pronounce whennes that I come,
And thanne my bulles shewe I, alle and some.
Oure lige lordes seel on my patente,
That shewe I first, my body to warente,
That no man be so boold, ne preest ne clerk,
Me to destourbe o f Cristes hooly w e rk ." (V I.335-340)
The Pardoner claims that the "shewe-ing" o f his "bulles," and especially o f "Oure lige
lordes seel" on his "patente," serves to "warente" his body.

These lines are

exhibitionistically suggestive. No one, "ne preest ne clerk ," can prevent the Pardoner
from doing his work because o f the symbolic potency o f the "bulled" documents which
he displays as his first rhetorical move. According to clinical psychologists, acts o f
exhibitionism frequently occur "when the man is experiencing a particular threat to his
already weak sense o f masculinity" (Altrocchi 491); so too, in the Pardoner’s case,
exhibitionism is tied to an apparent sense o f threat against his person when he enters
a town.
The Pardoner upholds, exhibits, and flaunts the potency o f the "bulles,"
agreements conspicuously "under seal," to mask the questionable nature o f his own oral
and sexual potency.

His oral impotence reflects the growing impotence not of

documents, but of the spoken word (i.e. o f the oath) in the common law.

Harry

Bailly’s violent response to the Pardoner’s offer o f pardon to the pilgrims represents
their collective frustration at the potency of the texts (the "pardouns," "bulles," and
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"patente"). The validity of these documents should be destroyed by the dissonance
between them and their holder’s will, expressed in his voice, but is not.
Throughout the Prologue and Tale texts are flaunted as the authorization for the
Pardoner’s speech. He opens his address to the pilgrims by conspicuously exposing the
Scriptural text upon which his regular preaching is based.

"My theme is alwey oon,

and evere was," he proclaims, "Radix malorum est Cupiditas" (V I.333-4). This Latin
text then becomes the foundation o f his performance in a new context, his address to
the pilgrims.

He repeats this Scriptural foundation further on in the opening of the

Prologue, saying, "Therefore my theme is yet, and evere w as,/ Radix malorum est
Cupiditas" (VI.425-6). The Latin o f this repeated quotation heightens its conspicuous
textuality. Furtherm ore, the Pardoner’s Prologue is given an epigraph, probably scribal
in origin, which states, "Radix malorum est Cupiditas." This epigraph then directs the
reader’s attention to the textual source: "Ad Thimotheum. 6 ." which suggests that the
epigraphic addition was made by a copyist/comm entator who understood the
significance of "textual underwriting" in the Pardoner’s perform ance.

The epigraph

draws attention to the fact that the Pardoner’s performance is an exhibition o f texts.
Not far into the introduction to the Tale the Pardoner explains: "The hooly writ
take I to my witness" (VI.483-4); and, a few lines later he directs his listeners to texts
again, telling them to remember what "Senec saith" (VI.492). The Pardoner then turns
to the Old Testament text which tells o f "Adam oure fader" (V I.505); and, then shifts
his listeners attention to the text o f Paul in the New Testament.

The Pardoner

emphasizes his textual sources though reiteration, as we see in his repetition o f Paul’s
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name (in both English and Latin, a conspicuously literate move) in the following
passage: "O Paul, wel kanstow trete:/ ’Mete unto wombe, and wombe eek unto m ete,/
Shal God destroyen bothe,’ as Paulus seith" (V I.520-22). The Pardoner then shifts his
audience’s attention back to the Old Testament with the story o f "Sampsoun," and
closes this passage by directing them to the texts, telling them: "Looketh the Bible, and
ther ye may it leere" (V I.578). A few lines later, he repeats this sentiment, saying:
"Redeth the Bible, and fynde it expresly" (V I.586). A bout fifty lines later the Pardoner
reminds the pilgrims that "olde bookes treete" o f false oaths (V I.630), orders them to
"Witnesse on M athew," and then quotes directly from "hooly Jeremye" (V I.634-5).
The actual Tale is concluded with the Pardoner’s notation, "that Avycen/ W root nevere
in no canon, ne in no fen,/ Mo wonder signes of empoisonyng" (V I.889-91).

The

Pardoner not only emphasizes texts over and over again, he also emphasizes the
supposed literacy o f the pilgrims as contrasted to the "lewedness" o f his usual listeners.
The Pardoner appeals to the pilgrim s’ own desire for a relationship with the pow er of
textuality.
Not surprisingly, after all his references to texts, at the conclusion o f his
performance a text is held up as the ultimate source o f pow er for the Pardoner, and for
the other pilgrims as well.

"Myn hooly pardoun may yow alle warice," (V I.906) he

proclaims, exposing his potent charter once again.
hooly bulle!" (V I.909) he orders them.

"Boweth youre heed under this

Then the Pardoner offers to textualize the

pilgrims themselves, telling them if, "Youre names I entre heer in my rolle anon;/ Into
the blisse of hevene shul ye gon" (V I.911-2). In this statement the Pardoner assumes
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for him self the role o f author of the final judgem ent in the pilgrims’ cases, a reference
both to the writing o f names in the "book o f life" (Revelation 3.5, 13.8, 17.8, 21.27,
22.19), and in a secular sense, to a recording o f a legal judgement.

By offerring to

write them into a text, the Pardoner emphasizes to the other pilgrims that his apparent
potency is connected to texts and the ability to write.
W e could say that Pardoner’s oral perform ance has more to do with writing than
with rhetoric.

The Pardoner offers the pilgrim s a written "guarantee," o r personal

contract o f salvation. He claims that by w riting them into a text he will create him self
as a potent pardoner and as a w riter on a level with the author of the "book o f life."
However, this affirmation of his potent status as potential author, a potential which is
never carried any further, is made in the context o f the Pardoner’s defensive and
contradictory acts of exhibition.
The perversity of the Pardoner’s anti-rhetorical technique is expressed in his
charters and other texts, which are exhibited on his body and in the context o f his
rhetoric. W hile it appears to many that the W ife o f Bath is "a voice o f the body," text
and voice are not nearly so divorced in her as in the Pardoner. Perhaps this is why the
two of them are juxtaposed by the Pardoner’s interruption of her speech~to later reveal
how, by contrast, the Wife has interiorized w riting as perhaps only a non-literate can,
while the Pardoner has exteriorized it, as only a literate can. While the W ife recites
texts from memory (i.e. by heart), the Pardoner points his listeners to exteriorized
writing, telling them to go find things in texts. W hile the Wife of Bath absorbs texts
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into her voice, the Pardoner’s voice points outwardly to them. They become fetishized
objects o f displacement within his speech.
The exhibitionistic act can be defined as "an expression o f defiance" (Altrocchi
491). J.F . Rhodes explains:
Like the Wife of Bath, the Pardoner courts the pilgrims by inviting them
to identify with his life o f adventure and to admire him for his
individuality and superiority, his scorn for conventional morality, and his
contempt for established authority. (43)
In his exhibitionistic confessions about his professional practices, the Pardoner defies
the spiritual content and "auctoritee" o f the "bulles."

Yet, in his typically paradoxical

fashion, he also upholds and exhibits these documents to establish his own "auctoritee."
Thus, the Pardoner’s exhibitionism, like his rhetorical strategy, works at cross
purposes.
J.M . Russell describes the exhibitionist as one who makes a marked division
between containers and their contents. He notes:
the masculine perversions, epitomized by the exhibitionist, the flasher,
take some aspect of oneself that the pervert himself regards as liable to
be found repellent, as repulsive, and flaunts this as if daring the other
person, the container, to accept that repelled part o f oneself. The male
pervert has found means to externalize his internal contents, and then
dares the other to accept (or reject) this. (102)
In the Pardoner’s case, the flaunted documents are stand-ins for something in himself
he finds repellent.
both.

This "something" is possibly his sexuality or his spirituality, or

The situation is complicated by the fact that the "bulles" are themselves

containers and have their own "internal contents."

Thus, there is a doubling of

exhibitionistic displacement; the Pardoner projects his own repelled interiority onto the
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texts, but the texts have an interiority which he also finds repellent. The Pardoner, in
a perversely masculine way, tempts the pilgrims to reject both the "bulles" as fleshly
and carnal containers for his repelled sexuality, and also to reject the "bulles"
themselves for their contents, the offer of a spiritual pardon. This suggests that what
the Pardoner considers repellant about himself is both his carnality and his spirituality,
confirming Kittredge’s belief that the Pardoner truly is "a lost soul" (123).
The dissonance between oral context and written texts in the Pardoner’s
performance is a paradigm of the dissonance between interior and exterior language,
or between orality as represented by the Wife o f Bath, and textuality as represented by
the Pardoner and the male "auctores" both characters make reference to.

Aptly, in

terms o f the Pardoner’s alienating performance, his voice and the body which contains
it are in apparent conflict. The General Prologue says o f the Pardoner:
A voys he hadde as smal as hath a goot.
No berd hadde he, ne nevere sholde have;
So smooth it was as it were late shave.
I trowe he were a gelding or a mare. (V I.688-91)
While the goat-ishness o f the Pardoner’s voice suggests Pan-like male sexuality, he is
paradoxically a goat without a beard. His body, rather than matching his voice, is like
that o f a "geldyng or a mare." Thus the goat’s voice is contained in a horse’s body.
While his body and his voice are displaced, his texts are also displaced in his horse-like
body and his goat-like voice.

To speak like a goat about texts is surely an act o f

dissonance. A goat would rather, we assume, devour the texts than speak o f them, and
this is perhaps what the Pardoner is doing in his perform ance.

The animal in the

Pardoner is feeding o ff o f texts, so to speak.
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The Pardoner exposes the dissonance between his exterior voice and his interior
desire through the displacement o f his exhibited documents. The Pardoner’s exhibition
o f the texts seems to expose their lack o f interiority; furthermore, the Pardoner’s
apparent lack o f potency appears also to be the texts’ lack.

The exteriority o f the

"pardouns" (emphasized by their placement on the Pardoner’s body) point to their
apparent lack o f spiritual potency, as they are, like the Pardoner, a "voice" which is
divorced from its proper context, the interior "will" o f both their author and the
speaker. However, the very exteriority o f the texts to the Pardoner’s use o f them play
up their potency as symbols of authority.

The context the Pardoner creates cannot

undermine the legal potency of the "patente" as proof o f his spiritual authority to
pardon sin. Similarly, nothing that the Wife o f Bath says about marriage and the texts
which underwrite the practice of it can alter the exteriorized, written laws o f m arriage,
nor the texts she quotes from. For this reason, exteriorized language is more legally
potent than interiorized language. The Pardoner’s use of displacement thus essentially
points to and emphasizes the potency of texts.
As W alter Ong has noted, "there is no way directly to refute a text.

A fter

absolutely total and devastating refutation, it says exactly the same thing as before"
(Qralitv 79). What you say about a document or agreement after the fact o f its creation
does not change or affect it. That is why texts are more potent than voice, which can
only "speak" and be "heard" in a context. Texts, on the other hand, speak both in and
out of context. In the Pardoner’s performance the documents have an existence which
is beyond, and outside of, their context.

The H ost’s response to the Pardoner is,
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accordingly, not directed towards the "pardouns" themselves (w hich are untouchable),
but towards the Pardoner’s genitals (which presumable are). The violence which the
Host threatens against the Pardoner’s sexual symbols is a displaced aggression which
should be directed towards the texts o f the "bulles." W hat the H ost really wants to cut
off is what stands in the place o f the Pardoner’s genitals, the w ritten charters.

He

really desires to emasculate not the Pardoner (for whom the operation may well be
redundant) but the "bulles,” which represent the peculiar, uncontextualized potency o f
texts and legal documents.
The threat of the Host is an extrememly important m om ent in the Pardoner’s
Prologue and Tale as it confirms the Pardoner’s displacement o f his own fear of lack
onto the reassuring objects of the texts. The Host threatens the Pardoner with a real
lack, suggesting that on an unconscious level he has understood the exhibitionistic
displacement going on in the Pardoner’s performance.

This reading challenges Paul

Taylor’s position that the Host’s attack on the Pardoner, "only confirm s the Pardoner’s
implication that the pilgrims cannot read the truth behind either his posture, his tale,
or their holiday excursion to Canterbury" (127). I suggest that, on the other hand, the
Pardoner, like sexual exhibitionists in general, may be no more consciously aware o f
his displacement process than the Host or the other pilgrims are. The Pardoner, Harry,
and the other pilgrims may merely apprehend at the conclusion o f the Pardoner’s
performance that their perception o f the relationship o f texts to contexts, containers to
contents, is a highly problematic one. In the Pardoner’s perform ance, texts themselves
tempt or create displacement.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

The aggression of the Pardoner’s oral use of texts provokes the H o st’s
aggression.

Harry Bailly responds with a threat instigated by the aggression o f the

Pardoner’s rhetorical affirmation that a written text supercedes its oral context. W hile
Derrida proclaims, "we, like Levi-Strauss, conclude that violence is writing" (135), the
Host responds not to the violence of writing, but to the orally exhibitionistic aggression
o f the Pardoner.
The Pardoner appreciates and attempts to exploit what the other pilgrims realize
at the end o f his performance, namely that his religious potency as a pardoner rests on
legal documents which are entirely divorced from his and their author’s voice and
desire. The Pardoner’s performance exposes the fiction o f the documents he carries.
By exposing himself, the Pardoner also exposes the "pardouns," and "bulles,"
revealing their fiction of a sublime m arriage between spiritual Will (a desire) and legal
will (a charter). Furthermore, he exhibits this dissonance in the context o f a defiant
and defensively masculine exteriorization o f texts and writing.
W ith the exception of Harry Bailly, the pilgrims remain silent at the end o f the
Pardoner’s Tale. By exposing his textual potency (in his "pardouns") the Pardoner
strips the oral potency from the other pilgrims. The inability o f interiorized language
(speech) to alter or affect exteriorized language (text) in any effective way has been
adequately demonstrated to the pilgrims. The divorce between spirit and text cannot
be made any more complete than in the Pardoner’s performance. However, the H o st’s
response only further affirms the exhibitionistic fiction the Pardoner has created. H arry
Bailly verbally attacks the Pardoner instead of his "pardouns," which are the real source
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of fraud. The Pardoner himself has "spoken true" to the pilgrims in the sense that he
has not masked his vice; it is the texts which do not speak true in their context.
The Pardoner demonstrates in his exhibitionistic acts o f exposing texts and oral
boasting that displaced texts are the foundation o f his fraud. The Host threatens the
Pardoner with castration, or a removal o f what the "bulles" signify. However, it is the
documents which are the symbols o f potency, not the Pardoner’s "lacking" genitals.
This transference occurs, in Glenn Burger’s analysis, because "the more the Pardoner
can be maintained as an absence of potency, the more the Host can assert his own
masculine and moral authority and establish that he is no false copy but the real thing"
(1146). But, the threat of castration seems to make the Pardoner more potent than he
has previously appeared to be in the description o f him as "a geldying or a m are." The
question then is whether the "false copy" is the Pardoner or his documents.

If the

documents are genuine, as their "bulles" testify, then the Pardoner himself is the
forgery. I suggest that the H ost’s threat is directed towards the person o f the Pardoner,
and not his "pardouns," because only he, and not the texts, can be and is silenced by
a refutation. The Pardoner is an unauthentic document when contrasted with his texts,
which are continually affirmed as legally potent.
We can question whether the Pardoner is really lacking in his masculinity, as
the narrator of the General Proloeue leads us to believe, or whether he only appears to
be. If his lack is only an apparent one, then his texts signify not lack, but the anxiety
about it. The very fact of an exterior sign, either sexual or textual, creates an anxiety
of loss. The anxiety over textual lack may then also be a displacement o f other fears.
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When we consider the perversion possible in the oral realm—the reduction o f the oath
to a commodity, the rhetorical misuse o f texts—texts themselves seem relatively benign.
The oral context surrounding a text can easily be perverted or altered, while the text
itself remains static or "valid."

It may be feared that the legal system, like the

Pardoner, has an interior lack, in the sense o f "Will" as desire, not an exterior lack,
in the sense of "will" as document. In the workings of the medieval legal system there
may exist a fear, like the exhibitionist’s castration anxiety, that a sense o f validity is
lost in the increasing dependency upon documents as a means of expressing will or
desire. It may be feared that the divorce created between texts and contexts is a split
between containers and contents, between written signs and spoken desires.
The anxiety about writing may be a displacement onto something physical and
exterior (a text) o f an interior conflict which can be expressed in the question, "does
the text lack in the way that I fear I lack?" If we all, male and female, fear a lack,
texts can become a locus of displacement for this anxiety about potency and the ability
to express desire (what the Wife o f Bath has triumphed at). As Derek Pearsall notes
of the contrast between the Pardoner and the Wife:
The Pardoner . . . has no thoughts or feelings . . . no hopes or regrets.
He never talks about his motives, except to reiterate monotonously that
his purpose is ever one. He never once says "I think" or "I feel," but
only describes what he has done or what he will do. W ithout soul,
feeling, or inner being, he is a creature of naked will, unaware o f its
existence but in the act o f will. ("Chaucer’s Pardoner" 361)
As I see it, the Pardoner does not discuss his desires and motivations because his will
and desire have been displaced onto texts. Just as documents have displaced the oral
context o f will-making in the legal system, conversely documents and texts are a locus
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o f displacement for the oral expression o f desire and will in the Pardoner’s
perform ance. There is nothing left for the Pardoner to "desire" once he has displaced
and then expelled both the physical texts and their spiritual contents.
The Pardoner uses texts and writing to get a hold over others, and this may be
the only form of desire available to him. The aggression of the Pardoner’s speech may
result from his misunderstanding about what is, and is not, truly seductive. The offer
o f pardon which he presents to the pilgrims in his conclusion is, in essence, an attempt
to humiliate the pilgrims. His command to "kiss the bulles" involves the exposure of
a weapon he holds over them and a threat which orders them to debase themselves
before it and him.

His own alarming "lack" of potency and normal sensibility is

compensated for by displacing himself onto the texts which he waves over the pilgrim s’
heads. As Burger posits, "the Pardoner’s exhortation to kiss his relics suddenly pushes
his quotation of authority, which is powerfully present in his tale, to an absurd
extreme" (1145). The pilgrims are silent in response to this threat and menace; only
the Host responds with a threat that was commonly directed towards rapists.

Burger

aptly refers to this threat as one o f "the H ost’s extreme assertions o f ’authority’ and
’norm ality’" (1146). The Pardoner’s combined "lacks," (spritual, physical, cognitive,
and rhetorical) may make him truly dangerous, as the compensation for them must be
the constant menacement and humiliation o f others.
W hile Paul proclaims: "the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life," the Pardoner
proclaims that his spirit can be as killing as his letter. He exposes the possibility that
his texts are more potent, affirming, and life-giving than he is, just as legally the letter
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is more potent or life-giving to the agreement than speech, the oral act which no longer
creates a valid contract. The displacement of spirit and letter, contents and container,
is the basis for perversion and for the Pardoner’s attempt to "disgust" the pilgrims. In
an attempt to define the "disgusting," Russell explains that, "we don’t want things that
are supposed to be inside to get outside the skin. That is my clue to the disgusting: it
pertains to circumstances where that which is supposedly inside the skin is not in the
container" (99).

If the parchment o f texts is "skin," then the disgust which the

Pardoner tempts the pilgrims to feel is a disgust over something which seems to have
escaped out o f the skin.

The Pardoner tempts the pilgrims to believe that "what is

supposedly in the skin," the genuine spiritual pardon, "is not in the container."

By

attempting to separate the container o f the text away from the spiritual contents, within
an exhibitionistic context, the Pardoner tries to disgust the pilgrims.
Discussing the literary legal debates contained in the works o f Robert
Grosseteste and St. Anslem, J.A . A lford remarks:

"the Devil always comes o ff as a

pretty poor lawyer" ("Literature and Law" 944). The Pardoner is also comes o ff as "a
pretty poor lawyer" because he makes the split between text and context, between the
legality of his documents and their purported spirituality, so obvious that he provokes
disgust. He is un-lawyerly as he fails either to subsume texts into his rhetoric as the
W ife of Bath does, or covertly hide them like the Man o f Law.

The Pardoner makes

a point of showing the pilgrims how displaced his texts are in the context he creates for
them.

This displacement is highlighted in The Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale to

demonstrate how texts can supercede the idea o f context. The oral context in which
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covenants were originally created is now superceded by the texts, whose dangling seals
make the documents themselves into convenants.

However, the documents are

covenants in the legal, but not necessarily the the spiritual, sense o f the word.

The

sealed charters which the Pardoner conspicuously displays represent what Jesse Gellrich
refers to as "the theft o f spoken promise" (161), when "the source disappear[s] into the
copy" (xi). W hile the pardons are legally valid, the context the Pardoner creates for
them invites the pilgrims to question whether they are still spiritually valid. The loss
created by the theft of a validating context from the documents is what the Pardoner’s
displacement exposes.

ENDNOTES

‘O f the function of the seals F .G . Kempin explains: "By 1284 (the Statue o f
Wales) it was clear that covenants could be used to bind one to any promise except a
debt . . . . By the end of the thirteenth century it was required that the writing must
have the seal o f the promisor affixed to it. The seal previously had been used in the
action o f debt to prove the validity of the document. If it was sealed, it was genuine,
but if it was not sealed, the defendant was free to prove it fraudulent" (Legal History
78).
2"Covenant" is "the medieval law yers’ word for agreement" (Simpson, Law o f
Contract 16). The three actions of covenant, debt, and detinue, "formed the backbone
o f the medieval law 6f contract . . . . Covenant, which was normally an action for
unliquidated damages, lay to provide a remedy for tort or wrong o f breaking an
agreem ent to do something other than pay a debt; it could only however, be used in the
case o f formal agreements under seal" (Simpson, Law o f Contract 6). In the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, F.G. Kempin summarizes, "covenant was the common law’s
closest approximation to the concept o f a contractual duty" (Legal History 78).
3W hile Larry Benson, et al. define "lappe" as a "large pocket (in a fold o f his
clothing)" (34), it seems just as reasonable to accept the definition that the word retains
in m odem English, "a person’s lap" (M .E .D .. V o l.5, PT.2, 651-3). Another
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interesting meaning for "lappe" in the context o f the Pardoner’s portrait is, "the female
pudendum" (M .E .D .. V ol.5, P T .2, 651-3).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Representing (Re)production: The Canon’s Yeoman’s
Revelations Of Textual Impotence

In his Prologue and Tale the Canon’s Yeoman gives an account to the other
pilgrims of his endless labours to "multiplie" matter alchemically. O f this project he
explains to the Canterbury group: "We blondren evere and pouren in the fir,/ And for
al that we faille o f our desir,/ For evere we lakken oure conclusion" (VIII, 670-2). In
this passage, whose theme he often repeats, the Yeoman describes the frustration o f his
and the C anon’s attempts to consumate the "alchemical marriage" which the texts of
alchemy alluringly speak of. The whole purpose of the Yeoman’s work has been to
realize the potential o f this marriage. However, the Yeoman must reveal the shameful
secret o f alchemy: that alchemists and alchemical philosophy are impotent and the
sought-after marriage can never be consumated. The Yeoman strives to explain to the
pilgrim s that there has been no potential for material (re)production in his w ork. While
Britton Harwood has argued that the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale involves "a
mystification o f work" ("Chaucer and the Silence" 342), I argue, rather, that the
Yeoman presents a rhetorical de-mystification of alchem y’s textual m ystification of
w ork and material production.
In the Prologue and Tale the impotence o f alchemy as a process which attempts
to (re)produce precious metals is paralleled to the allegorical impotence o f alchemical
"auctores" and their texts. Ultimately, the Yeoman produces and multiplies nothing but
the representation o f an elusive potential in his spoken words, just as alchemical texts,
78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79

in the Yeoman’s view o f them, are endlessly self-replicating, (re)producing only more
and more texts which seduce readers w ith a held-out potential meaning. The Y eom an’s
attitude toward texts aligns w ith a n ideological (if not practical) resistance to
textualization in the English com m on law.
The legal concepts o f counterfeiting and forgery are related to the alchemical
project in both its metalurgical and philosophical aspects.

Chaucer appears in the

C anon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale to see practical alchemy as a counterfeiting
operation which merely pretends to (re)produce precious metals, and alchemical texts
as embodying a forged and counterfeit philosophy which only appears to contain
meaning. Ultimately, the Yeoman accuses alchemy of using language in a counterfeit
manner. In both its physical and textual aspects alchemy is represented in the C anon’s
Y eoman’s Prologue and Tale as a textualization of physical, moral, and rhetorical
impotence.
The fear of counterfeiting and forgery informs a number of pieces o f legislation
passed in the late Middle Ages. This may be connected with a fear o f what R. A. Shoaf
calls "the irrationality and the m ystery o f money" (Dante 7). In S h o a f s conception,
"the problem o f meaning in money is analagous to the problem of meaning in language"
(Dante 8).

Statutes were passed in the thirteen and fourteenth centuries in the first

English attempts to legislate standards for coins and precious metals. Like the language
a nation uses, its coinage must be created out o f meaningful and trustworthy signifiers.
The King’s image on a coin, like the Leopard’s Head on an ingot, is a symbol which
is supposed to guarantee fullness, plenitude, and worth—high value as opposed to empty
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value. But, counterfeiters use the same encoded symbols to pass empty value off as
high value.

When coinage and precious metals are threatened by counterfeiting, not

only the economy o f the nation, but the ideological system that establishes worth and
value is called into question. Forgery threatens the very idea o f "value": o f trust in
signs and signifiers (which include numerical symbols and written words).

The

"exposure" o f the Yeoman reveals that the practice o f (re)productive fakery comes forth
from, and also leads into, a void.
The impotence o f the Canon and the Yeoman can be connected with the concept
of "counterfeiting," which is the art of false representation. I will argue, based on the
evidence o f an early Greek manuscripts, that practical alchemy attempted to produce
metals which seemed like gold and silver; thus, on this level alchemy was a
counterfeiting operation.

While Harwood has argued that in the Canon’s Yeoman’s

Prologue and Tale alchemy "is not an allegory o f production. It is an exotic instance
of it. The Yeoman is apparently the only wage laborer anywhere in Chaucer--the only
person hired to make a commodity" ("Chaucer and the Silence" 343), it seems, on the
other hand, that the Yeoman presents alchemy as an allegory o f non-(re)production.
The very point the Yeoman repeatedly states is that there has been no production; rather
than making a commodity, both the Canon and the Yeoman failed to (re)produce
anything.
Based on a textual foundation of false representation, the Yeoman’s alchemical
quest fails to produce material of value; all is loss and reduction rather than increase
and endless reproduction.

In the Yeoman’s alchemical enterprise, the potential for
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(re)production cannot be realized. Alchemy is fascinated with the potential for material
production, but the fluidity o f base metals exists only on the level o f language.
Alchemy was far more (re)productive as a literary project than as an industrial or
scientific one.
Just as the statutes address the problem o f nothing (counterfeit and foreign coins)
masquerading a something (legal tender), the Yeoman closes his perform ance by
addressing this problem in texts. The Yeoman exposes the forged and counterfeit value
o f alchemical texts; this is why his Tale closes with an exposure o f the texts.

In

contrast with the often noted veneration o f texts in medieval culture, the Yeom an points
to the possiblity o f textual impotence.
codification mirrors this attitude.

The English common law ’s resistance to

The common law uses experience and custom to

negotiate the void left by legal codes and the written language o f the lex scripta.
During the late M iddle Ages England was affected by the debasement o f coinage
occurring on the Continent.

Low denomination "deniers" made o f heavily alloyed

silver were making their way (illicitly) from Italy and France into the British economy,
probably because inflation in England created an increased demand for coinage. These
very small denomination coins were needed for use in retail trade.

Robert S. Lopez

estimates that the cost o f living in England quadrupled between 1150 and 1325 (71).
A sense of anxiety over the diminishment and reduction o f coinage is evident in
legislation passed in England during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
The first statutes dealing with the abuse o f coinage were created during the reign
o f Edward I. The Statutum De M oneta was enacted in 1292. Its purpose is:
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To counteract the damage and dangers which have happened to the
Sterling money o f England. Orders are issued by the King that it be
forbidden throughout the land, in all the market towns, for any man on
pain o f grave punishment to be bold enough to spend or handle any
money o r coin other than that o f the Kingdom o f England, Ireland and
Scotland. (20 Edw. I, 4)
The Statute warns that only coins issued by British governments are legal tender.

It

specifies that people bringing coins known as "deniers" into the country are to be
reported to the authorities, and the coins confiscated by the King.
The Articuli De Moneta (1292) give explicit details about thirteenth century
counterfeiting practices.

Its stated purpose is to place a strict ban on the use o f

continental deniers as "This is money which is made abroad and does great harm to our
King, to our people and to the English coin" (20 Edw I, 6).

Also banned by the

Articuli De Moneta is:
a type o f coin made in Avignon under the name o f Edward King o f
England and which can only be detected by its weight. Coins are made
by melting down pewter and lead and putting this metal between two
leaves o f silver and then making this into a coin. This malpractice
causes great damage to the community. (20 Edw. I, 6)
As we see from this statute, not only were small denomination, debased deniers seeping
into the English economy to fill a void the pure silver English Sterling created for petty
change, but counterfeit coins were invading from the Continent. The Avignon coin is
a clear symbol of false representation:

its worthlessness (the leaden core) is masked

under a thin veneer (o f gold) which "represents" great value.
The first pieces o f legislation regarding precious metals also appear in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Statutes created in 1238 (22 Hen. Ill) and 1300 (28
Edw. I, stat.3, ch.20) create quality standards for gold and silver. The statute o f 1300
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stipulates that goods made o f precious metal must be stamped with a m ark indicating
the m etal’s quality, and that gold and silver must be "wrought o f one uniform
standard." The statute also stipulates that gold and silver, "shall not be offered for sale
until assayed by the wardens o f the craft and further that it be m arked with the
Leopard’s Head" (28 Edw .I, stat.3, ch.20). The Statute o f Purveyors, passed in 1350,
contains the Treason Act w hich makes counterfeiting o f the K ing’s seals and coinage
one o f the most serious offences in the realm. The Act states that it shall be treason:
If a man counterfeits the K ing’s Great o f Privy Seal, or his money, and
if a man brings false money into this realm counterfeit to the money o f
England, knowing the money to be false, to m erchandise and make
payment in deceit o f our said Lord the King and o f his people. (25 Edw
III, stat. 5, ch. 2)
The punishments stipulated for these trespasses were severe; men were to be drawn,
hanged, disembowelled alive, beheaded, and then quartered; women were to be burned
alive.

The abuse o f coinage was considered to be an attack upon the K ing and the

realm itself, for it attacks the proper representation o f the King and his w orth.
The statutes related to counterfeiting are significant for a reading o f the C anon’s
Y eoman’s Prologue and Tale because the alchemical project, not just o f the Canon and
his Yeoman, but o f practicing alchemists in general, bears a resem blance to
counterfeiting operations. One o f the most ancient alchemical texts know n to us is a
Greek papyrus, Leyden Papyrus X ,1 w ritten near the end of the third century A .D , but
probably copied from earlier sources (Caley 1149-50).

The work offers practical

recipes for making gold, silver, and "asem," for purifying and testing m etals, and for
changing the color of other metals so they will look like gold (referred to as
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"colouring"). O ut of 111 recipes, 75 deal with methods for purifying metals, making
alloys, testing metals for purity, imitating precious metals, and colouring the surface
of metals.

It is quite obvious from a reading o f the recipes that "manufacturing,"

"colouring" and "purifying" gold, silver and "asem," are attempts to counterfeit
precious metals. W hile Gareth Roberts suggests that "increasing" precious metals likely
meant, "increasing its weight but decreasing its purity in alloys with other metals" (23),
he adds the caution that, "early metallurgists might have thought that they were simply
producing more gold, since they had no fixed ideas about what constituted ’gold’" (236).

However, I argue that Leyden Papyrus X refutes the notion o f the "naive

metalurgist" as there is clear evidence o f deceitful intentions.
For instance, the sequence o f recipes from 15 to 17 shows an increasing
clarification o f the author’s intent.

Recipe 15 is for "The Coloration o f Gold;" it

vaguely describes its purpose as, "To color gold to render it fit for usage." Why gold
needs another color than its own is not made clear. Recipe 16 is for "Augmentation
of Gold," and this appears to be a fragment, so it is not clear from the directions
exactly what

"augmentation"

means.

However,

recipe

17 is boldly entitled

"Falsification o f Gold;" its directions state:
M isy [probably iron or copper pyrites or sulfates] and Sinopian Red
[possibly iron ochre or red lead], equal to one part of gold. After the
gold has been thrown in the furnace and it has become o f good color,
throw upon it these two ingredients, and removing let it cool and the
gold is doubled. (Caley’s trans.)
Berthelot suggests that recipe 17 is the continuation o f recipe 16 and the title
"Falsification o f Gold" is a comment or gloss erroneously copied into the papyrus by
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a scribe. The scribe would then have "erroneously" given the true intent o f the recipe
in the word "falsification" (which does not occur again in the papyrus).
W hile the w ording of the recipes is veiled, their intent is fairly obvious. Recipe
26 for "Purification o f Silver" reads:
How silver is purified and made brilliant. Take a p ait o f silver and an
equal weight o f lead; place in a furnace, and keep up the m elting until
the lead has just been consumed; repeat the operation several times until
it becomes brilliant. (Caley’s trans.)
Here the words "purification" and "brilliant" seem to be code-words to cover the fact
that a silver alloy is being produced. Roland Rowell notes that "caches o f R om an coins
buried for years and disenterred by ploughshares have frequently been found upon assay
to be seriously debased" (5), and it is doubtful that classical alchemists could have been
naive enough to believe that "cutting" silver with lead made it more "brilliant." Other
recipes in the papyrus for "Coloring in Silver," that is, "for silvering objects o f copper"
(Recipe 27); for "M anufacture of Copper Similar to Gold" (Recipe 28); for "Whitening
o f Copper . . . in order to mix it with equal parts of asem, so that no one can recognize
it" (Recipe 23); and for "Coating o f Copper" so that, "the copper shall have the
appearance of silver" (Recipe 42) give evidence of the intent to produce counterfeit
representations of precious metals.
In all, 22 recipes deal with the doubling o f "asem" (2 recipes) and the
manufacture of "asem" (20 recipes). Some recipes included in this count have no titles
or are called "Another;" however, their placement and directions make them almost
certainly recipes for "asem."

According to Caley, the names "asem" and "asemon"

refer to "alloys intended to imitate gold or silver, most generally the latter" (1151).
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According to this interpretation of the word, most o f the papyrus is given over to
recipes for the production of imitation gold and silver.

Glossing the word asemon,

Berthelot explains:
Le m ot asemon etait regarde au X V IF siecle comme representant l’argent
sans marque, c ’est-a-dire plus au moins impur, renfermant du plomb, du
cuivre ou de I’etain; en un mot tel qu’il se produit d ’ordinaire a i’etat
brut dans la fonte des minerais. (Les Origins 89-90).
Berthelot also notes that the word has, "plus de vraisemblance du mot egyptien asem .
qui exprime felectru m , alliage d’or et d ’argent" (Les Origins 90). If the word asemon
was used in seventeenth-century France to refer to unhallmarked silver (which had been
cut with lead, copper, or tin), the original alchemical project o f manufacturing "alloys
to imitate pure silver" had an influence well into the heyday o f alchemy.
The statutes reveal that by Chaucer’s time there were fixed ideas about what
constituted "gold" and "silver," and, furthermore, the making of alloys was well
understood.

The statutes relating to currency and precious metals were created to

counter a perceived threat to the coinage o f the realm: an awareness o f a threatened
impotence in currency.

Fears about a shortage o f precious metals for minting were

caused by increased demand in a country that resisted the debasement o f its silver
coinage. This fear and the threat caused by the illicit introduction of foreign currency
and counterfeit coins, swirl around the edges o f alchemy.

As John Day notes,

historians accept as a truism that "money was chronically short" in the late Middle
Ages (55).

The fear of an increasing impotence in coins was perhaps the impetus

behind the alchemical belief that coinage could be endlessly "multiplied." The need for
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m ore currency may have led to the hope that the "seed" from which it is made could
be endlessly replenished.
Alchemical writers rendered the process o f increasing and producing precious
metals in term s of a marital and sexual allegory.

Late medieval and Renaissance

alchemical w orks regularly "compare the alchemical process to the gestation, birth and
nutrition o f a child" (Roberts 22).

Joseph E. Grennen notes that the idea o f the

chemical wedding "was based on the very ancient analogy between the alchemical opus
and human generation, which gave rise to the theory that masculine and feminine
principles were needed to begin the Work" (469). In later alchemy, all metals were
believed to be generated out of mercury and sulpher, and the chemical wedding o f male
sulphur and female mercury was consummated in the alchemical vessel, which many
texts describe as a marriage bed (Roberts 84-86).
The Yeoman opens the Tale with a long passage describing his and the C anon’s
attempts to officiate at an alchemical wedding.

As in the Prologue, the Yeoman

laments the futility and sterility o f their efforts.

He bemoans o f his quest for "The

philosophres toon,/Elixer clept" (VIII 862-3):
And al oure sleighte, he wol nat come us to.
He hath ymaad us spenden muchel good,
For sorwe of which almoost we wexen wood,
But that good hope crepeth in oure herte,
Supposynge evere, though we sore smerte.
To be releeved by hym afterward. (VIII 867-872)
In trying to produce the Elexir o f Life the Canon and Yeoman reduce themselves to
wasting "muchel good." The Elixir, symbol o f vitality and potency, will not com e to
them, the Yeoman laments. They spend and waste their "good" trying to produce the
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seed o f life; ever seeking relief, they get nothing but a enticing prom ise o f delayed
gratification.

"Supposynge evere . . . To be releeved" by the Elixir, they are never

brought to any "conclusion."
Like the Canon o f the Tale, the two partners have stooped to borrowing their
"seed" silver from other men. They themselves produce nothing, and have lost what
they did have. In the Prima pars o f the Tale the Yeoman gives a vivid description o f
waste and loss, the only products o f their attempts to "multiplie."

W aste is most

vivivdly portrayed in the description o f the explosions which rock the workroom. The
Yeoman tells us:
Ful ofte it happeth so
The pot tobreketh, and farewl, al is go!
Thise metals been o f so greet violence
Oure walles mowe not make hem resistence,
But if they weren w roght of lym and stoon
They percen so, and thurgh the wal they goon.
And somme of hem synken into the ground—
Thus han we lost by tymes many a pound—
And somme are scatered al the floor aboute;
Somme lepe into the roof. (VIII, 906-15)
The seed, which must by now be borrowed, is then lost by being spilled on the ground,
scattered on the floor, and blasted through the walls and roof. "Violent reactions will
occur" when mercury comes into contact with a variety o f other substances, a modem
chemist explains (Sittig 1045), and in their blind experimentations, alchemists must
have frequently created explosive combinations in which "much good" was lost. This
waste of the seed results in an increased (re)productive sterility for the Canon and the
Yeoman.
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The T ale’s wily Canon can manage to fool the priest into believing that
impregnation has occurred in the alchemical vessel and something has been produced.
However, this production is faked.

The silver has been hidden previously in a

hollowed out "cole" (VIII, 1177) and the end o f "an holwe stikke" (VUI, 1265). W hat
orgasmically comes forth has not been produced by the Canon at all, but borrowed
from another man.

The Tale, like the Prologue is then another revelation o f the

shameful secret o f alchemical impotence. Faking it is the best perform ance that the
Fictional Canon can manage. While the silver is real, the process o f producion is faked.
Alchemy is like counterfeiting and forgery as the practicioner is producing
something whose value or origin is concealed and falsified.

By concealing the true

origin o f his silver ingot, and thus "representing" sterling silver as alchemical silver,
the Fictional Canon Fits the definition o f a forger.

The Canon is creating forgeries

because, "the essence o f forgery is that it is an instrument which tells a lie about itself
in the sense that it purports to be made by a person who did not make it" (Rowell 69).
This definition also virtually defines the entire canon of alchemical literature.

As

Roberts notes:
alchemists claimed a host o f venerable authorities who practiced alchemy
o r wrote alchemical works . . . . Just as alchemists claimed distinguished
ancient figures as legitimising predecessors, so alchemical works
apocryphally fathered themselves upon venerable ancestors . . . . most
o f the distinguished authors claimed by alchemical treatises had nothing
to do with those works going under their names. (13-17)
In Roberts opinion, "Chaucer’s ’Arnold of the Newe Toun’ and Lull were two o f the
most respected medieval authorities, but Lull probably wrote none o f the alchemical
treatises that gave him this reputation and Arnold hardly any, if any at all, of those
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ascribed to him" (18).

The desperation o f their quest for authoritative sources and

authors is revealed when later alchemical w riters quoted Chaucer’s Yeoman as a source
o f alchemical knowledge in their treatises.

While S.F. Damon uses this as evidence

that Chaucer was "not only in sympathy w ith [alchemy], but possibly knew (and if so,
respected) the famous secret" (782), it seems, rather, to reveal a desperate paucity of
material.

Alchemical authors stoop to borrowing their "seed" o f ideas from anyone

they can pull into their canon.
As Chaucer must have been aware, alchemical writers had a compulsive desire
to establish a sense of authority for their art by giving it origins in antiquity.

This

origin is extremely vague. The early Greek texts are "pseudonymous, apocryphal and
dubious" (Roberts 19).

Texts are often attributed to dieties and Biblical figures.

Allison Coudert notes that "Alchemists attributed works by the score to Adam, Moses,
his sister M ary (Miriam), to Cleopatra, Hermes Trismegistus, Thomas Aquinas, Roger
Bacon, Albertus Magnus, even to Pope John XXII, who had issued an edict against the
practice o f alchemy" (105).
Considering the dubious nature o f the alchemical canon it is ironic that the
Yeoman’s Canon has a particular distrust o f spoken language. He ironically believes
this to be the vehicle o f language which will lead to his downfall. The narrator tells
us:
Whil this Yeman was thus in talkyng,
This Chanoun drough hym neer and herde al thyng
Which this Yeman spak, for suspecioun
O f mennes speche evere hadde this Chanoun. (VIII, 684-87)
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The Canon’s suspicion o f speech leads him to order the Yeoman: "Hoold thou thy pees
and spek no wordes mo" (VIII, 693). The Yeoman, he claims, is about to, "discoverest
that thou sholdest hyde" (VIII, 696), that is, the secrets o f their trade. However, after
the Canon disappears, the Yeoman defiantly declares: "Al that I kan anon now wol I
telle" (VIII, 704).

This statement of the Yeoman is defiantly opposed to the use o f

language by the Canon and in alchemical texts (another m isleading "canon"?).
Alchemical authors are often metaphorical to the point o f incom prehesibility.

For

instance, Zosimos o f Panopolis (c. A.D. 300) describes mercury as:
the herm aphrodite, which is always escaping, pressing on into its own
nature, the divine water o f which all have been ignorant, whose nature
is hard to contemplate for it is neither metal nor w ater which is always
moving, nor a body, for it is not dominated, (original in Berthelot,
Collection. Vol. 2, 143-4, Roberts’ translation)
The enigmatic and elusive quality o f quicksilver characterizes the use o f language in
general by alchemical writers.

Mercury can be fragmented and then turned whole

again, fragmented and recombined endlessly.

Like the silver beads o f metal, the

language of the alchemical texts is almost impossible to hold onto or grasp.
Both rhetorical emptiness and physical impotence can be related to mercury.
M ercury’s toxic effects upon the human nervous system correspond with the Yeoman’s
behavior and the style of his rhetorical performance. As J.C . Cam pbell notes:

"The

Yeoman has sometimes been accused o f being confused . . . . His emotions fluctuate
widely during his perform ance, from anger to awe to sarcastic hum or to credulousness"
(174). Judith Herz has also commented on the Yeoman’s m ercurial qualities:
the Canon and his Yeoman enter with one attitude only to change it in
the next moment. These two move into the C anterbury w orld actively.
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energetically; they burst into it. The narrator refers to sweat five times
in twenty lines of the C anon’s description. And, once arrived they do
not stay still. The shifting process continues as the Yeoman gradually
reveals the extent of his scorn for the Canon. (232)
Com m entator’s on the Yeoman’s performance in the Prologue and Tale have
overlooked the fact that according to descriptions o f their practices, alchemists, like
hatters in later centuries, would have commonly suffered from nervous disorders caused
by mercury poisoning. Mercury was an essential elem ent in alchemical w ork for more
than purely metaphorical reasons. It was used because "it is a good solvent for other
metals, forming some compounds but usually giving alloys which are known as
amalgams," and mercury will easily amalgamate with siver and gold (Hopkins 720).
However, at room temperature mercury "vaporizes slightly, a fact o f importance
because its colorless and odorless vapor is extremely toxic, with cumulative effects"
(Hopkins 719-20). By the Yeoman’s account, he works continuously to "multiplie,"
thus his exposure to mercury vapour must be high. He also seems to understand the
process o f vapourization, as he complains to the pilgrims that, "fumes diverse/ O f
metals, whiche ye han herd me reherce,/ Consumed and wasted han my reednesse"
(VIII, 1098-1100).2
M ercury’s toxic effects are a result of its "predilection for the central nervous
system" (Am dur 647). Mercury "accumulates in the brain quickly during exposure but
is released from the brain very slowly" (Sittig 1045). The effects o f chronic exposure
to mercury vapour can result in, "changes in personality and behavior, with loss o f
memory, increased excitability (erethism), severe depression, and even delirium and
hallucination" (Amdur 648). The long-term effects of mercury exposure would account
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for the Yeoman’s excited speech, his mercurial entry into the entourage, and his
revelations o f increasing despair, and impotence.
The Yeoman is not only affected by mercury, he appears to mimic the metal’s
most noticeable characteristics. The Yeoman’s much-emphasized sweating is like the
sweating o f the metal itself, its vaporization.

The Yeoman’s paleness reflects the

paleness o f m ercury’s silver colouring. The metal was held to be the female partner
in the alchemical marriage, as its cool, moist paleness contrasted with the warm, dry
"reedness" o f the masculine partner, sulphur. If the Yeoman is losing his "reedness,"
and becoming moist and pale, alchemically this implies that he is losing his masculinity.
If he is being overtaken by mercurial characteristics then he is being feminized. The
alternating expressions o f excitement and despair caused by m ercury’s cerebral toxicity
combine w ith the m etal’s other toxic effects—the Y eom an’s sense that he is an impotent
man, an empty vessel.
Just as the origins of the texts leads onto false trails and pathways, the language
o f the texts misleads the reader by hiding, rather than revealing, or perhaps even
containing, meaning. The problem of clarity stems from the fact that, like the Canon’s
and Yeoman’s hidden enterprise in the "hemes" and "lanes blynde," alchemy was a
secret art which used language in a manner which was intentionally obscure. As the
Yeoman him self remarks, "Philosophres speken so mystily/ In this craft that men kan
nat come thereby,/For any wit that men han now-a-dayes" (VIII, 1394-96). Directly
following this statement, the Yeoman makes two more rather cryptic comments on the
use of language in alchemical texts. He says:
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They mowe wel chiteren as doon jayes,
And in hir termes sette hir lust and peyne,
But to hir purpos shal they nevere atteyne.
A m an may lightly leme, if he have aught,
To m ultiplie, and brynge his good to naught! (VIII, 1397-1401)
One is led to question whether the pronouns "they" and "hir" in the first three lines
refer to the philosophers or to their followers. I w ould translate the lines: "they (i.e.
the men who read the texts) may as well chatter (i.e. speak orally) as jays do, and put
all their lust and pain into words (i.e. spoken ones), for their (alchemical) goal shall
never be attained." If the Yeoman is speaking o f him self here, he is then differentiating
his spoken words (w hich are an expression o f his desires and sorrows) from the written
words o f the philosophers. To "chiteren as doon jayes" is an ambiguous simile which
could illustrate both the meaningless enigmas of the philosophers, or the Yeoman’s oral
expression of his emotional truths. The placement o f these lines after the preceding
ones (VIII 1294-96) in which "Philosophres" is the obvious subject, leads the reader
to assume that "they" and "hir" refer to the texts o f the philosophers, and not to men
like the Yeoman.

However, ambiguity is created here because this sentence is

sandwiched between one whose subject is the "Philosophres" and one whose subject is
"A man." The Y eom an obliquely moves from discussing the texts of the philosophers
to vague pronouns which may refer to the philosophers or to their followers, and then
moves to speaking about himself (although somewhat obliquely in the words "A man").
The question created by this use of pronouns is whether the chattering o f jays (referred
to in VTII, 1397) is meaningless written language, or meaningful oral revelation. The
conclusion of the Y eom an in this passage is that even though the texts o f alchemy are
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difficult to understand, through experience one can easily discover the real secret of
alchemy: how to turn something ("aught") into nothing ("naught"). Here the Yeoman
holds up experience as his real source o f learning. While texts have been meaningless,
experience has conveyed the truth to the Yeoman.
Just as the Prologue closes w ith declarations of defiant speech by the Yeoman
in the lines: ”A1 that I kan anon now wol I telle" (VIII, 704), and, "I wol nat spare;/
Swich thyng as that I knowe, I wol declare" (VIII, 718-19), the Tale closes w ith defiant
declaration of the intent to reveal. "And right as swithe I wol yow tellen heere/ What
philosophres seyn in this mateere" (VIII, 1426-7), the Yeoman declares. The secret of
Hermes is that a man who "O f philosophres understonde kan;/ . . . he is a lewed man"
(VIII, 1444-45). The "lewed" (those without full literacy) and the "learned" (those with
literacy) are reduced to the same level in the Yeoman’s performance. This leveling is
a part o f the Yeoman’s process o f revealing that the source o f his frustration is textual.
I, thus, disagree with the position that at the end of the Tale Chaucer proceeds to
defend "true" alchemy (Haynes 17, Damon 783).
The quotation o f Senior’s words reveals the emptiness of alchem y’s textuality.
W hen Plato is asked to "name the privee stone" (VIII, 1452), he answers that it is
"Titanos" (a cover name, a signifier which does not signify); and, when asked to clarify
this cipher he calls it "Magnasia" (giving another cipher). Senior then accuses Plato
o f explaining the "ignotum per ienocius" (VUI 1467) that is, using language as a
meaningless enterprise. W hen asked again to define "Magnasia" Plato responds with
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another enigmatic statement: it is a water made o f four elements. Then, when asked
to give the "roote" (root meaning) o f the water, Plato responds:
"Nay, nay . . . certein, that I nil.
The philosophres sworn were everychoon
That they sholden discovere it unto noon,
Ne in no book it write in no manere. (VIII, 1462-6)
Plato reveals that the endlessly fathered texts o f alchemy are counterfeit because the
authors were sworn before they began not to reveal the secret. Thus, the texts which
(re)produce themselves into a vast alchemical canon are worthless signifiers o f meaning.
Like the counterfeit coins from Avignon, they are lumps o f lead pretending to a value
and meaning they do not possess. The real "secree of the secretes" is that alchemy is
the art o f counterfeiting and forgery. Like these covert operations, alchemy attempts
to make nothing look like something.
The C anon’s suspicion o f the Yeoman’s oral revelations contrasts with the
credulity he displays in devotedly following the doctrines o f forged and meaningless
texts.

The only things in the C anon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale which are not

empty, forged, counterfeit, or impotent are the Yeoman’s spoken words.

In his

confession o f the emptiness he has discovered in himself and his w ork, the Yeoman
uses language to convey meaning, in contrast the philosophical texts, which use
language in the most perverse way possible, not to convey meaning. The emptiness of
textuality is thus held up against the fullness o f speaking.

The chattering o f jays is,

after all, a description o f textual emptiness.
The rhetorical performance o f the Canon’s Yeoman Prologue and Tale
represents attempts at coming to a "conclusion" which end at "naught."
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justify this w ork’s inclusion near the end o f a large and unfinished work o f literature.
James Dean notes that "The Yeoman and the Canon, who link up with the other thirty
pilgrim s at Baoughton, in effect rescue the Canterbury Tales book from its ow n
framework and structure, which while not rigid and uncompromising, could not easily
have led to closure without some external event" (752).

The only real closure or

conclusion attained in the Prologue and Tale is found in the speech o f the Y eom an
when he states, "And there a poynt, for ended is my tale" (VIII, 1480). The Y eom an’s
rhetorical performance has revealed that there has been no end reached in any o f his
other endeavours. The work never came to anything; instead, what he had o f value was
reduced to nothing.
Anxieties about the reduction o f value in texts underlie the Canon’s Y eom an’s
Prologue and T ale. While the Pardoner upholds texts as more powerful than contexts,
the Yeoman undermines the value o f texts. His context (his story) debases the value
o f the texts he quotes from.

He reveals that language about emptiness (his ‘o ra l’

performance) is not at all the same thing as the empty language o f alchemical texts.
Thus, the C anon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale expresses a fear of emptiness not only
economically, but textually. The texts o f alchemy are sim ilar to the paradox that, "The
zero is something that must be there in order to say that nothing is there" (M enninger
400); in other words, language is needed in order to represent the potential

for

meaningless expression in writing.
In light o f the Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale we can consider again
Bracton’s statement: "Though in almost all lands use is made o f the leges and the jus
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scriptum . England alone uses unw ritten law and custom.

There law derives from

nothing written [but] from what usage has approved" (T hom e’s trans. 19).

As a

statement o f fact, Bracton’s insistence on the unwrittenness o f the common law is not
completely accurate. As Henry Sumner M aine has pointed out, the purported descent
of Roman law from a code, and English law from "immemorial unwritten tradition" is
mainly a theoretical distinction (7). M aine’s thesis about the origins o f the common
law is that, "As soon as the Courts at W estminster Hall began to base their judgem ents
on cases recorded, whether in the year books or elsewhere, the law which they
administered became written law" (13).

To Maine in the ninteenth century, written

case-law is "only different from code-law because it is written in a different way" (13);
however, to Bracton in the thirteenth century, there is an important distinction between
the lex scripta and the lex non scripta. one which he insists upon at the opening o f his
treatise. Bracton’s statement suggests that the unwrittenness o f the common law is a
defensive gesture against codes and codification (i.e. Roman and French law). Perhaps
the subtext o f his statement is really the belief that nothing can be contained in, or
represented by, writing.
Maine and Bracton’s difference o f opinion focuses on what Goodrich calls a
"fiction o f origins" in the law.

G oodrich posits that "the law depends upon a

geography of mental spaces, which cannot be reduced to its physical presences, its texts
(lex scripta). or its apparent rules.

The appearance of law is only ever an index or

sign, a vestige or relic of anterior or hidden causes" (9-10).

For Goodrich, law

requires hidden or disguised origins.3 He notes:
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A structural principle is operative in legal dogmatics, which attributes
causes strictly to an invisible or unconscious order, or to the imagination
of the senses fformae imaeinariae) and in doctrinal terms to the spirit o f
the law . . . . A canonic geography or mapping of law institutes a
cartography o f those structures, those forms o f terror o r manipulation
that bind invisibly and from within, for they are the measure o f that
most complex and mixed o f spiritual and temporal constructions, namely
the presence o f an "unwritten law." (9-10)
W hen a society moves from oral law to written law a profound transformation results
as the law becomes "fixed" in codes which require an identifiable origin, that is, they
require an "auctor" to give them "auctoritee."
Maine holds that "when prim itive law has once been embodied in a Code, there
is an end to what may be called its spontaneous development.

Henceforward the

changes effected in it, if effected at all, are effected deliberately and from without"
(17). Thus, codified law has a tendency to become dead or static, removed from the
culture. As Jack Goody has noted, in oral societies there is:
an imperceptible process o f adjustment o f norms . . . . in response to
external pressures or internal forces. The process is imperceptible
because norms have only a verbal, an oral existence, so that rules that
are no longer applicable tend to slip out of the memory store. But write
down the norms in the form of a code or statute and you then have to
make deliberate and conscious efforts to effect any alteration. (139)
Codes get left behind when a society changes, and tend to become devoid o f meaning.
I would argue that Bracton’s insistence on the unwrittenness o f English law reflects an
attitude strongly held by his culture, that is, an insistence on the common law ’s "living"
potency. Bracton wishes to portray the common law not as an empty vessel or dead
recepticle, but as a living entity which cannot be reduced to, or contained within, a
text. The common law must have no origin or author except for England herself. The
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very essence of the common law is its Englishness, and this sense o f identity is tied to
the common law’s mystical origins w ithin the alchemical vessel of the motherland.
W hat Bracton reveals in his defiant stance against written law is English
culture’s resistance to the reduction o f the common law to a set o f w ritten codes.
Bracton, The W ife o f Bath, and the Canon’s Yeoman assert that it is only through
"experience" that meaning can be found.

The lex non scripta. based as it is on

"experience," is thus a living entity, a metaphor o f life itself. The potency o f the lex
non scripta stems from the fact that it is "alive."

In contrast, the lex scripta has a

tendency to degenerate into impotence. It becomes dead for having been set down and
enclosed on the parchment.
Goodrich describes the common law as informed by a sense o f loss. This loss,
he claims:
would undoubtedly include the loss o f its authentic sources, the pristine
immemorial law which preceded the inventions of statute, the native
common law in the Celtic and later Anglo-Saxon tongues that existed
prior to the D anish, Roman, and Norman invasions, the true unwritten
constitution w hich represented an "honest" England that preexisted
Europe and its increasingly vocal call to a written law. (7)
Canon law and Roman law (based on Codes) seem to the English as em bodiments o f
verbal and legal impotence.

The Continental codes represent an im ported language

which is potentially empty o f meaning and lacking an authentic source. A ll codes are
potentially forms o f false representation. What the Yeoman expresses in his Prologue
and Tale is his experience o f the emptiness of textual representation. The fear of false
representation on the inscribed page informs Bracton’s treatise and the Canon’s
Yeoman’s Prologue and T ale.
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ENDNOTES

‘A translation o f Leyden Papyrus X into English can be found in E.R. Caley’s
"Leyden Papyrus X." The original Greek version is included in M. Berthelot’s
Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs. vol. 1, 28-51. I have used Caley’s translation
throughout.
2W hen m ercury is stored in vessels stopped with corks, its vaporisation will
inevitably be observed, as the metal works its way into the pores o f the cork and beads
of the metal drop out when the cork is tapped. It is thus not unlikely that the Yeoman
(and Chaucer) would know of this characertistic o f the metal.
3The true origins o f Bracton’s treatise are also disguised and hidden. Much o f
it was copied directly from Roman legal texts during a time w hen the study o f Roman
law was proscribed in England (see: Maine 79). He, thus, disguises not only the
Roman origins o f his own text, but essentially passes off codified Roman law as the
pure unwritten English law.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Sir Gavvain And The Green Knight And The
(In)determinacy Of The Oral Oath

An oral nostalgia prevails in our thoughts about writing—in the idea that spoken
discourse is somehow more determinate than w ritten discourse. In the view o f Hannah
A rendt the movement from a legal system based on sovereignty (oaths) to one based
on w ritten bonds (contracts) is one toward a destabilization of legal certainty.

She

w rites, "the danger and advantage inherent in all bodies politic that rely on contracts
and treaties is that they, unlike those that rely on rule and sovereignty leave the
unpredictability o f human affairs and the unreliability o f men as they are" (244).
Implied in A rendt’s statement is the assumption that written bonds are unpredictable,
while oral oaths are certain.

From this point o f view, legal anxieties result when a

society shifts from an oral legal system to a w ritten one, since written bonds are open
to interpretation in a way that spoken oaths are not in an oral culture.
The social world depicted in Sir Gawain and the Green K night1 is based upon
the rule and sovereignty of oaths; however, human affairs still remain quite
unpredictable and humans rather unreliable. I propose that Sir Gawain challenges the
thesis of the certainty of the oral oath by deprivileging the determinacy o f oral
communication.

At the opening o f the poem Gawain makes an oral contract face to

face with the other party, an agreement based on formulaic and customary usage; yet,
he still has no idea what he has agreed to do, or more siginificantly, whom he has
agreed to do it with, as Bertilak is not identifiable either through his use of language
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or his signs. Neither the G reen Knight nor the oaths entered into with Lord and Lady
de Hautdesert can be translated or fully understood by Gawain.

Furtherm ore, the

identity o f Gawain himself is repeatedly called into question throughout the poem,
suggesting that the characters are uncertain of their ability to identify one another. I
suggest that the poem raises significant questions about the use o f the oral oath in the
late fourteenth century, as the poem denies that the oath is a m ore determ inate method
o f binding parties to an agreement than the written contract.
In his opening address the narrator says o f his tale-telling:
I schal telle hit astit, as I in toun herde,
W ith tonge.
As hit is stad and stoken
In story stif and stronge,
W ith lei letteres loken,
In londe so hatz been longe. (30-36)
In these lines the narrator makes two rather contradictory statements about his source
material. He begins by saying that he will tell the story as he heard it, but he modifies
this by saying in the next lines that he will tell it as it has been "stad and stoken . . .
with Iel letteres." These two statements create a question about what form o f language,
oral or written, sets down and fixes language, and locks it in true letters. As I translate
them, the lines suggest the paradox that the story has been set down and fixed, locked
with true "letters," for a long time, in an oral tale.
The diction of "stad and stoken" and "loken" imply the fixity o f w riting, rather
than oral tale-telling, and suggest that the narrator will tell it as he read it, not as he
heard it. This is confirmed at lines 689-90 when the narrator states, "M ony wylsum
way he rode,/ The bok as I herde say."

In this later passage hearing is related to
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books, not to tongues. The narrator creates in the ambiguous diction o f lines 30-36 an
oral myth o f the certainty o f tongues which lock in ”Iel letteres,” only to deflate this
m yth later in lines 689-90 when we learn that it is a book which has locked the tale in
true letters. Turville-Petre notes o f these lines:
Gawain is set in an entirely oral context. The narrator is portrayed as
an entertainer who has heard the story and, even though (as he goes on
to say, 11 33-6) the story exists in w ritten form also, he is merely
transmitting it as he heard i t . . . . The author o f the poem—the m an who
moulded the basic plot-elements into this brilliantly organized structure,
and who wrote it down so that scribes could make copies o f it—is
obviously not giving a portrait o f himself. (37)
However, I disagree that lines 33-6 state that the story exists in w ritten form; they seem
to state the opposite, or at least leave open the question o f whether the story has been
locked in true letters in an oral or a written form. J. G ellrich also notes the ambiguity
o f lines 30-36. He interprets the lines as follows:
"Now" (as-tit) he will begin the public recitation o f his script ju st as it
has been told "with tonge," and thus he will avoid the hesitation or
interruption always possible in silent reading. Yet his delivery will not
be impromptu . . . . "Locked" in alliteration, the narrator’s words will
also be the oral pronunciation o f letters linked in cursive script; the
spoken will have the quality o f words "set down and fastened" in the text
"firm and strong." That book is none other than the poem in front of
us, the written object presenting itself as the voice o f the narrator. So
powerful is the narrator’s fiction o f his speaking that it once led critics
to opine that his is a poem "for the ear rather than for the eye." (201-2)
The question of what locks and fastens firmly and strongly, the oral or the written,
seems to pervade the narrator’s opening address to his readers. This question becomes
"a crisis o f interpretation" in Sir Gawain. to borrow R. A . S h o af s term ("Syngne" 154).
W hile Sir Gawain appears to embody a late medieval nostalgia for the oral,
oath-tied past, the poem actually illuminates the indeterminacy o f that past, and the
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uncertainty of the ties which bind it.

This sense o f ambiguity is compressed at the

conclusion of the poem into the symbol o f the lace, a tie which represents an ambiguous
set o f oaths, and which quickly becomes divested o f any meaningful relationship to
them.

The lace is virtually indecipherable by the conclusion o f the poem; it has

become an enigma only surpassed by M organ herself and her sub-entities the Lord and
Lady de Hautdesert. In effect, the lace has so many meanings it has no meaning; it is
a code with too many possible translations.

Like the key players in this dram a of

signification, the lace is a sign whose multiplicity allows it to ellude definition.
The lace which accompanies the third covenant can easily be untied, as is
demonstrated by Lady de Hautdesert’s quick removal of it from her body.

F o r this

reason I argue that the lace is symbolic o f the oral bonds which Gawain enters into.
The poet entices us to believe at the opening of the poem that "tonges" have locked the
story in "lei letteres."

Similary, the whole poem entices us to believe that the oral

oaths Gawain enters into are serious and binding covenants which must be upheld for
the sake of honour. For this to be the case, we must see the oaths as "true" bonds; but
the poem unlocks the oaths and reveals them as part o f a treacherous game. If critics
have failed in any aspect of their interpretation o f this poem I believe it is in underappreciating the essential treachery and legal insubstantiality of the oral oaths which
G awain enters into and attempts to m aintain.2
The poem’s characterization of oath-making is, I believe, set up in the fourth
line where the "tulk" who wrought the plots of treason at Troy is described.

The

narrator says that he, "Watz tried for his tricherie, [)e trewest on erthe" (4). In this line
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there is a play on the word "tricherie" as meaning both "treachery" and also "trickery"
(Stratman 620). This word is disjunctively modified by "trewest," so that the "tulk’s"
is the most true, faithful, vertuous, or trustworthy (Andrew and W aldron 353) of
treacheries/trickeries. This sense o f trustworthy treachery can be related to Bertilak’s
apparent virtuousness (his generosity as a host and his reprieve o f Gawain) which is
actually subordinate to his treachery and trickery towards Gawain in setting up
situations o f entrappm ent by oath under M organ’s direction. Bertilak and the Lady may
also be tried, by the poet, for "tricherie," for the "treasonous" plot o f the poem
revolves around the ensnaring quality of the oaths they dictate to Gawain. Thus, while
the reader can easily assume that it is Gawain who is on trial in the poem, also
implicated in trustworthy treachery are the oath-weilding Lord and Lady de Hautdesert.
Hautdesert is a placename which ambiguously signifies, among other possibilities, a
superior emptiness or desert, a haughty desertion, or possibly high treason. The key
resident of Hautdesert, and the key party in the entire plot, Morgan la Fee, herself is
an inexplicable, mythic embodiment of contradictions between "trustworthiness" and
"treachery."3
The oral agreements and the lace require an interpretive subtlety which neither
Gawain, A rthur’s court, nor the reader is completely able to master. Sir Gawain does
not privilege oral discourse, nor idealize the legal certainty of an oath-tied past.
Rather, the poem expresses an anxiety about the relative uncertainty o f traditional ties
and bonds. The ultimate message o f Sir Gawain. one which the poet’s contemporaries
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may have been reluctant to hear, is that there is no ideal, mythic, legal past to which
society can strive to return.
According to Peter Goodrich the common law itself embodies a nostalgia for the
oral past. Goodrich eloquently writes of the common law ’s pervasive nostalgia for the
"loss o f its authentic sources, the pristine immemorial law w hich preceded the
inventions o f statute, the native common law in the Celtic and later Anglo-Saxon
tongues" (7). This nostalgia, he claims, is for the loss o f orality. Goodrich posits that
the common law, "was a tradition that existed to protect those things that the English
value and had always valued. Its constitution was domestic, its law unwritten, its creed
a matter of good manners and o f doing things as they had always been done" (6).
Encroaching radically upon this conception o f the common law was the actual situation
in the fourteenth century. The law was, in fact, bound up in an overly-com plex system
o f documentation known as the writs. The w rit system o f pleading made direct access
to the courts difficult or impossible for the untrained person. As N orm an Doe explains:
in the formative period o f the common law (although there were
procedures without writ) substantive rules existed only latently within
claims that a litigant could put (in his count) before a court, w ithin the
writs (those instruments initiating suits in the royal courts) which
facilitated these claims, and within the remedies which the writs
embodied. The settlement o f individual disputes was based not upon the
application of rules but upon making an acceptable claim by means o f
the correct wr i t . . . . As the earliest tracts on the com m on law indicate,
it was the writ system itself which operated as the focal point o f legal
practice and study. Legal literature expressed and accom m odated a law
o f writs rather than a law o f property or a law o f contract. The early
medieval legal practicioner found the law not in an explicity stated body
of rules, based on legislation and judicial decision, but in the Register
o f W rits. (1-2)
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As Doe suggests, contracts were formed according to what the writ system allowed
them to be made upon, and the language o f the writ then determined what could be
agreed upon. The writ virtually dictated the contract, not the parties entering into it.
Law was no longer founded upon custom ary rules and common sense, but upon the
procedural compexities embodied in the Register o f W rits.4 This system was not how
the English ideally wanted to see their common law as deriving or functioning. There
was reason in the fourteenth century for a nostalgic view o f an oral legal past, one
whose sense of "covenant" derived from words spoken in the common tongue by one
party to another, rather than from the inscribed Latin o f the Register o f W rits.

As

Goodrich claims, "the geneology of common law may well reflect a sense o f m ourning
for . . . the loss o f the unwritten" (28).
The form o f the oral agreements entered into in Sir Gawain is based on
formulaic expressions necessary in an oral legal system.

But, even though the

agreements between Gawain and the Green Knight/Bertilak are traditional and formulaic
in character, they contain elements o f the unexpected and the ambiguous w hich are
characteristic of oral communication. As Havelock describes the problem: "in prim ary
orality, relationships between human beings are governed exclusively by acoustics
(supplemented by visual perception o f bodily behavior) . . . . A com munication system
of this sort is an echo system, light as air and as fleeting" (65). The contrast between
the supposed fixity of the ritualized utterance o f the forumulaic oath and the acoustic
situation in which words are as "light as air and as fleeting" underlies the treatm ent o f
oath-making in Sir Gawain.
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One problematic aspect of the oaths in the poem is the difficulty of identifying
the Green Knight through visual perception. As Robert Blanch notes, the Green Knight
is "a totally ambiguous character" ("Imagery" 53). Furtherm ore, it appears that the
Green Knight may be as ambiguous to Gawain as to the reader. John Plummer argues
that "the essential point o f the Green Knight’s ambiguous appearance is the ambiguity
itself" (199) which presents Camelot "with a challenge in beheading and in the correct
use o f signs, the latter being the more difficult" (198). N either the complex signs of
the Green Knight nor his "unhuman" character can be adequately comprehended by
Gawain at the moment he enters into his agreement with him. One necessary element
for a valid contract is that the parties must know the correct identity o f the party they
are contracting with. According to St. Germain, a valid contract "must be clear and
certain" (Dial.II, c.24).

It is, therefore, significant that the G reen Knight/Bertilak

refuses to divulge his identity to Gawain before the oaths are taken, and that even by
their final parting at the Green Chapel Bertilak’s explanation o f his identity is
ambiguous and incomplete. W ith the identity o f the G reen Knight far from clear and
certain, the agreements Gawain enters into with him become so as well.
Later on Gawain discovers that Morgan la Fee has created the oaths and
apparently devised and controlled the entire plot. Thus, G awain has unwittingly entered
into bargains w ith M organ, not the Green Knight or Bertilak and the Lady. As the plot
revolves around a set o f interlocking "deals," the language o f the business world can
best describe the situation. M organ apparently owns a controlling interest in Bertilak
(who may not be an autonomous entity, but a sort o f "shadow company"); therefore,
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Gawain is unwittingly agreeing to enter into bargains with a hidden party who is even
more ambiguous than the party he thinks he is contracting with.
Added to the question of "mistaken identity" is the problem o f whether,
considering the dramatic nature o f the Green K night’s challenge in A rthur’s court,
Gawain’s participation in their first agreement is completely voluntary. Simpson notes
that, "duress had been accepted in medieval law as invalidating acts in the law, and
there was in principle no reason why cases o f assumpsit [i.e. contract] involving duress
or menace should not have arisen" (Contract 537). The fact that the other mem bers of
A rthur’s court refrain from taking up the Knight’s challenge reveals the unwillingness
o f the court to enter into this exchange.

Another hurdle in taking the agreement

between Gawain and the Green Knight seriously is that it involves an illegal act, namely
murder. Simpson notes that, "in the medieval law o f formal contracts it was recognized
that illegality in the contract was a ground for holding the contract void" (Contract
507). Illegal condiditions in an agreement rendered "not only the condition, but also
the bond itself void" (Simpson, Contract 507). While Blanch and W asserm an’s assert
that, "the medieval contractual tradition shapes the narrative and delineates the specific
rules or promises Gawain violates in the course o f his adventure" ("M edieval
Contracts" 599), I argue that the agreement the Knight asks the court to enter into is
a wager (i.e. a betting transaction) not a formal contract or convenant. For this reason
the agreement escapes the necessary requirements for contract formation. Added to the
necessity of clarity and certainty are the stipulations that "the thing prom ised or
undertaken must be lawful," "must be possible to be done," "must be co-hering, and
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agreeing in itself, and with the consideration," and, "must be serious and w eighty" (St.
Germain, D ial.II, ch .2 4 ).s
The challenge the Green Knight offers borders on what Simpson calls a "joke
contract."

As an example he cites a medieval case in which the facts included "a

promise in consideration of 12d. to pay £5 to the defendant if the plaintiff does not have
him whipped at the cross at Gloucester, and this was held not actionable" (Contract
534). About this judgem ent Simpson explains:
The case seems close to a w ager, but wagers, perhaps the m ost obvious
type of contract which the courts might have refused to recognize on the
ground o f frivolity, were regarded as actionable at common law. Indeed
it is in connection with wagers that the common law first recognized the
doctrine that a promise was good consideration for a prom ise, so that
wagering contracts so far from being anomalous have in fact been the
source of an important contractual doctrine . . . . It never seems to have
been argued during our period that wagering contracts w ere bad at
common law either on the ground of mere frivolity o r on the ground that
their enforcement was contrary to public policy. (Contract 534)
The G reen Knight’s challenge escapes the problem of a lack o f consideration (necessary
for a binding agreement), as it offers a prom ise in return for a promise, and thus
follows the form o f a wager (i.e. what we would call a bet). The form o f the wager
is that the Green Knight promises to receive a blow from Gawain if G aw ain will
promise to receive one from him. While it appears that medieval courts were in favour
of upholding wagers, this agreement technically stands somewhere on the border
between a formal covenant and a joke contract.
There is apparently dissension in A rthur’s court over whether the agreem ent
between Gawain and the Green Knight is a serious and binding covenant.

The

somewhat cryptic question that "al same segges" ask at Gawain’s departure for the
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Chapel:
on

"Who knew euer any kyng such counsel to take/ As knOtez in cauelaciounz

Crystmasse

gomnez?"

(682-83)

reveals

that

arguments

and

objections

("cauelaciounz") have been made over the Christmas games. The im plication is that
there has been something o f a "court case" made over the games, likely a n attem pt to
determine whether the wager Gawain entered into with the G reen Knight constituted a
serious and binding covenant.
While Blanch and W asserman’s interpret the exchange game as "a formal
contract with well-defined perimeters o f responsibility" ("Medieval Contracts" 603-4),
it seems, on the contrary, that Gawain has considerable difficulty determ ining w hat his
actual "perimeters of responsibility" are. Blanch and W asserman themselves recognize
that the "perimeters" of Gawain’s second wager are not very well-defined.

They

explain Gawain’s complex set of reciprocal responsibilities as follows:
In yielding himself contentedly to the lady’s will, G aw ain creates a
network o f conflicting obligations; while both he and Lady Bercilak are
bound as guest and as wife, respectively, to Bercilak, G aw ain has
already pledged him self through a formal, publicly sworn cerem ony to
the will o f the host . . . . Thus having placed himself at B ercilak’s
disposal, Gawain may not satisfy the contradictory impulses o f the lady.
Furthermore, the convenant framed between Gawain and the K night at
Camelot precludes any promise to remain at Hautdesert until G awain is
assured that his stay at Bercilak’s castle will not violate his pledged
appearance at the Green Chapel. ("To ’Ouertake Your W y lie’" 123)
It seems, then, that Gawain is not very certain about the perimeters o f the agreements
he has entered into, for his reciprocal responsibilities are virtually undefinable. In his
castle the Green Knight/Bertilak for a second time tricks Gawain into entering into a
loosely-defined verbal wager with reciprocal obligations that are nearly im possible for
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Gawain to comprehend or uphold. The essential part o f the contracts which Gawain
fails to understand are the obligations created for him by the oaths.
In a society which diligently upholds and maintains hierarchies, the oral oath
would, in effect, probably mean what the most powerful person says it means.

In

G awain’s case, the agreements he enters into with the Green Knight/Bertilak mean what
Bertilak says they mean because Bertilak outranks Gawain on a number o f levels:
socially, metaphysically and psychologically. Bertilak has a psychological advantage
in the first situation in A rthur’s court as menacing and unnatural intruder, later in his
own castle as welcoming and generous host, and finally at the Green Chapel as wielder
o f life or death judgm ent over Gawain. In both wagers Bertilak dictates the term s o f
the agreement to Gawain, thereby controlling the "perimeters" o f the oaths. Because
o f the many advantages of rank Bertilak holds over Gawain’s head, he dictates the rules
o f the wagers, and later interprets the meaning of them for Gawain.

The G reen

Knight/Bertilak is "bigger" than Gawain in more than just a literal sense; thus he and
not Gawain apparently interprets the meaning o f the wagers. In this regard, the world
o f the poem is feudal. But, this world and the certainty o f its ties are undermined by
the poet’s treatm ent of oath-making.
Shoaf has argued that "it is clearly more than ju st a convenience to speak o f a
crisis o f interpretation in Sir Gawain: indeed, one can argue that the whole plot o f the
poem follows a succession o f such crises" ("Syngne" 154). As one instance o f crisis,
Shoaf refers to the first wager offered by the Green Knight. He explains that A rthur
and Gawain "can only interpret the Green Knight’s challenge as implying that he.
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Arthur or Gawain, is to strike the blow with the ax, whereas, in fact, the challenge is
sufficiently ambiguous to leave open the possibility o f A rthur or G awain critically
choosing the ’holyn bobbe’ as the weapon to use" ("The ’Syngne o f S urfet’" 158-9).
I suggest that the case for choosing the "bobbe" is even stronger than Shoaf describes
it. The Green Knight makes a point o f signifying to the court that he com es in peace,
and that the holly bob is the signifier of this intent. As he says to them: "Oe may be
seker bi J>is braunch J3at I bere here/ {Dat I passe as in pes and no plyOt seche” (265-6).
The Green Knight clearly signifies by his words (and his other signs) that w hat he seeks
in not "batyle bare," as Arthur interprets his intent, but a "Crystemas gomen" in which
one man will "strike a stroke for anojser" (282-7). The Green Knight tells Gawain he
will "bede jae {)is buffet" (381), and "fange at {)y fust {Dat I haf frayst here" (391). Two
key words in these phrases, "buffet" and "fust" have double meanings w hich make the
Knight’s offer ambiguous. W hile "buffet" most commonly means, "To beat, strike .
. . with the hand; to thump, cuff, knock about" (O .E .D .. II, 2nd ed., 625), the M .E .D .
offers as an alternative, "a blow struck with a weapon" (V o l.l, 1212).

In order to

make G awain’s choice o f a blow with a weapon the more reasonable, editors o f the
poem note that "fust" can mean either "hand" or "fist" (Andrew and W aldron 320),
thus offering the translation that the Knight wagers to receive at Gawain’s "hand" what
he has asked for at the court.

However, head-chopping would not be the obvious

interpretation of a blow for a blow wager o f this sort, as both "buffet" and "fust" have
far less violent denotations.

From this perspective, A rthur’s seizure o f the axe is a

somewhat pathological interpretation o f the bargain, as is his belief that the Green
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Knight seeks "batayle bare" after he has announced that he comes in peace.

Shoaf

suggests that it is the "influence" of the G reen Knight which makes A rthur and Gawain
feel "compelled" to interpret the game in a way w hich does not take either the issues
o f criminality or reciprocal obligation into consideration. However, it may be, as well,
that Gawain and Arthur are influenced by excessive self-interest to make this
interpretation of the Knight’s words.
A rthur and Gawain’s seizure o f the axe is highly self-defeating, but it also
reveals their willingness to enter into a one-sided bargain. Gawain believes that he will
not have to receive in return what he has given, because the decapitation o f the Knight
should ensure that Gawain will escape from any reciprocal obligation. By interpreting
the bargain in a self-interested way, Gawain seeks to escape from reciprocity.

The

Green Knight says that he comes in peace to strike a bargain, but allows the court to
interpret the terms o f the bargain as they wish. They choose to interpret it in a way
which is as disadvantageous to the other party, and as advantageous to themselves, as
is possible in the situation. Arthur and Gawain understand the bargain to mean that
they will not have to deliver the "consideration" offered to the Green Knight. M organ
and Bertilak win the Christmas game because A rthur and Gawain agree to make a
bargain that is unconscionable.

M organ apparently foresaw A rthur and Gawain’s

interpretive stance, predicated upon their eagerness to enter into an unfair bargain. In
this way, oath-making is the real and hidden "weppen" Morgan wields over Gawain,
and A rthur’s court.
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Morgan and Bertilak use the interlocking oral oaths to manipulate and ensnare
Gawain.

In this light, the chivalric oath is, to use Blanch’s term s, an "insignia of

entanglement" in the poem rather than an "enclosing refuge and comfort" ("Imagery"
54-55). While I agree w ith Goodlad that "Sir Gawain is essentially about a m an (gome)
and games (gomnez)" (46), the problem is that these "games" are formulated by
chivalric oaths which Gawain and feudal society take very seriously. The "gomnez"
play with the crucial links of the feudal social system and cross the line between
frivolity and legality. The jokes involve formulaic oaths of a socially sacred nature.
The paradox o f "oath" as "game" can be contrasted to C lanchy’s comments on
the medieval attitude towards documents.

Clanchy notes that:

"Both to ignorant

illiterates and to sophisticated Platonists written record was a dubious gift, because it
seemed to kill living eloquence and trust and substitute for them a mummified
semblance in the form o f a piece o f parchment" (From Memory 296-97). The tricky
nature of the oaths in Sir Gawain calls into question whether medievalists themselves
are sometimes overly influenced by nostalgia for an oral past, as the Gawain-poet
appears to be suspicious o f the "living eloquence and trust" supposedly found in speech,
something Havelock describes as "light as air and as fleeting" (65). I would agree that
Sir Gawain and the G reen Knight is a work that points to "the potential division within
both speech and writing between what is uttered and what is meant" (Gellrich 33).
Shoaf explains that "both Dante and the Gawain-poet depend on a very ancient
tradition in which the knot is frequently a figure connected in some way or another with
textuality" ("Syngne" 160); however, the knots which Gawain gets him self tied into are
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related to orality, not textuality.

The "knots" w hich bind Gawain are the oaths he

enters into. M organ and Bertilak tie Gawain into knots orally by wielding oaths over
him. The spoken word in Sir Gawain is the tricky part o f the knotting games which
entrap Gawain.

In both wagers Gawain is forced to make acts o f interpretation in a

context which does not allow him sufficient freedom o f choice or foreknowledge o f
consequences.
As Shoaf has pointed out, Gawain had a choice of two weapons in the hall in
Camelot. H ow ever, the most powerful weapon M organ and the Green Knight weilded
in the hall was the oath. Thus, there are three weapons offered in A rthur’s hall, and
Gawain accepts two o f them, the axe and the oath. Similarly, there are a number o f
ambiguous "gifts" offered by Lady de Hautdesert in the exchange game, and Gawain
accepts some o f them (the kisses and the lace) while presumably rejecting others. The
gift of the lace is accompanied by an oath of secrecy which entraps Gawain in an
impossible tangle of reciprocal obligations. Thus, the choice o f the lace over the ring
is parallel to the choice of the axe over the "bobbe," and the highly problematic oath
which accompanies the acceptance o f the lace duplicates the original entrapment of
Gawain by oath in Arthur’s court.

Like the G reen Knight’s oath, which is more

dangerous than his other weapons, Lady de H audesert’s oath of secrecy is more
dangerous than her other implicit offers. The real dangers in the poem are not offered
by physical weapons such as the axe or the female body, but are contained in the knotty
word-games o f the oral oaths.

These oaths entrap the acceptor of them into a self-
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defeating web o f obligations to the oath-weilders, the key one o f whom remains a
hidden party.
In all three instances the terms o f the oaths, as dictated by Bertilak and the
Lady, create bargains whose terms appear to be one-sidedly in G aw ain’s favour;
however, entering into these one-sided bargains is actually self-defeating for Gawain.
In none o f the situations does Gawain appear to pay attention to the apparent lack of
reciprocity (i.e. "consideration") in the agreement.

At the making o f the first oath

Gawain ignores the signification by statement, gesture, and symbolism o f the Green
K night’s peaceable intent, in order to make a deal that he believes will not require him
to carry through with the consideration. The actual terms o f the oath make the Green
Knight promise to do something which is humanly impossible, a clear warning sign that
Gawain ignores. The second bargain is also one-sided. Bertilak states:

"Quatsoeuer

I wynne in £e wod hi worjjez to yourez/ And quat chek so 3 e acheue chauge me
jDerfome" (1105-6). While "chek" can be glossed as "bad luck" (Andrew and Waldron
248), it has more ominous meanings such as "doom," "onslaught," and "attack."
Bertilak thus offers his winnings in exchange for Gawain’s bad luck o r doom; and again
Gawain seeks to take advantage o f som eone’s else apparent willingness to enter into an
unequal bargain. While Gawain should be forewarned by Bertilak’s use o f the word
"chek," he again makes a bargain which is seemingly one-sided. Gawain, like those
who presented "cauelaciounz" at A rthur’s court, knows that these are shady bargains
from the outset.

While Bertilak and M organ know that ample consideration will be

extracted in return from Gawain, in Gawain’s own original understanding o f them,
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these were inequitable agreements which he should have declined for that reason.
Derek Pearsall has refered to Chaucer’s Pardoner as "A Salesman" ("C haucer’s
Pardoner"), and so, too, is Bertilak. His offers tem pt Gawain to doom him self by his
own greed. To accept these bargains is shameful, because they tempt the prom isee to
profit at someone else’s expense or misfortune.
The secrecy oath is another offer which is too good to be refused, and again a
problem of reciprocal obligation is clear from the outset.

Symbolic objects often

accompanied the formation of covenants in the Middle Ages, so the lace can be seen
as an accompaniment to the covenant o f secrecy, the actual "gift" Lady Hautdesert
offers Gawain. The acceptance of the oath o f secrecy with its accompanying lace (a
kind o f "seal" for the agreement) is thus a third wager/game that Gawain blindly enters
into.6 By agreeing to accept the secrecy oath and the lace, a covenant is created
between Gawain and the Lady. But when he is forced to reveal the lace to Bertilak,
Gawain finds that Lady de Hautdesert has perpetrated the "trewest" "tricherie," by
enticing him into another self-defeating bargain. This realization precipitates G aw ain’s
"anti-feminist rant," as the triply-wounded Gawain realizes that the L ady’s seduction
o f him was a cold-hearted trick. Gawain’s rant against "other" women is a deflected
tirade against the true object o f his anger; what he really wants to say he refrains from
in front o f the L ady’s husband. In Bertilak’s interpretation o f the L ady’s actions and
words to Gawain, she has perpetrated the most virtuous o f treacheries by only
pretending to want to seduce Gawain, and even worse, apparently doing so at her
husband’s request.7
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As Gawain discovers by this point in the poem, nothing is really locked in true
letters orally. The poet undermines the fixity o f the oral world he creates w ithin the
poem. Sir Gawain suggests that a world based on chivalric oaths is a w orld o f shapeshifting, ambiguity, and verbal entrapment; it is also the world o f the travelling
salesm an’s quick and easy, shady bargain. Like the lace which "forms a knot easy to
untie" (Shoaf, "Syngne" 160), the oral agreement does not lock, set down, o r fix with
any certainty; it is the apparent certainty o f the oaths which forms the essential element
in their "tricherie." In contrast, the writing o f the poem locks in "lei Ietteres" the oral
treachery o f the oaths Lord and Lady de Hautdesert dictate to Gawain. In this way the
poem functions to undermine the fiction o f oral certainty. The oaths created by M organ
pull Gawain into an ambiguous and self-defeating network o f relationships and
reciprocal obligations with "middlemen" whose identity he does not com prehend, and
whose existence turns out to be only a false front to hide the party with w hom he is
really contracting.
The social world of the chivalric oath, tied by the bond o f the spoken word, is
untied by the written word o f Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. As Palm er notes of
the period after the Black Death, "In England written contractual arrangem ents allowed
confidence in a broad array o f economic and social activities" (62). The confidence
given by the written contract now supercedes the uncertainty and am biguity o f the
spoken agreement. If oral communication is as "light as air and as fleeting," who can
say what was spoken in an oral contract, and if this is determined, who can then
interpret the meaning of what was spoken and not spoken, but gestured? T he apparent
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confidence Gawain has in spoken oaths is unravelled over the course o f the poem. In
the end, there is very little certainty about what any o f the spoken discourse between
characters has meant.

W hat has transpired between people is supposedly clearly

interpreted by Bertilak, yet his interpretation only reveals an interlocking network o f
"tricherie."

The apparent simplicity and certainty o f the oaths is an integral part of

their effectiveness as weapons; they seem straightforw ard at the moment they are made.
But, like the Lord and Lady de Hautdesert themselves, the oaths’ simplicity is a false
front.

W hen the front is stripped away, the treachery o f the tongue, embodied in

spoken w ords, is revealed.
The final denouement o f the poem is the revelation by Bertilak that M organ la
Fee has really controlled the action o f the plot.

From this revelation it appears that

Lord and Lady de Hautdesert have not been in control o f their gestures or language;
thus, by the conclusion o f the poem, their words and actions over the course o f the plot
are impossible to interpret. Jeanne M athewson has asked about Lady de Hautdesert,
"Who knows what the lady really wants?" (215)

But the question should really be

reflected back to Morgan, for who knows what she really wants? By the conclusion
of the poem the gestures, gifts, and words involved in the making o f the three oaths are
more enigmatic than could possibly have been foreseen. Thus, the reader is entrapped
in the same situation as Gawain, o f having been unable to predict the meaning of
apparently straitforward agreements.

Only M organ apparently has the power to

interpret the oaths because she "outranks" everyone else in the poem. As she declines
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to speak, the reader and Gawain are left only with Bertilak’s explanation of the oaths,
and the sense that Bertilak may not understand their true significance.
As Dennis Moore points out:
M organ’s unforeseen emergence as prime mover of the story suffuses the
romance with an ambiguity and indefiniteness because o f the wide gap
between her sudden crucial importance and our scant knowledge o f her
nature, her motives, and her relationship to other characters. As the
reader reconsiders the events o f the poem, fitting the memory o f their
original appearance into a new framework o f understanding, new doubts
arise. W hat exactly has been M organ’s role? (226)
W hile Geraldine Heng asserts that "Morgan’s signature in the drama is deciphered by
the Green Knight, who unravels it backward to the beginning o f the poem’s action"
(501), this seems a gross overstatement of the actual effect of Bertilak’s briefly-stated
revelation o f M organ’s role. Bertilak "deciphers" almost nothing in his revelation to
Gawain. Instead, he creates ciphers where none had seemed to exist before. Bertilak
does not him self "unravel" M organ’s "signature in the drama;" rather, he presents
surprising revelations which Gawain (and the reader) must attempt to interpret.
M organ, an enigmatic symbol herself, becomes an enigma in the poem , and turns the
plot into something of an enigma.
Because Bertilak reveals himself to be a false front for a covert operation by
M organ, his own credibility is seriously undermined. Nothing he has said or done now
appears to be an honest expression of his will and desire. As Marie Borroff asks: "It
is all very well to accept the Green Knight’s judgements at the end o f the poem, but for
those of us who do so, a further, and formidable, question must be faced. Why should
we accept his views? . . . what kind o f authority does he represent?" (107) Bertilak’s
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interpretation o f Morgan’s motivation for instigating the beheading gam e is not very
convincing, and it does not help to expiain subsequent plot developments. Heng refers
to B ertilak’s explanation as "reasons so apparently tenuous that they require continual
scholarly rehearsal" (501). But, rather than arguing, like Heng, against the tenuousness
o f M organ’s motives as stated by Bertilak, I suggest that the Gawain-poet presents the
possibility that Bertilak does not understand what M organ or the Lady de Hautdesert
really want.

From this perspective, the poem then revolves around a similar plot as

The W ife of Bath’s Tale, in which a Knight is set the task o f discovering what it is that
w om en desire. This intertextual reference makes the connection between the "old hag"
(M organ) and the "young damsel" (the Lady de Hautdesert) in the castle m ore
suspicious, and adds ammunition to C arson’s thesis that they are both M organ;8 for, in
The W ife o f Bath’s Tale the hag is a shapeshifter who is both young and beautiful, old
and "loothly." The answer to the K night’s quest is "sovereignty," something which
M organ apparently weilds in an enigmatic fashion.
If Sir Gawain is an exercise in reading women’s motives, this reading has to be
done literally backwards through the poem from the ending to the beginning. Thus, the
w ork provides a true exercise in "opposite readings."

Reading back through the

"female p lo t," whose motivations cannot be adequately explained by Bertilak, the reader
is given the task of deciphering the encoded words and gestures in the oath-making
situations; yet, the reader cannot be certain o f the key to the code. The code to the
covert female plot, in contrast to the male plot the poem has apparently been centered
around, is not, and cannot be, adequately expressed by Bertilak.

The female code
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remains a feminine enigma; it cannot be satisfactorily deciphered from the information
given.
Despite Sheila F isher’s thesis that M organ is "on the periphery . . .

in this

poem" (131), "displaced from the center" and "marginalized" (144), and the poem itself
"cleansed of female signification" (144), I would argue that M organ is dead centre in
this work, an enigma so powerful that critics once argued that she effectively "ruined"
it.9 Morgan certainly ruins any chance of a "straight-forward" reading o f the poem,
because she symbolizes the treachery o f signification. Used as her tool, spoken oaths,
with their accompanying gestures and symbolic objects, are weapons o f trustworthy
treachery within the oral fiction o f S ir Gawain and the Green Knight. The author of
the work apparently has no nostalgic desire for the "certainty,” "purity,” and
"innocence" o f an unwritten legal past (cf. Goodrich).
The Gawain-poet’s response to oral contracts may be related to a revolutionary
legal situation created by the attempts to enforce the Statues o f Labourers (A .D . 1351).
F or the first time in English history peasants took their lords to court and asked the
justices to uphold oral contracts regarding wages and other issues related to their terms
o f employment. Stephen Justice has interpreted the use o f parole (i.e. oral) contracts
by the courts in the enforcement o f the Statutes as an attempt to m aintain the feudal
status quo. He summarizes his source (Putnam) as follows: "parole contracts between
lords and their laborers were taken as binding . . . .

This decision made oral

agreements as binding as written contracts, but o f course left laborers without appeal
to the documentary evidence that the written contract would offer" (37).
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summary o f the courts’ attitude toward contracts is that, "the content o f a parole
contract was in effect what the lord said it was" (37). However, Justice gives a rather
perverse reading o f his stated source material, Bertha Putnam ’s well-documented study
The Enforcem ent o f the Statutes o f Labourers. W hat Putnam ’s work reveals is quite
the opposite o f Justice’s thesis. While referring to one particular case, Putnam does
state that it was found relevant in making the judgem ent that "the statute had been made
for the advantage o f the lords" (200); but, overall her research reveals no particular
bias by the courts in favour o f "masters" over "servants." In Putnam’s own words:
The result of these figures is to prove that the courts were perfectly
ready to allow to servants or to masters offending against the labour
legislation the full advantage o f any legal technicalities; but that the
juries almost never gave verdicts in favor o f servants or even o f
employers who were charged with infringement o f the law. It has
already been shown what kind o f questions o f fact arose in actions for
breach of contract; but it has also been admitted that no information has
com e to my notice as to the necessity o f any formality, such as the
presence of witnesses, for the validity o f the parol agreement between
m aster and servant. If a servant said in court that no such agreement
existed, or if a second master claimed a previous contract with the
servant, it must have been difficult to establish either the truth or the
falsity o f the statement. In the existing conditions o f the labour market
the sympathy o f witnesses called in to testify and also of the jurors was
likely to be on the side o f the plaintiff, while the presumption o f guilt
was certainly on the side o f the defendant. (213)
In the enforcem ent of the Statutes the justices made the unusual decision to uphold
parole agreem ents, something the common law had traditionally held a very restrictive
attitude tow ards. However, the reliance on oral contracts was not used to uphold feudal
power structures, as Justice claims, but helped to defy them .10 This can be related to
an overall trend in the courts’ attitude toward contracts after the Black Death. Contract
enforcem ent worked both ways socially, for as Robert Palm er notes, "Just as the
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governm ent worried that such high mortality would diminish laborers’ desire to work,
so they worried that the wealthy would shirk their debts . . . .

Preservation of

traditional society meant that even the upper orders had to live up to their obligations"
(59).
Putnam summarizes the evidence o f the enforcement of the Statutes o f Labourers
as follows:
The fact that villeins were being tried and convicted by the justices of
labourers exactly like free men, and that they were themselves bringing
audacious suits in quarter sessions against their own masters; the fact
that these masters evidently preferred to leave to the crown-appointed
officials the brunt o f the work o f enforcing these measures against their
tenants whether free o r bond, while they themselves merely received the
fiscal profits resulting from convictions; these facts, as well as many
others, all point in the same direction. The cataclysm o f the Black
Death had hastened the break-down o f the old system and had
accelerated changes in economic and social relations throughout the
community; the statutes o f labourers must be regarded not as having
created a new system or a new set of economic relations, but as
affording proof that radical changes had occurred, ushering in a new era.
(223)
W hile, as Putnam notes, the nature o f the actual parole agreements were virtually
impossible to determine, the validation o f them by the courts reveal a breakdown in the
social hierarchy. Thus, the ambivalence o f the Gawain-poet’s attitude tow ard parole
agreements may be related to the paradox that while oral contracts created the bonds
which tied together the feudal world in which his poem is set, the use o f oral contracts
in the enforcement of the Statutes o f Labourers revealed the demise o f feudalism in the
w orld in which he lived.
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ENDNOTES

‘The edition of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight referred to is A ndrew and
W aldron’s. Further references w ill appear as line citations within the body o f the text.
2Discussions o f legal, especially contractual, elements in Sir Gawain and the
Green Knight include: Kathleen M . Ashley, "Bonding and Signification in Sir Gawain
and the Green Knight. " and "’T raw th ’ and Temporality: The Violation o f Contracts and
Conventions in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight": Robert J. Blanch, "Religion and
Law in Sir Gawain and the Green K night. " "The Legal Fram ework o f ’a Twelmonyth
and a Day" in Sir Gawain and the G reen Knight," and "Imagery o f Binding in Fits One
and Two o f Sir Gawain and the Green Knight": Robert J. Blanch and Julian N.
W asserman, "To ’ouertake Your W ylie’: Volition and Obligation in Sir G awain and the
Green K night." and "Medieval Contracts and Covenants: The Legal Coloring o f Sir
Gawain and the Green Knight. "
3F o r a discussion of M organ as a complex and ambiguous folklore m otif see:
Edith W hitehurst Williams, "M organ La Fee as Trickster in Sir Gawain and the Green
K night."
4As Robert Palmer notes, "Almost all litigation in the com m on law courts (the
court o f common pleas, the court o f king’s bench, and the exchequer o f pleas) began
with a writ" (62-30. Much of B racton’s (thirteenth century) treatise On the Laws and
Customs o f England is given over to describing the proper writs to use in each
circumstance.
sThe legal meaning of "consideration" is remuneration, a necessary elem ent for
the formation of a contract.
‘’The seals which legally validated charters were attached to them by laces or
strips o f parchment. For a discussion of this practice see: M .T . Clanchy, From
M emory to W ritten Record, pp. 308-317.
7O r so Bertilak says. For, as Jeanne Mathewson asks, "Who knows what the
lady really wants? . . . the Green Knight tells Gawain that he has put his wife up to her
tricks, but are we to ignore what the narrator tells us at the time the lady is pursuing
Gawain: ’Bot the lady for luf let not to slepe’? (215).
8See: Mother Angela C arson, O .S .U ., "Morgain la Fee as the Principle of
Unity in ’Gawain and the Green K night’".
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9Authors who have argued that M organ is a weak spot or fault in the poem
include: J.R . Hulbert, "Syr Gawayn and the Grene K nyS t,"; G .L . K ittredge, A Study
o f Sir Gawain and the Green Knight; Albert B. Friedman, "M organ le Fay in Sir
Gawain and the Green Knight": and Larry D. Benson, A rt and Tradition in Sir Gawain
and the Green Knight. Dennis Moore in "Making Sense o f an Ending: M organ Le Fay
in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight" gives an excellent overview o f the reaction o f
earlier critics to Bertilak’s revelation o f M organ’s influence on the plot.
l0I believe that Britton Harwood also misinterprets the results o f the enforcem ent
of the Statutes when he writes: "Feudalism for our present purpose may be defined as
the use o f centralized state power to extract the surplus product from the direct
producers. (An example of such a use would be the enforcem ent o f the Statutes of
Labourers by royally appointed justice o f the peace, one o f whom was Chaucer)"
("C haucer and the Silence o f History" 340).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

Ian W ard notes in Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives that there
are two trends in the field he labels "law and literature studies." One trend examines
"law in literature" and the other views "law as literature." He explains:
Essentially, "law in literature" examines the possible relevance of
literary texts, particularly those which present themselves as telling a
legal story, as texts appropriate for study by legal scholars. In other
words, can K afka’s The Trial, or C am us’s The Fall, tell us anything
about law? "Law as literature," on the other hand, seeks to apply the
techniques o f literary criticism to legal texts. (3)
In his ow n work Ward proposes to erase this distinction; however, his delineation of
the distinction is limited by his assumption that "law and literature studies" is carried
out only by legal scholars. In fact, literary critics have for well over a century delved
into the realm o f legal research in order to interpret literary works. An early work of
this type is C .K . Davis’ The Law in Shakespeare, published in 1884, which provides
a reference guide to the use of legal terms in Shakespeare’s plays. From the nineteenth
century onwards the study o f "law in literature" has included works which provide an
explanation of legal terms and issues in order to illuminate the meaning o f literary
works.
My own view o f the distinctive trends in this field is to differentiate between
literary scholars, who tend to use the law to interpret literature, and legal scholars who
use literary works in order to explain legal points and issues. One o f the best examples
of w ork done by a literary scholar is R. Howard Bloch’s Medieval French Literature
and Law which illuminates our understanding o f French romances by exploring how
129
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they reflect legal issues and tensions within French feudalism. What makes this work
so effective is that it manages to be equally informative about French literature as it is
about feudal law. At their worst, works by literary scholars adopt a rather simplistic
attitude toward legal studies and manage not to be very informative about either law or
literature. J. A. H ornsby’s Chaucer and the Law stands out as an example o f this rather
hollow cross-referencing between law and literature.
On the other hand, legal scholars can be highly simplistic in their approach not
only to literary works, but towards the discipline o f literary studies. Richard Posner’s
Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation offers rather facile interpretations o f
literary works ranging from the Iliad to Bleak H ouse, and his approach to the study o f
"law and literature" is marked by oversimplified definitions o f "literature" and "literary
interpretation." For Posner, "the problems o f literary and legal interpretation have little
in common except the word ‘interpretation’" (17).

His central claim is that "it is as

important a task o f law and literature scholarship to point out the differences between
the fields as it is to identify similarities," (17) and he proceeds to do so.

A fter

digesting his w ork, the reader is left to ponder ju st how meaningful or necessary this
gesture is.
On the other hand, the best works by legal scholars provide an equally
illuminating discussion o f both legal issues and literary works. For instance, Theodor
M eron’s H enry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws provides an engaging examination o f
medieval laws o f w ar and also offers an explanation o f how and why Shakespeare
altered the facts o f history in Henry V .

A scholar of international law, M eron’s
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prim ary focus is the laws of war; therefore, Shakespeare’s drama serves as more o f an
exemplum than as a main focal point o f the work.

Nevertheless, M eron’s study is

equally useful for literary as for legal scholars.
In the preceding chapters my approach to the subject o f law and literature has
been to depart from the compartmentalization o f legal scholarship and literary criticism.
I have chosen to focus on the parallel responses of poets and the legal system to the rise
o f literacy and the increasing use o f texts.

For instance, while I wished to present a

departure in literary criticism by arguing that the Wife o f Bath’s rhetoric is as legal as
it is clerical, the overall goal in the first chapter is to demonstrate how "the pow er of
interpretation" over texts is equally relevant to historical analysis, literary criticism,
legal debate and courtroom strategies o f pleading. My aim has been to demonstrate that
"buried texts" are a parallel source o f concern for both poet, legal practitioner, common
citizen, and king in the fourteenth century.
W hile chapter two contains a lengthy exploration o f a specific legal issue
embedded in a few lines of text, my overall intention is to show how the feudal ideal
o f the oral oath was being undermined by a profession whose pow er and status now
largely rested in its assumption o f "the pow er of interpretation" over texts.

In each

chapter it is the concern of the poet with the distinction between lex scripta and lex non
scripta, however covertly expressed, which is the focus o f my prim ary interest.
Medieval anxieties about texts and writing informs my discussion o f the
Pardoner’s performance in chapter three.

The question is whether legal documents

contain a validity on their own, outside o f an oral context in which they are created.
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The Pardoner’s attempt to affirm the pow er o f the text outside of any oral context
aligns with legal anxieties about the use o f written contracts and agreements.

The

performance o f the Pardoner is disturbing and relevant because his fetishization o f texts
(an obsessive interest in and submission to their power) reflects the attitude toward the
text in medieval Christianity—the cult o f the book which arises from the use o f the Bible
as a sacred icon. In the Pardoner’s perform ance legal anxieties about "the letter o f the
law" are aligned with theological anxieties about "the letter of the spirit."

At the

culmination o f the Pardoner’s Tale the pilgrims and the reader are left with the uneasy
sense that the text is more potent than the spirit, and thus come to an understanding o f
why writing is a source of destabilization in the legal as well as the eccesiastical sphere.
In chapter four I argue that the C anon’s Yeoman’s Prologue and Tale serves as
a counterbalance to the anxieties about textual power left unresolved at the end o f the
Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale. The Yeoman presents a de-mystification o f texts which
exposes their emptiness and impotence.

The Yeoman claims that the impotence o f

alchemy, a science based on a long tradition o f codification, is the result o f textual
impotence. The "false and empty code" o f alchemy is aligned with the resistance to the
idea o f legal codification in England. By questioning whether written texts have or can
have any authentic source, the Yeoman aligns him self with the English stance that the
true law rests not in texts but in experience.
Over the course of the four chapters on The Canterbury Tales the idea o f "the
power o f interpretation" over texts becomes an increasingly complex problem. Chaucer
insistently questions whether texts themselves have power, meaning, and authentic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133

sources. Aside from the Pardoner’s "alienating" performance, the overall thrust o f the
Tales is that meaning does not com e from, nor is contained in, texts.

Only through

"experience," to use the Wife of B ath’s term, is meaning to be found; and, as the W ife
demonstrates, experience is gained by a negotiation of texts, custom s, and personal
experimentation. Chaucer aligns him self on the side o f the lex non scripta: for him the
true law is a living, breathing entity which cannot be enclosed in a w ritten page.

A

truly potent law for Chaucer is one that is alive in speech and action, not enscribed on
parchment. For Chaucer, the letter is always a form of "fale representation."
The departure taken in chapter five is away from the Chaucerian questioning o f
and suspicion about texts and into the Gawain-poet’s anti-nostalgic romance where
masculine oath-making turns into feminine web-spinning. The entrapm ent o f Gawain
in a web of indeterminate oral and social constructions reveals a counter-m ovem ent to
the nostalgia for a world devoid o f "textual deceptions." In Sir Gawain and the G reen
Knight assuming "the power of interpretation" over the spoken word becomes even
more problematic than assuming interpretive power over texts, as the fleeting quality
o f the speech act allows for indeterminacy about what has been transacted. The real
meaning of the oaths in this poem, like the motivations of M organ, rem ain indelibly
mysterious, for in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight nothing is "with lei letteres loken"
orally.
There are few scholarly studies which parallel the form o f approach I have
attempted in this dissertation.

One notable work is Peter G oodrich’s Oedipus Lex

which presents a psychoanalytical approach to the study of the comm on law in the post-
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Reformation period. His examination o f the forces of desire and repression at work in
the common law offers extraordinary insights into the cultural entity we call "the law ."
N ot bound by Posner’s dictum: "the problems o f literary and legal interpretation have
little in common except the word ‘interpretation’" (17), Goodrich applies the same
analytical approach to the law as a literary critic would to a text.

The result is, I

believe, a groundbreaking work o f cultural and historical analysis which examines the
common law as, in Foucault’s term, a "monument."
Like Goodrich I have attempted not to be bound by categorizations o f what
constitutes legal and literary analysis and have sought to reveal how limited that form
o f either/or categorization is. The forces at work creating the medieval common law
are the forces at work stimulating the production of poetic works.

To distiguish

between what is literary and what is legal in the works o f Chaucer and the Gawain-poet
is futile; their poetry is informed by the same forces which create and interpret laws.
W hat Chaucer and the Gawain-poet say about poetry and literary interpretation in their
work is what they also say about law and legal interpretation. It has been my intent in
the preceding pages to erase the dichotomy in "law and literature studies" and to
demonstrate how meaningless that distinction is.

I propose that "the power of

interpretation" is the same and is exercised in the same way in all realms o f culture.
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